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I.

INTRODUCTION

Individual identity is a key concept in legal classifications.
However, the concept of identity has an identity crisis of sorts. Some
theorists embrace identity—feminist theorists—and other groups eschew it—
queer theorists. Identity inhabits realms beyond the theoretical—its
spectrum continues all the way to the individual. Identity can be construed
as biological, personal, public, legal, political, historical, and fluid among
many other sometimes complementary, but often conflicting classifications.
Therefore, identities are more complex than mere singular categories.
Kimberle Crenshaw was the first to specifically discuss the ideas of
intersectionality and identity in a discussion of violence against women,
noting, “experiences of women of color are frequently the product of

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1
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intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and how these experiences tend
not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or
antiracism.”1 Adding to Crenshaw’s observations about intersectionality,
Patricia Hill Collins noted that:
Gender, sexuality, race, and class hierarchies all require a
favorable political climate. While U.S. nation-state policies
regarding marriage and family reflect dominant moral codes, they
also regulate property relations. Assumptions about marriage and,
by implication, desired family forms remain supported by
governmental policy, corporate policies, and the legal system. For
example, denying slaves legal marriages, forbidding interracial
marriages, using marital status to determine taxation policies and
social welfare state entitlements, and refusing legal marriage to
sexually stigmatized individuals all reflect nation-state interest in
2
regulating an allegedly natural institution.

The study of intersectionality has continued to pose questions not
only on how sex and race might interact, but also on how the following
intersect: Social class, ethnicity, religion, age, sexual orientation, and
multiple other ascribed or assigned statuses, characteristics, roles, and groups
into which society and individuals are assigned or assign themselves. A

* Charlene L. Smith, Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. In addition to her teaching obligations, she is Executive Director of the InterAmerican Center for Human Rights, a non-profit organization housed at the Shepard Broad
Law Center.
Eileen Smith-Cavros, Associate Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar
College of Arts and Sciences. She teaches sociology and anthropology classes while also
performing field research in social and environmental justice issues in the United States,
Mexico, and Ghana.
Ana C. Alvarez received her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in May 2013. Ana received a Bachelor’s of Science from the University
of Central Florida, with a major in Political Science and a minor in Legal Studies. Ana would
like to thank Professor Smith for allowing her the opportunity to take part in the writing of this
article. Additionally, Ana would like to thank her family for their never-ending motivation
and support, which made her involvement in this article possible.
The authors want to thank Eric Young, Assistant Dean, Law Library and
Technology Center, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, for initiating
the oral history project. The web link is: http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/kimballarchive/.
1.
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1990–
1991) (footnote omitted).
2.
Patricia Hill Collins, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political
Economy, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 49 (2000), available at http://
www.jstor.org/stable/1049471.
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female lawyer might have an experience different from a lesbian lawyer, or
different from a gay male lawyer, or different from an African-American
lesbian lawyer; a woman who is perceived as a lesbian lawyer might selfdescribe differently if asked her own identity.3 As a result, we chose to take
an oral history approach to this project with the belief that although all
interviewees shared the characteristics of being lesbians who were also
lawyers, each woman’s unique circumstances shaped who she was, how she
saw herself, and how she interacted with the law.4 Thus, each woman
defined herself in terms of identity.5 This project also considered how the
legal system, the workings within it, and the concept of justice itself might

3.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, Attorney at Law, The Law Office of
Lilas Ayandeh, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 3 (June 27, 2012) (on file with Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Jennifer
Travieso, Attorney at Law, Ins. Law Advocates, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (June 28, 2012)
(on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library).
4.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 3; Interview with
Robin L. Bodiford, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Robin L. Bodiford, P.A., in Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., 1–2 (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17,
2012)] (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library);
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Robin L. Bodiford, P.A.,
in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Aug. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug.
3, 2012)] (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library);
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, Attorney at Law, Seril L. Grossfeld Attorney at Law, P.A.,
in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1–2 (June 29, 2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Linda F. Harrison, Assoc. Dean, Critical
Skills Program & Assoc. Professor of Law, Nova Se. Univ., Shepard Broad Law Ctr., &
Phyllis D. Kotey, Dir. of Cmty. Externship Programs & Clinical Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla.
Int’l Univ. Coll. of Law, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Aug. 1, 2012) (on file with Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with Lea P. Krauss,
Attorney at Law, Lea P. Krauss Esquire, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (July 17, 2012) (on
file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Interview with
Michelle M. Parker, Attorney at Law, Parker Law Firm, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (June 30,
2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library);
Interview with Monica I. Salis, Attorney at Law, Monica I. Salis, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale,
Fla., 1 (July 9, 2012) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center
Library); Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1. In 2012, the authors
interviewed nine lesbian lawyers who practice in South Florida. These nine responded to an
announcement about the oral history project on the Gay & Lesbian Legal Network (“GLLN”),
which was sent to all members. Each of the lesbian lawyers granted an interview with the
authors, which was videotaped, and is currently available on the Shepard Broad Law Center’s
Library and Technology website at: http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/. Videos were transcribed
and those transcriptions are currently part of the Harris L. Kimball Memorial Digital Archive
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Florida Legal Oral History. The web link
is: http://nsulaw.nova.edu/library/kimballarchive/. Each one of the participants granted the
interviewers permission to use information from the interview. This article is a product of
those interviews.
5.
E.g., Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1.
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interact with the lesbian status shared by all interviewees and the
understanding that being a lesbian and being a lawyer might mean very
different things to each woman.6 We wanted to examine differences between
the women’s narratives as well as similarities that arose.7
It is important to note that the group of lesbian lawyers we
interviewed was accomplished through a snowball8 sample of women who
were practicing law, teaching law, or had practiced law in South Florida.9
We acknowledge clearly that this was not a random sample and that South
Florida—especially Broward County—is a unique place within the United
States given its diverse population and international qualities.10 In
addition—as noted in a National Public Radio (“NPR”) report on the 2010
Census—Florida recorded the second largest number of same-sex couples in
the United States, in spite of having a “constitutional amendment[] restricting
marriage to a man and a woman.”11 With regard to the project, it does not
completely include a full spectrum of minority lawyers—for example, no
Hispanic-American lesbian lawyers or Asian-American lesbian lawyers were
included in the study.12 This was not by design, but because none were
reached through the snowball sample––an obvious limitation we were unable
to address.13
In relation to the lesbian lawyers, Newman notes that belonging to
“advantaged . . . sexuality-based groups can serve as cultural capital . . . as

6.
E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 17.
7.
See infra Part II–III.
8.
Survey Sampling Methods, STATPAC, http://www.statpac.com/surveys/
sampling.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (providing explanation of snowball sampling).
9.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1;
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.
10.
See Broward is South Florida’s Most Racially Diverse, S. FLA. BUS. J.
(June 28, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2011/06/28/
broward-south-florida-racially-diverse.html. “Detailed racial breakdowns from 2010 [United
States] Census Bureau data indicates that [thirty-seven] percent of Broward County residents
are of a minority racial group.” Id. Further, “[t]he Williams Institute of Census has said that
South Florida is one of the top spots for LGBT population [g]rowth.” Patricia Davis, LGBT
Population Increases 60% in Broward County Florida, FLA. EST. PLAN. L. BLOG (Aug. 23,
2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.floridaestateplanninglawyerblog.com/2011/08/the-gay-southwill-rise-again.html.
11.
Corey Dade, Data on Same-Sex Couples Reveal Changing Attitudes, NPR
(Sept. 30, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/30/140950989/data-on-same-couplesreveal-changing-attitudes; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
12.
But see Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19; Interview with
Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1.
13.
See Survey Sampling Methods, supra note 8. However, the study did
include Jewish, Persian, Catholic, Protestant, African-American and Caucasian participants.
See infra Part III.
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illustrated by the historical preference for white, male, heterosexual
employees over women, people of color, and homosexual or transgendered
If cultural capital “can determine a person’s social
individuals.”14
opportunities,” it follows then that in a society that is heterosexist, an identity
other than heterosexual might be viewed as a liability in terms of cultural
capital.15 If so, can it also have an effect on what we might call legal capital
or opportunities within the legal system—from perspectives of career or
client, of success or of justice?16
II.

COMING OUT STORIES

Calhoun notes that the identities of lesbians (and gays) are usually
considered from standpoints of sexuality.17 Her argument, however, is that
lesbian identity is “best described as an identity that breaks heterosexual
law.”18 While the authors of this paper do not ascribe to that as the single
best description, there is within Calhoun’s claim an inherent and important
truth.19 The identities of lesbian lawyers, their clients, and the greater lesbian
community are closely intertwined with the law and legal decisions that
affect them, directly or indirectly, or shape the way that society views
lesbians and the way lesbians view society and the law.20 Thus, how lesbian
lawyers see their own identities and those of their clients connects to how
they identify the nature of law and justice as well as how they interact with
the legal system.21
Some things have indeed changed in the twenty-first century for
lesbian lawyers in terms of identity; other things have not.22 One area that
remains challenging is the declaration and/or negotiation of identity.23 Some
of the interviewees did not come out as lesbians until after graduating from
law school or later.24 Several delayed coming out for family concerns.25

14.
DAVID M. NEWMAN, IDENTITIES AND INEQUALITIES: EXPLORING THE
INTERSECTIONS OF RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 27 (2005).
15.
Id.
16.
See id.
17.
Cheshire Calhoun, Commentary, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing
Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (1993).
18.
Id. at 1860.
19.
See id.
20.
E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 8–11.
21.
See, e.g., id.
22.
Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://
www.apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
23.
Id.
24.
E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1. But see Interview
with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 5–6.
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Some lesbians married men and lived contrasting public and private lives.26
Some had children, while others were never interested in children.27 Most
interviewees minimized their coming out stories as they retold them to us
initially. However, as they further described events and family relationships
in relation to coming out, most had some degree of trauma associated with
coming out.28 This ranged from angst over deciding if, when, and how to
come out, to strains on relations with some family members, some of which
were or are not completely resolved by coming out.29 This declaration of
identity and its consequences in a heterosexist and homophobic society can
be an ongoing source of personal stress and difficulty that heterosexual
lawyers never face.30
A.

Are Lesbian and Gay Male Issues Different?

A few of the interviewees discussed their coming out as especially
difficult because they were lesbian and not gay men.31 For example, one
noted that, in spite of holding progressive political beliefs, her father was
accepting of her gay brother, but not of her being a lesbian.32 However,
another interviewee felt that gay men actually had more challenges than
lesbians, commenting: “I do think that many gay men find much more harsh
discrimination and are treated differently than lesbian women.” 33
Additionally, an interviewee noted that gay men she worked with on
committees did not want to hear about feminism;34 however, another
interviewee remarked that when men found out she was a lesbian, they
treated her as one of the guys.35 A few interviewees noted that being a
woman presented many challenges in itself; even before the challenges that

25.
E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1.
26.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford, (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 8;
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 2–3; Interview with
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 2–3.
27.
Compare Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra
note 4, at 1–3, with Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10.
28.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 18–19; Interview with
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10.
29.
E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19.
30.
E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 10–13.
31.
See, e.g., Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4,
at 2.
32.
Id.
33.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2.
34.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 3.
35.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 9.
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lesbianism might present.36 In general, however, there was a sense among
most participants of shared issues between lesbians and gay men. 37 Further,
several of the interviewees represented multiple gay male clients, and a few
described their legal victories for gay male clients as their proudest career
moments.38
B.

Queer Theory/Feminist Jurisprudence: Relationship to Identity

One of the questions we wanted to consider was if the lesbian
lawyers were influenced by any theoretical perspective that focused on either
being a lesbian, a woman, or combinations of various approaches. For
example, in the 1980s, Adrienne Rich observed that the framework of
feminist jurisprudence was one where lesbians were perceived as either
“abhorrent, or simply rendered invisible.”39 Rich was interested in why
heterosexual feminists “crushed, invalidated, forced into hiding and
disguise[d]” women who loved other women, and why feminist scholarship
totally neglected the lesbian existence.40 Rich’s conclusion was that the
“lesbian existence is potentially liberating for all women.”41 Further, Rich
observed that there was a difference “between lesbian existence and the
lesbian continuum.”42 Her observation was that lesbians generally led or
lead double lives in order to fit into the heterosexual normative, where
women are second-class citizens. 43
Fourteen years later, Elvia R. Arriola noted that she perceived “the
law as a powerful instrument for cultural transformation.”44 Arriola was
“call[ing] for [a] new perspective[] in discrimination analysis.”45 She notes,

36.
Id. at 11; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note
4, at 18; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2, 4.
37.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 18–19; Interview with
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 9–10; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D.
Kotey, supra note 4, at 3.
38.
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Lea
P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 13; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6–7.
39.
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 631, 632 & n.2 (1980) (commenting on Alice Rossi’s
paper, Children and Work in the Lives of Women, delivered at the University of Arizona, and
Doris Lessing’s book, The Golden Notebook).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 659.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 105 (1994).
45.
Id.
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as did Rich more than a decade before, that the feminist and other legal
scholars failed to develop “adequate models of analysis in support of gay and
lesbian victims of discrimination.”46 Also, part of her article is openly
critical of lesbian legal theory because it too “perpetuates the problematic
idea that lesbian invisibility should be remedied by simply carving out
theories around singular traits by which a person might self-identify.”47 In
her view, if lesbian legal theory embraces categorization into a single trait, it
flounders because it fails to “capture a person’s full identity . . . to advance a
meaningful principle of equality.”48 The legal theory that follows the idea of
a single trait results in group-based equality.49 Arriola concludes that the
courts instead should be looking at the total person, which might include
“gender, sexuality, race, class, age, and ethnicity. Each trait is important to
one’s moral worth, yet none provides justification for the denial of equal
rights under the law.”50
Traditionally, the law has been hostile toward lesbians.51 Under antisodomy laws, claiming the identity itself of lesbian—and acting on that
identity—was deemed illegal.52 Even after lesbianism itself was no longer
considered against the law, lesbians received unsatisfactory protection under
the law from the perspectives of feminist and lesbian scholars.53 Professor
Nancy Polikoff noted in 1986, in relation to child custody disputes involving
lesbian mothers, “[t]he courtroom is no place in which to affirm our pride in
our lesbian sexuality, or to advocate alternative child-rearing designed to
produce strong, independent women.”54
Several decades later, how do lesbian lawyers view related issues?
This will raise questions about how and if contemporary lesbian identities
influence the law, and if and how law may influence lesbian identities. For
example, do the interviewed lesbian lawyers believe the law treats lesbians
and gays in a just manner? Why do they believe what they do, and does it
affect their interpretation of law, their practice of it, their relationships with
juries and opposing counsel, their political beliefs, and their day-to-day
lives? However, examining the interviewees only in relation to the law is not

46.
Id.; see also Rich, supra note 39, at 632–33.
47.
Arriola, supra note 44, at 107.
48.
Id.
49.
See id at 106.
50.
Id. at 143.
51.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 798.02, 800.02 (2013).
52.
See id.
53.
See Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families:
Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907, 907 (1986).
54.
Id.
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enough.55 Related identity issues like generational, heritage, and family
issues—when women came out, the decade in which they became lawyers
and practiced law, and how their own families reacted—as well as other
identities claimed by the interviewees like racial or ethnic identities, to cite
just a few examples, are also likely to interact with their self and professional
identities, and perhaps impact at least some of their choices.56
The theories would seem significant to lesbian lawyers.57 However,
when the interviewees were asked about feminist jurisprudence, many
responded that they knew very little about it.58 Regardless of not connecting
feminist jurisprudence with being a feminist, most considered themselves to
be feminists.59 For instance, Monica Salis believes that “if you stand up for
women’s rights, [you are also] . . . standing up for lesbian rights.”60 Many of
those we interviewed said the legal system gave them a chance to change the
way in which people were treated.61 Monica said it was her observation that
if you encountered a bigoted father with a daughter, then you argued: Would
you want your daughter treated that way?62 She considered it her job to
make sure that the courts were fair.63 Since there is “bias everywhere . . . [in]
[e]very case, [her] job is to make a perfect record.”64
While the lesbian lawyers may not have had a jurisprudential theory
that they identified with, they reported stories of judges who would

55.
See Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at
20; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra
note 4, at 20–21.
56.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19; Interview with Linda
F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra
note 4, at 6–7.
57.
See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4.
58.
E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 3. For instance, Lilas
Ayandeh said that she would not do anything to promote feminism, but she was “pro-women,
doing things and would . . . vote for Hilary Clinton.” Id. Michelle Parker viewed feminism as
fighting discrimination. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1. She wants to
be treated the same as men. Id. Jennifer Travieso said she was probably more of a feminist
while in college, but did not have time when in law school. Interview with Jennifer Travieso,
supra note 3, at 1.
59.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 17–
18; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Monica I. Salis,
supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.
60.
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1.
61.
E.g., id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 9.
64.
Id. (“call[ing] judges on their bad calls [and] proffer[ing] into the record”
all that is needed to clarify the record).
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constantly refer to the male lawyers as counsel, while the women lawyers
would be referred to as miss.65 In fact, Lilas Ayandeh said that her female
suitemate lawyer-friend got into an argument with a judge who kept calling
her miss, and she said, “stop calling me miss, [I am] a lawyer too.”66 And the
judge responded that he did not know what she was talking about.67 Lilas
observed that maybe the judge was pompous, or he just did not know what
her suitemate was talking about because the law is so geared toward men.68
Thus, while the principles of feminist jurisprudence may not have been
known specifically, those interviewed certainly had first-hand experiences
with the law and the effects of the law being sexist.69 Seril Grossfeld, for
example, mentioned a case involving a divorce proceeding in which the
judge said that “he [did not] think it was right . . . to throw a man out of his
house.”70
There were those who described themselves as activists, such as Lea
Krauss.71 However, when asked if she considered herself a lesbian
separatist, she said she did not do things to the extreme.72 Lea equated being
a lesbian separatist activist with making judgments that might interfere with
her desire to be accepting.73 Lea also said how a lesbian was treated was
related to the way she looked.74 If a lesbian blended into society, then she
would be treated the same as heterosexual women.75
III.

HOW DID INTERVIEWEES SELF-IDENTIFY?

Nearly all of our interviewees used the word lesbian as one of the
first words with which they identified themselves.76 Robin Bodiford
explained her choice of lesbian as a primary identifying word.77 She stated:

65.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 11.
66.
Id. (emphasis added).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
See, e.g., Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 7–8.
70.
Id. (emphasis added).
71.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2. Lea is the current
president of GLLN, the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Network, which is active in Broward
County. Id. at 9.
72.
Id. at 2.
73.
Id. She also observed that women were “still struggling to get equal pay.”
Id.
74.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 2.
75.
Id.
76.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 1;
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.
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I [am] a lesbian. . . . Because basically once you decide that you
[are] a lesbian, it pretty much defines your life. You wake up
every day and you [are] a lesbian and you have to deal with it and .
. . [i]t does [not] go away. . . . You never get to forget about it
unless you may be, you know, absorbed in a book or a movie or . .
78
. something like that, but other than that, . . . it never goes away.

Most interviewees also mentioned several other identifying words
together; from woman to mother to daughter to attorney or lawyer––used by
most interviewees—to black, rather than a single identity.79 This is
exemplified by Linda Harrison, who described herself as “[f]emale first,
African American second, lesbian third, and mother on top of all those.”80
Lea Krauss said, “I would say I identify as a gay woman, as an attorney, as a
friend, a cousin. I [am] pretty family and friend oriented.”81
Several expressed discomfort at the general idea of categorizing
identities.82 Michelle Parker, for example, commented, “I tell other people to
not put themselves [in] a category to limit themselves. I do limit [my]self, I
consider myself a lesbian but I know that [is] kind of hypocritical . . . that I
tell other people to not limit themselves or to categorize themselves but then
I do [it] myself . . . .”83 Only one interviewee volunteered the term feminist
when we asked if the interviewees considered themselves feminists.84
Interestingly, most were somewhat hesitant to fully qualify themselves as
feminists for various reasons.85 A few equated feminism with activism, and
were not activists, therefore reluctant to call themselves feminists.86 For
example, Jennifer Travieso explained, “I [am] a lesbian. I would qualify
myself as a feminist. . . . I think in college I was definitely a feminist. I think
now I [am] maybe not as strong or as active in—under the title of feminist as

77.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 1.
78.
Id.
79.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1;
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4,
at 1.
80.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 1.
81.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 1.
82.
E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4,
at 1.
83.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1.
84.
Id.
85.
E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4,
at 17–18.
86.
E.g., Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.
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I used to be.”87 Several others clarified areas where they felt like they
differed from some feminist thinking.88 Phyllis Kotey noted:
The only reason I [am] bothered by [the feminist label] is I [am]
bothered by the phrase and all the baggage that it brings with it.
But for me, even with all of the baggage that it brings to bear, I
still must say that I believe that in issues with gender, issues of
race, that we have to be advocates and make sure that people are
treated fairly. And that [is] what I see being, you know, a feminist
[is] all about. It [is] not about whether I wear makeup or not, or
whether I shave my legs or not, no more than being black is all
about whether I raise my black power fist.
But I certainly think that it [is] important that I am always
sensitive to issues of gender and I always try to be. And when I—
people tell me, oh, it does [not] matter. I [am] like, well, if it did
[not] matter, then we would have more women in place—in
89
positions of power.

Most of our interviewees were white and did not mention race or
ethnicity in terms of their identities.90 Two of our interviewees were
African-American, one was Persian-American/Iranian-American, and three
were Jewish.91 These interviewees all discussed ways in which race or
ethnicity impacted their identities and/or legal careers.92 Both African
American interviewees mentioned the critical importance of class within the
legal system and one discussed being the recipient of racial bias in the
courtroom in the 1990s.93 Linda Harrison explained that when she was a
prosecutor, “[t]he judge wanted someone else appointed to try the case”
because he was just concerned about keeping his record intact of never

87.
88.

Id.
E.g., Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4,

89.
90.

Id.
See, e.g., Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4,

at 17–18.

at 1.
91.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1; Interview with Seril L.
Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note
4, at 1; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 14; Interview with Monica I. Salis,
supra note 4, at 13.
92.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1–2; Interview with Seril
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra
note 4, at 4–5; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 14; Interview with Monica I.
Salis, supra note 4, at 13–14.
93.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 24–
26.
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having a black person prosecute a case in his court.94
described looking for a first job after law school:

Seril Grossfeld

[T]he first job was difficult because I was a Jewish woman from
New York in Northern Florida looking for a job. So there was
[not] much opportunity and I usually got appointments for
interviews . . . they could [not] tell from my name, and when I
95
walked in, they said, “Oh, we just filled the job.”

Persian-American interviewee Lilas Ayandeh discussed the challenges of
revealing and maintaining her identity within her ethnic community and
family:
[T]he [Persian] culture is so strong and rich . . . and even in Iran
you hear the president say we do [not] have gay people. I mean
that [is] ridiculous, what [do] you mean you do [not] have gay
people, of course you do; but it [is] not something that [is]
accepted . . . there is [sic] jokes about gay people from back in the
day, so it [is] something that [is] just engrained in the culture that
it [is] not real and the people that are there look at that as lower
than dirt kind of thing. So yes it was definitely hard to come out to
96
them [family]—they are accepting now.

A.

Law School Experience

The law school experience for a lesbian can be traumatic and/or
enlightening.97 She can be tolerated but ignored, or validated as someone
bringing insight into the law.98 Sometimes, all of these approaches are her
experience.99 To illustrate the traumatic, it has not been uncommon for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (“LGBTI”) bulletin boards
to be vandalized.100

94.
Id. at 25.
95.
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5.
96.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 19–20.
97.
See Scott N. Ihrig, Sexual Orientation in Law School: Experiences of
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Law Students, 14 LAW & INEQ. 555, 566 (1996).
98.
Id.
99.
See id.
100.
Id. at 568. The University of Michigan Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual group
was forced to put Plexiglas over its bulletin board. Id. at 568 n.73. In 1988, Lynn Miller, a
contributing editor to the Student Lawyer, noted that when she asked a lesbian who was Chair
of the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Caucus about being out, her response was that “students do
[not] want to be isolated—or harassed.” Lynn Miller, The Legal Closet, 16 STUDENT LAW.,
Feb. 1988, at 12, 14. Further, the lesbian leader noted that at the University of Oregon Law

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

22

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

14

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Recently, the atmosphere in most law schools is one of toleration.101
However, even by 1994, any classroom discussion that focused on LGBTI
issues was frequently confined to the legal arguments, according to Scott
Ihrig, who studied the issue as a student at the University of Minnesota.102
Rarely were the facts of such cases discussed.103 The impact was to
silence the voice of the LGBTI community.104 For instance, Ihrig observed
that any time sexual orientation was the legal question of the constitutional
law case being discussed in class, if he volunteered observations, he was told
by his professor to “‘divorce your personal politics from your constitutional
law.’”105
For lesbians, the problem is compounded.106 Lesbian sexuality is
almost totally absent in any discussion, based on court cases.107 Ruthann
Robson also noted that in her experience as a law professor—even if such
discussion took place—it was not uncommon for the lesbian students to
censor their comments and never make them personal.108 Of course, there
are exceptions.109 For instance, Monica Salis, who went to the University of
Miami Law School in the late 1970s, said she took classes related to
discrimination and she always tried to turn the focus to gay rights.110 Monica
also observed that she was perceived to be very outspoken.111 For a variety
of reasons, many of those interviewed were not out while in law school.112
As has been noted, many of the interviewed lesbian attorneys waited until

School, some “‘students were getting hate mail.’” Id. The Dean did respond by sending a
message to the entire student body that such mail was unacceptable. Id.
101.
Ihrig, supra note 97, at 566.
102.
See id. at 555, 557–58.
103.
Id. at 572. Monica Salis noted that in no class that she took at the
University of Miami Law School in the late 1970s, was there any discussion of sexual
orientation, not even when Bowers v. Hardwick was assigned. Interview with Monica I. Salis,
supra note 4, at 4.
104.
Ihrig, supra note 97, at 566.
105.
Id. at 558.
106.
See RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 221 (1998).
107.
Id.
108.
Id. It was noted by a law student in the Student Lawyer (1988), “‘[t]here
are times in class when I want to bring up gay-related issues, but I can’t raise my hand,
because I know [that] everyone in the class will immediately wheel around in their chairs to
see who said that.’” Miller, supra note 100, at 14.
109.
See Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4.
110.
Id. at 2, 4.
111.
Id. at 4. Monica admits that even her high school transcript said that she
had forced the closure of the school due to demonstrations, which she orchestrated. Id.
112.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1; Interview with Seril
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 3; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8.
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after graduating from law school to make their identity known. 113 Further,
their recollections were that sexual orientation was not discussed in the law
classes.114 Even in those law classes where the expectation that a discussion
might take place—such as Constitutional Law, Family Law, or Wills and
Trusts—they did not remember any mention of sexual orientation issues.115
Lea Krauss validates what the studies have shown.116 Lea graduated in 1999
and she does not recall any classes where sexual orientation was the focus of
the legal discussion.117
There were exceptions to being silent.118 Michelle Parker, who
graduated in 2011, recalls that sexual orientation issues were talked about
openly in some of her law classes.119 Perhaps this might be related to the fact
that the law school had many openly gay and lesbian law professors and even
a dean.120 Michelle observed that the professors knew she was a lesbian, and
in her classes she felt that the professors explained things in more detail that
were related to sexual orientation issues.121 On the other hand, Seril
Grossfeld—who attended law school in the 1970s—says that there were no
open LGBTI law professors.122 In fact, Seril noted that there were very few

113.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 1, 4; Interview with
Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 3–4; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 4, 6, 8.
114.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 11;
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison &
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 7; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8;
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4.
115.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (July 17, 2012), supra note 4, at 11;
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 5; Interview with Linda F. Harrison &
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 7; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8;
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 4.
116.
See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 8.
117.
Id. Lea says that she took Constitutional Law her last year in law school
and they talked about Bowers v. Hardwick. Id.
118.
See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7.
119.
Id.
120.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 10; Interview with
Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7. Michelle attended the Shepard Broad Law Center,
Nova Southeastern University. Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7.
121.
Id. Michelle recalls that in a Civil Procedure class where the professor
knew she was a lesbian, that professor “spen[t] ten extra minutes on it just for [her] benefit.”
Id. Lilas Ayandeh was not out while in law school and she does not remember any discussion
at the same law school—Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University—where
there was any discussion that related to sexual orientation. Interview with Lilas Ayandeh,
supra note 3, at 1, 7. Further, Lilas did not know that there were several out professors at the
law school and was surprised when told who they were. Id. at 9–10.
122.
See Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 2, 4.
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women law professors.123 In some instances, there were openly gay
professors at the law school but their presence seemed subdued.124 For
instance, Jennifer Travieso remembers that she took a course in sexual
identity with about six or seven other students.125 It was a paper course and
she thought that what she learned was very interesting.126
For the few who acknowledged their sexual orientation while in their
teens or twenties, it was common to become activists in their undergraduate
years.127 Identity recognition prompted being active in law school too.128
There were exceptions even to this general observation.129 Monica Salis
went to New York University for her undergraduate education and was
involved with women’s organizations on campus where half the members
were lesbians.130 But, when she got to University of Miami Law School in
1979, there were no identifiable lesbians.131
In contrast, Jennifer Travieso joined an underground LGBTI club at
a Catholic university law school.132 She decided to run the club in a much
more active way.133 She approached the Assistant Dean for funding,
something all groups at the law school did.134 The Assistant Dean flat out
denied the request and Jennifer was explicitly told that the group would not
be welcome.135 Jennifer sought help from her favorite professor and he

123.
Id. at 5. Monica Salis said there were no out professors at the University
of Miami Law School in the late 1970s. Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 3.
124.
See Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7.
125.
Id. at 6.
126.
Id. at 6–7.
127.
See, e.g., id. at 1.
128.
See, e.g., id. at 3. Many of those interviewed are very active in the LGBTI
community currently. See Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 14–15; Interview
with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 14. For instance, Lea Krauss is President of GLLN,
which is a very active group. Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9. She is also
very active in The Pride Center as a board member. Id. One of the reasons they asked Lea to
be on the board was to have a “younger perspective and a female perspective.” Id. at 10. She
is largely responsible for assembling a women’s resource center that addresses issues with
regard to health, networking, and also provides a social center where women feel safe. Id.
Until she got this established, The Pride Center was largely a boys’ club. Id.
129.
See, e.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 3.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 2–3. “[All her] friends in law school were gay men.” Id. at 3.
“They were easy to identify and it was very comfortable. . . . We studied for the Bar, shared a
hotel room up in Tampa, and took the Bar together.” Id.
132.
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 3.
133.
Id. at 3–5.
134.
Id. at 3.
135.
Id. at 3–4.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

25

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

LESBIAN LAWYERS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

17

suggested contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).136
With the backing of the ACLU, the LGBTI club was born.137 By the end of
the year, the group won an award for being the most active at the law
school.138 Interestingly, the faculty sponsor of the group was not the out
professor at the school, but rather her favorite law professor, the one who had
suggested she consult the ACLU.139
Jennifer’s experiences were somewhat mirrored by Michelle Parker,
who became the President of Lambda United, the law school LGBTI club at
Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, and made it into
one of the most active groups at the law school.140 She took on the task
because, in her words, “equal right[s] [are] so important to me . . . [and]
raising awareness is . . . important.”141 In fact, Michelle said that so much of
her time in law school was taken up by the group, that her grades suffered.142
Fortunately, at her law school, the group had existed for some time and they
were given funds without hesitation.143 Under Michelle’s leadership,
Lambda sponsored fundraisers with the money going to organizations such
as the Broward House that helps people with HIV/AIDS.144 They also joined
other student groups to present a Gay Adoption Symposium. 145 Michelle
also observed that “[she] would [have] died without the faculty
[involvement].”146

136.
Id. at 4.
137.
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 4.
138.
Id. at 4–5. Some of the students at the law school were not in favor of the
club, so Jennifer and her group decided to “poke fun at ourselves” and offered a free breakfast
consisting of Fruit Loops. Id. at 5. Jennifer also indicated that she really felt empowered by
being the founder of the law school group. Id. at 11. Fighting for people’s rights was an
amazing experience for her. Id.
139.
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7.
140.
Compare id. at 4–5, with Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4,
at 1, 6. When nobody wants to lead, the law school club becomes almost underground. See
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. According to Michelle, “[she] was making the same grades as [her]
first year [friends who] all graduated with honors, except for [her].” Id.
143.
See id.
144.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6. They also had
Rock Out Loud with a band and hamburgers. Id. Lambda gave half of what it made to Fight
Out Loud, which helps people who “have been victims of discrimination based on their sexual
orientation and sexual identity.” Id.
145.
Past Events: Symposium on Gay Adoption in Florida, IACHR NEWSL.
(Inter-Am. Ctr. for Human Rights, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 2011, at 7, available at http://
nsulaw.nova.edu/students/orgs/iachr/newsletters/index.cfm.
146.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 7.
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As far as helping the lesbian lawyers secure legal positions after
graduating, the various law schools did not seem to be aware of any potential
problems associated with getting jobs and being a lesbian.147 Whether those
interviewed were out to their future employers related to several factors.148
For those who graduated in the 1980s and waited until after law school to
come out, sexual orientation was not of concern.149 In contrast, those who
had been active and out in law school, interviewed as out lesbians.150
Michelle Parker, for instance, observed that she
would rather [the firm] know that I am gay before I . . . step foot in
your office because if you [are] going to have a problem with it I
would rather you know now and I do [not] want to be terminated
151
in two months because you found out that I was gay.

Fortunately for Michelle, her firm is fine with gay folks.152 Jennifer noted
that “now some firms are marketing directly to the gay community.”153 The
gay attorney can identify with the gay community and it is actually
positive.154 In South Florida, there may even be an advantage to being
identified as a lesbian according to Lea Krauss, the current president of the
Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Network (“GLLN”).155 It is a method by which to

147.
See id. at 7–8. In 1988, an article in Student Lawyer noted that “‘[g]ay
students feel they have to remain closeted to get a job and establish a reputation . . . .’” Miller,
supra note 100, at 14. Activists are caught between a rock and a hard place. “If they include
membership in any gay organizations on their resumes, [it is] an automatic warning. If they
leave them off . . . [the students] ‘look like . . . boring pe[ople] with no leadership skills.’” Id.
148.
See Miller, supra note 100, at 17.
149.
See id.
150.
See, e.g., Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8. There
were those in-between years where those who were out were very afraid to be when they
started their job searches. See Miller, supra note 100, at 14. They believed they would not
get the position, and if they did, and it became known they were lesbians, they would be fired.
See id. at 15. Their experience at the time was that they did not fit in. Id. They could not take
their partners to any social function. Id. They had to be very careful about what they talked
about that was personal. Id. Then, the result was that the lesbian/gay attorney was perceived
to be removed and cold. Miller, supra note 100, at 15. Law professors at that time counseled
gay students to do research about the firms to see which ones contributed to gay causes. Id.
That way, they were more likely to fit in. Id.
151.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8. Further, Michelle
said she wanted to be free to take her girlfriend to the Christmas party. Id. And she wanted to
know if the firm was anti-gay before working for them. Id.
152.
Id. The firm’s secretary is a lesbian and her uncle, who is gay, is the
person in charge of all the firm’s scheduling. Id.
153.
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 11.
154.
Id.
155.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 3, 9.
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get business and, further, the LGBTI community “feel[s] comfortable dealing
with a lesbian [attorney].”156 “[P]rofessionally, you can use that to your
advantage.”157
For lawyers, education is never finished.158 In fact, Continuing
Legal Education (“CLE”) is a requirement.159 With the influence of such
groups as the GLLN,160 the Florida Bar presented a CLE program geared to
LGBTI issues.161 The presentation covered such issues as death of partners
and how the remaining partners might not have any rights.162 As Jennifer
noted, “[i]f you do [not] have the proper documents in place and . . . [the]
partner’s family does [not] agree with you, they come in . . . [and] take the
body.”163 Jennifer expressed her dismay, “it [is] completely legal for them to
do that. It [is] heart wrenching.”164
B.

LGBTI Client’s and Court Experience

Various judicial councils and bar associations have been concerned
about fairness in courts for the LGBTI community.165 For instance, the
Arizona report found that “[t]hirteen percent (13%) of judges and attorneys
have observed negative treatment by judges in open court toward those
perceived to be gay or lesbian.”166 Further, if sexual orientation was part of
the legal issue, “[thirty-nine] percent believed their sexual orientation was
used to devalue their credibility.”167

156.
Id. at 3.
157.
Id.
158.
See Continuing Legal Education Requirement, FLA. B., https://
www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/8182
932fc055e6f78525669e004f74f2!OpenDocument (last updated May 26, 2005).
159.
Id.
160.
See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 12; Interview with
Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 9. Lea P. Krauss is currently the president of the GLLN.
Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9.
161.
See Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 9–10.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 10.
164.
Id.
165.
See GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REPORT TO THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 18 (1999); SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS SUBCOMM., JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 1 (2001),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/report.pdf.
166.
GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., supra note 165, at 20.
167.
Todd Brower, Obstacle Courts: Results of Two Studies on Sexual
Orientation Fairness in the California Courts, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 39, 45
(2003) [hereinafter Brower, Obstacle Courts].
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It has been observed that once the client’s sexual orientation
becomes part of the legal proceeding, the entire proceeding is overshadowed
by the trait.168 When juror polls are taken, jurors are more likely to say that
“they cannot be fair . . . [to] gay litigants,” compared to any other group.169
Given this knowledge, it would appear that some lawyers use this animosity
to plant negative seeds in prospective jurors’ minds.170 For instance, when
an attorney asks whether the prospective juror would “‘accept unbiased
testimony from [a] gay witness[],’” the implication is that the gay witness is
unreliable.171 Further, if the LGBTI lawyer represents activists in the LGBTI
community, a conflict may arise.172 This fact may be important because, as
Professor Nancy D. Polikoff noted, if the activist client wanted, for example,
to shout out in a courtroom, she as the lawyer was conflicted between
identifying with her client’s need to be heard, and her desire to abide by her
respect of the judicial system.173 With one exception, none of those
interviewed represented gay activists.174 Only a few of those interviewed
actually had clients who even identified as LGBTI.175 Lilas Ayandeh, being
the accidental exception by representing a client who had a civil rights claim,
said that she advertised in Girl Magazine, which is well known in the South
From that advertisement, Lilas was
Florida lesbian community.176
approached by a client who wanted to be represented by her because she
wanted a lesbian lawyer.177 Lilas sought out civil rights attorneys for their

168.
Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical
Analysis of Lesbian and Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 609–10
(2001).
169.
Id. at 611. The jurors are more likely to be less fair to gay or lesbians than
“African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, or Whites.” Id.
170.
Brower, Obstacle Courts, supra note 167, at 58.
171.
Id.
172.
See Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a
Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 450 (1996).
173.
Id. at 449–50.
174.
Compare Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 16, with
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4–5, Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug.
3, 2012), supra note 4, at 2, Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note
4, at 12–13, Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17, Interview with Michelle M.
Parker, supra note 4, at 8, Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6, and Interview
with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7.
175.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4; Interview with Seril
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra
note 4, at 12–13; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; Interview with
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 6; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 7.
176.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4.
177.
Id.
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advice as to whether the case had merit.178 The case ended as other civil
rights attorneys said it would.179 The client lost due to the weakness of the
facts in her case.180
Generally, the court system in Broward County was seen as fair
toward the LGBTI community.181 While Michelle M. Parker has many
LGBTI clients, the issues are usually not gay related.182 The reason that her
firm has so many gay clients is due to the manner in which they advertise on
the GLLN website.183 GLLN is a very active legal network.184 Thus, many
in the community decide on which lawyer they will retain based on finding
them on the network.185 Michelle noted that they handle Title VII cases, but
based on gender, not sexual orientation.186 Thus, Michelle noted that while
their clients had been fired because they were lesbian, the focus of the case
was sex discrimination because the client did not fit the female stereotype.187
IV.

FLORIDA LAW AS IT RELATES TO THE LGBTI COMMUNITY

Florida’s LGBTI population is one of the highest in the United
States, and the figure is continually rising.188 In the past decade, the number
of same-sex households alone has greatly increased in Florida.189 One would
infer from such statistics that the LGBTI community is attracted to Florida

178.
Id. at 5.
179.
Id.
180.
See id. Some part of the loss was due to the fact that the client had been
“pulled over for a DUI [and in doing so] almost hit th[e] Deputy on the side of the road.”
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 5. However, the client was convinced that the
whole episode was due to her sexual orientation. Id. at 6. The client arrived at this conclusion
because when she was stopped, the deputy asked if she was gay. Id. He probably arrived at
this conclusion because she had short hair and her partner, who was also in the car, was very
feminine. Id.
181.
Id. at 6; see also Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17.
182.
See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8.
183.
See id.
184.
See Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 9.
185.
See id. at 13; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8.
186.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; see also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
187.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 8; see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (discussing sex stereotyping).
188.
GARY J. GATES, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL,
POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 6 tbl.3, app. 1
(2006), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-SameSex-Couples-GLB-Pop-ACS-Oct-2006.pdf.
189.
Jeff Kunerth, More Gays are Now Families, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 18,
2011, at A1.
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due to its favoring laws and liberal constituency; however, that is not the
case.190 Florida’s laws towards members of the LGBTI community have
been described as hostile and even draconian.191 Historically, the treatment
towards the LGBTI persons in Florida exemplifies an overall societal
animosity.192 There have been “‘witch hunts’ for lesbian and gay teachers,
political attacks through voter initiatives, [and] overtly discriminatory
laws.”193
Florida’s legislation and judiciary make a clear distinction between
the LGBTI individual and the heterosexual individual.194 In Florida, the
LGBTI individual’s rights and protections are limited in comparison to those
of a heterosexual individual.195 Although the LGBTI community, at a local
level, might enjoy some added protections that the State of Florida fails to
provide,196 “the scope of [such] protections is limited and . . . do[es] not
geographically encompass a large percentage of Florida’s LGBT[I]
population.”197 Florida’s LGBTI community faces much discrimination in
various aspects of the law due to their sexual orientation.
A.

Right to Marry

On September 21, 1996, Congress effectuated the Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which grants states the right to decline recognition
of same-sex marriages sanctioned in another state.198 DOMA was motivated

190.
Matthew T. Moore, Long-Term Plans for LGBT Floridians: Special
Concerns and Suggestions to Avoid Legal and Family Interference, 34 NOVA L. REV. 255, 256
(2009); see also GATES, supra note 188, at 6 tbl.3, app. 1; Kunerth, supra note 189.
191.
See Moore, supra note 190, at 256.
192.
See id.
193.
William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida
Today: Confronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus, 24 NOVA L. REV. 751, 751
(2000).
194.
See id. at 754.
195.
CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., A LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR LGBT
FLORIDIANS AND THEIR FAMILIES 7–10 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://
www.CarltonFields.com/Files/Uploads/Documents/OtherPubs/Equality_Florida_Handbook_3
Ed_06_2012.pdf.
196.
See Kunerth, supra note 189. For example, “Orlando and Orange County
both offer domestic-partnership benefits to same-sex couples—something they [did not] do
[ten] years ago.” Id.
197.
Moore, supra note 190, at 259.
198.
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012); see
also Nanci Schanerman, Note, Comity: Another Nail in the Coffin of Institutional
Homophobia, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 145, 150–51 (2010).
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

31

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

LESBIAN LAWYERS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

23

by the likely prospect that same-sex marriages would soon be recognized in
Hawaii.199 “[T]he federal government was worried that [Hawaii] was
dangerously close to granting same-sex marriages, and the implications of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause would mandate recognition of marriages
performed in Hawaii in every state around the country.”200 By enacting
DOMA, the federal government’s purpose was to leave the decision of
recognizing same-sex marriage up to each state, rather than having it
mandated upon all states on the basis of federal principles.201
The Florida Legislature took prompt action with regard to the
Federal DOMA and, by June 1997, the DOMA law was accepted and
codified into the Florida Statutes.202 In the process of enacting the Florida
DOMA, many supporters of such law made their hostility toward the LGBTI
community known.203 Take, for example, the words of Senator Grant, an
advocate for Florida’s DOMA, “‘God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and
Steve,’” or how he expressed that it was “‘[g]reat that [the Act] [took] effect
on June 4, right smack dab in the middle of Gay Pride Week.’”204
Although Florida’s DOMA makes clear that same-sex marriages are
not recognized within the state, the issue did not stop there.205 In 2003, when
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts overturned its state law banning samesex marriage,206 Florida’s opponents to same-sex marriage were quick to
realize that Florida’s DOMA was also at risk of being overturned.207 For that

any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.

Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2(a).
199.
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–60, 67 (Haw.), reconsideration
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), and appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike,
910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), remanded, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d,
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997); Schanerman, supra note 198, at 150.
200.
Schanerman, supra note 198, at 150.
201.
Id. at 150–51.
202.
FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2013); Michael J. Kanotz, Comment, For Better or
for Worse: A Critical Analysis of Florida’s Defense of Marriage Act, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
439, 445 (1998).
203.
Kanotz, supra note 202, at 446.
204.
Id. at 445–46 (second alteration in original).
205.
Id.
206.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003);
Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the
Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 375 (2004–2005).
207.
See Vote Yes on Amendment 2, CHRISTIAN FAM. COALITION, http://
cfcoalition.com/full_article.php?article_no=94 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). The coalitions
advertised various reasons why an amendment to the Florida Constitution was necessary. Id.
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very reason the process to amend Florida’s Constitution began.208 In 2005,
“[a] coalition of groups joined . . . and agreed on the language [for] the
Florida Marriage Protection Amendment . . . .”209 The proposed language
stated, “‘marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the
substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.’”210 The
Supreme Court of Florida approved the language of the Amendment by a
unanimous vote.211 By 2008, the decision to determine whether the proposed
Amendment was to become part of the Florida Constitution was left in the
hands of Florida’s constituents.212
There were ugly campaign tactics favoring the passage of the
Amendment; one campaign advertisement particularly encouraged voters to
vote in favor of the Amendment by threatening that activist judges could
ignore the will of the people and legalize same-sex marriage if the
Amendment was not passed.213 Furthermore, advertisements emphasized
hostile societal views against the LGBTI community by stating that the
Amendment would “protect[] . . . children from being taught [by] public
schools that same-sex marriage is the same as natural marriage,” and it
would “give[] children the best chance for both a mom and a dad.”214 The
results were surprising to the LGBTI community since opinion polls “never
showed the [Amendment] getting any more than [fifty-nine] percent

208.
See id.
209.
Florida
Voters
Approve
Marriage
Protection
Amendment,
PROLIFEBLOGS.COM (Nov. 4, 2008, 9:44 PM), http://www.prolifeblogs.com/articles/archives/
2008/11/florida_voters.php. “Amendment 2 defines marriage as the union of one man and
one woman and will prohibit polygamy, group marriage, and same-sex marriage from being
recognized in Florida.” Id.
210.
Anthony Niedwiecki, Florida’s Amendment 2: What Does “Substantial
Equivalent” to Marriage Mean?, BILERICO PROJECT (Oct. 20, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://
www.bilerico.com/2008/10/floridas_amendment_2_what_does_substanti.php.
211.
Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926
So. 2d 1229, 1241 (2006); Florida Voters Approve Marriage Protection Amendment, supra
note 209.
212.
See FLORIDA FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT PETITION FORM: FLORIDA MARRIAGE PROTECTION AMENDMENT 1 (n.d.),
available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/41550-1.pdf.
213.
FLA. FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL, YES ON 2: FACT SHEET 1 (2008), available
at http://ccpcfl.org/Voter-Guides/2008/2008MarriageAmend2.pdf.
Massachusetts . . . activist judges ha[d] re-written marriage laws and ignored the
will of the people by legalizing same-sex marriages. There is a national movement
to do this all over the country, which is why [twenty-seven] states have passed state
constitutional amendment [sic] to protect marriage. . . . Amendment 2 protects the
definition of marriage from activist judges.

Id. (emphasis added).
214.
Id.
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support.”215
Yet the Amendment passed by a supermajority;
“[a]pproximately 4.6 million voters supported [the] Amendment, . . . while
about 2.8 million opposed it.”216 Passage of this Amendment “demonstrates
that neither legislative nor societal hostility in Florida is likely to end
soon.”217
For now, an LGBTI individual in a long-term, non-marital
relationship will continue to be viewed as an individual under the laws of
Florida.218 Since the LGBTI community is denied of the right to marry, they
are also denied the “legal status and certain benefits derived therein.”219
Marriage bestows upon couples a litany of legal rights and
benefits, including but not limited to: [F]iling joint state and
federal income tax returns, social security survivor benefits,
immigration benefits, bereavement leave, immunity from
testifying against your spouse in court, wrongful death and loss of
consortium relief, sick leave to care for a partner, assumption of a
spouse’s pension, automatic inheritance rights, child custody,
burial determination, hospital visitation rights, divorce protections,
220
and domestic violence protection.

Acknowledging that change is necessary, the Supreme Court of the
United States found section three of DOMA unconstitutional.221 Even so,
LGBTI individuals must undertake “costly and time consuming litigation
under Florida law” to make sure that his or her loved one does not become a
legal stranger upon the occurrence of an unexpected event.222

215.
Florida Marriage Amendment Wins 62% Support, FLA. BAPTIST WITNESS
(Nov. 13, 2008), http://gofbw.com/News.asp?ID=9579.
216.
Id.; Florida Voters Approve Marriage Protection Amendment, supra note
209.
217.
Moore, supra note 190, at 256.
218.
Id. at 257.
219.
Melissa A. Provost, Comment, Disregarding the Constitution in the Name
of Defending Marriage: The Unconstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 8 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 157, 159 (1997).
220.
Id.
221.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (reasoning that,
“[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity”)..
222.
Moore, supra note 190, at 280; see also William Gibson, Lesbian Case in
Miami Highlighted Denial of Hospital Visitation Rights, SUNSENTINEL (Apr. 16, 2010, 11:18
AM), http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/dcblog/2010/04/lesbian_case_in_miami_
highligh.html.
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What the Future May Hold?

Even when the LGBTI individual takes legal measures to protect his
or her partner and provide him or her with rights to prevent them from
becoming legal strangers upon the occurrence of an unexpected event, there
still remains the frightening possibility that such legal documents will be
ignored because the gay and lesbian “‘relationship is so thoroughly invisible
and disrespected.’”223 Take for example the 2008 case of Clay Greene and
Harold Scull, partners of twenty years, whose legal measures to “name[]
each other [as] beneficiaries of their respective estates and agents for medical
decisions” were completely ignored.224 “By the time [Scull] died, county
officials had [already] sold all of the couple’s possessions, confiscated their
cats, and assumed control over their finances.”225 Scull died without seeing
his partner Greene, since Greene was confined to a nursing home and
prohibited from visiting him.226
Although the legal measures taken by an LGBTI individual might be
ignored or contested,227 such measures are still the best option an LGBTI
individual has to provide rights and protect his or her life partner. In Florida,
the LGBTI individual must plan ahead in the event sickness or death
strikes.228 This is especially true since “Florida [is] hostile to same-sex
relationships and consider[s] same-sex partners to be legal strangers.”229

223.
Gerry Shih, Suit Charges Elderly Gay Partners Were Forced Apart, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010, 2:09 AM), http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/suit-chargeselderly-gay-couple-was-forced-apart/?scp=1&sq=elderly%20gay%20partners&st=cse.
224.
NCLR Launches Campaign on Behalf of Clay & Harold, DAILY KOS (Apr.
19, 2010, 5:43 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/04/19/858870/-NCLR-LaunchesCampaign-on-Behalf-of-Clay-Harold.
225.
Nancy J. Knauer, Gay and Lesbian Elders: Estate Planning and End-ofLife Decision Making, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2010).
226.
Id. at 164; NCLR Launches Campaign on Behalf of Clay & Harold, supra
note 224.
227.
See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14;
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., LGBT OLDER ADULTS: FACING LEGAL BARRIERS
TO TAKING CARE OF LOVED ONES (2010), available at, http://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/
resources/pdfs/LGBTOlderAdultsandTakingCareofLovedOnes.pdf.
228.
See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14.
229.
Knauer, supra note 225, at 188.
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Transfer of Property

In Florida, a LGBTI individual must utilize legal tools and
documents to make sure that his or her life partner has access to him or her
and to his or her property upon death or incapacity.230
[T]here are a wide variety of legal documents available and
recognized under Florida law that can be used to facilitate the
orderly transfer of various types of property upon death, in the
event of incapacity, or to otherwise avoid the default disposition of
231
those assets upon death under existing law.

So in Florida, if a LGBTI individual wishes for his or her life partner
to be granted any of his or her property upon death, he or she must have valid
legal documents specifying such wishes because failure to do so can leave
the surviving life partner empty handed.232
Although some states have facilitated matters for their LGBTI
community in this regard by granting legal recognition and protection to the
same-sex relationship, Florida is not one of those states.233 Florida’s
legislature has failed various times to pass laws that would “recognize the
long-term relationships of same-sex couples”; until such occurrence,
Florida’s same-sex partners will continue to be “forced . . . to fit themselves
into existing legal categories.”234
Same-sex partners can “fit themselves into existing legal
categories”235 through estate planning.236 “[E]state-planning documents
enable[] same-sex partners to give each other some measure of legal standing
and protection.”237 For example, through a valid will, same-sex partners can
devise their property to their partners—devisees—rather than allowing

230.
See CARLTON FIELDS & EQUAL. FLA. INST., supra note 195, at 14.
231.
Id.
232.
Id. at 14–15.
233.
See Aimee Bouchard & Kim Zadworny, Growing Old Together: Estate
Planning Concerns for the Aging Same-Sex Couple, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 713, 749 (2008).
“The Hawaii [L]egislature passed the Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which granted
some of the legal rights of marriage to couples who registered as reciprocal beneficiaries.”
Id. at 717. “When Vermont extended the status of a civil union to same-sex couples, it
granted them all the same legal rights as provided by marriage within the state . . . .” Id. “The
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act states that same-sex domestic
partners will be treated like heterosexual married partners in the event of the death of one
spouse.” Id. at 720.
234.
Adams, supra note 193, at 761 & n.74, 762.
235.
Id. at 762.
236.
Knauer, supra note 225, at 167.
237.
Id.
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Florida’s intestacy laws to govern the distribution of their property.238 If the
probate method is not preferred, the LGBTI individual has other options,
such as “trusts, joint ownership, and transfer on death designations.”239
Unlike heterosexual couples, if same-sex partners fail to take legal action to
provide their long-term partners with rights, their partners will be legal
strangers in the eyes of Florida law.240
2.

Visitation Rights and End of Life Decisions

Some of the most unconscionable are laws that stand in the way of
LGBT[I] people taking care of those they love, in life and in death.
. . . LGBT[I] people could be excluded from medical decisionmaking for a partner. . . . [U]pon the death of a partner, LGBT[I]
people are often denied making end-of-life decisions about last
241
rites, funerals, and disposition of remains.

Unlike heterosexual couples, same-sex couples have to provide the
hospitals with legal documents “before being allowed to take part in [their]
partner’s care” or to even be allowed to see their partner.242 This is why
LGBTI individuals are advised to have legal documents that verify their
relationship and grant their partners the right to make medical and end-of-life
decisions.243
A recent Florida case that gained much national attention, Langbehn
v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County,244 exemplifies the difficulties
same-sex partners face in obtaining access to their hospitalized partner and in
being permitted to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner. 245
Janice Langbehn was not allowed access to Lisa Pond, her partner of
eighteen years, during the critical hours of Pond’s hospitalization when she

238.

Id. at 189–90, 192.

In the vast majority of states where the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the
rules of intestate succession distribute the decedent’s property to the closest
relatives in the following priority: Children, parents, siblings, nieces and nephews,
grandparents. . . . If a decedent is not survived by any relatives within the
prescribed degrees of relationship, all property will escheat to the state.

Id. at 190–91 n.141 (emphasis added).
239.
Id. at 189–90.
240.
See Knauer, supra note 225, at 188.
241.
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 227.
242.
Tara Parker-Pope, How Hospitals Treat Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/how-hospitals-treatsame-sex-couples/.
243.
Id.
244.
661 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
245.
Id. at 1331–33.
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remained semi-conscious.246 Although Janice had a power of attorney,
which authorized her to make medical decisions on behalf of her partner in
the case of incapacity, no one in the hospital “acknowledged the legal effect
of the document.”247 Instead, Janice was informed by a social worker that
because Florida was an anti-gay state, she was not going to be allowed to see
Pond or know about her medical condition.248 It was not until Pond’s sister
arrived at the hospital that Janice was allowed access to Pond, but at that
point, Pond was already unconscious and died soon thereafter.249
Although Janice unsuccessfully sued the hospital and hospital staff
for the emotional distress she was forced to endure,250 her case was not
overlooked by the President of the United States.251 President Barack Obama
noted,
[LGBTI] Americans are “uniquely affected” by relatives-only
policies at hospitals . . . [and] “are often barred from the bedsides
of the partners with whom they may have spent decades of their
lives—unable to be there for the person they love, and unable to
252
act as a legal surrogate if their partner is incapacitated.”

Therefore, in 2010, President Obama issued a memorandum requiring
hospitals that accept Medicare or Medicaid funds to adopt policies that
would provide visitation rights to same-sex couples.253 Further, the
memorandum directed hospitals to respect “all patients’ advance directives,
such as durable powers of attorney and health care proxies.”254
Since hospitals must abide by the President’s executive order to
continue obtaining funding from the government, it is not surprising that
Florida hospitals have changed their policies to include same-sex partners as

246.
Id.
247.
Id. at 1332.
248.
Id.; see also Susan Donaldson James, Lesbians Sue When Partners Die
Alone, ABC NEWS (May 20, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=7633058.
249.
Erin Shaughnessy Zuiker, The Rights of Patients to Visitors of Their
Choice: CMS Expands the Meaning of “Immediate Family” and Through Regulation
Requires Hospitals to Do the Same, HOSPS. & HEALTH SYS. RX, May 2011, at 16, 16.
250.
Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
251.
Obama Orders Hospital Visitation Rights for Gays, Lesbians, CNN
POLITICS (Apr. 16, 2010, 2:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/15/
hospital.gay.visitation/index.html.
252.
Id.
253.
Id.
254.
President Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum–Hospital Visitation
(Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidentialmemorandum-hospital-visitation.
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part of their “family member” definitions and have adopted a nondiscrimination policy that encompasses sexual orientation, gender identity,
and gender expression.255 Although such policy changes are occurring
throughout Florida hospitals, they are not a result of any state action.256
President Obama’s memorandum did not cover end-of-life decisions
that arise when dealing with funeral decisions and disposition of remains.257
However, this issue also causes problems for the same-sex partners,
specifically when “[f]amilies [are] unfamiliar with or intolerant of a samesex relationship [and they] may make after-death arrangements contrary to a
couple’s wishes.”258 In Florida, “any person may carry out written
instructions of the decedent relating to the decedent’s body and funeral and
burial arrangements.”259 Therefore, it is advised that same-sex partners
provide directives on how they wish their remains to be disposed.260 If such
measures are not taken, the same-sex partner will have no say in such
decision regarding the area of burial and cemetery arrangements, since the
state law has traditionally vested decision-making authority in the next of
kin.261
3.

Living Facilities

About eighty percent of senior care is provided by family, but since
LGBTI elders typically do not have the traditional family support system,
many end up relying on nursing homes or other institutions for long-term
care.262 The thought of going to a nursing home or a living facility raises
many fears for the LGBTI elders.263 Unfortunately, their fears are validly

255.
Id.; see also, e.g., JACKSON HEALTH SYS., VISITATION POLICY 1–2 (2010),
http://www.jacksonhealth.org/library/policies/jhs-visitation-policy.pdf.
256.
See President Barack Obama, supra note 254; see also, e.g., JACKSON
HEALTH SYS., supra note 255.
257.
See President Barack Obama, supra note 254.
258.
Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 233, at 748.
259.
FLA. STAT. § 732.804 (2013).
260.
Bouchard & Zadworny, supra note 233, at 748.
261.
Jennifer E. Horan, Note, “When Sleep at Last Has Come”: Controlling
the Disposition of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 423, 428
(1999) (discussing the difficulty encountered by surviving same-sex partners).
262.
LGBT MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & SERVS. & ADVOCACY FOR
GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, & TRANSGENDER ELDERS, IMPROVING THE LIVES OF LGBT OLDER
ADULTS
ii,
33–34
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sageusa.org/resources/publications.cfm?ID=21.
263.
Dean H. Freeman, Gay Seniors Fear Nursing Home Abuse in Broward if
“Outed”, FLA. NURSING HOME LAW. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2012), http://
www.floridanursinghomelawyerblog.com/2012/08/gay_seniors_fear_nursing_home_1.html.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

39

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

LESBIAN LAWYERS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

31

rooted, especially when elders “face a heightened risk of abuse . . . regardless
of other identity factors.”264 Being part of a minority group makes the
LGBTI elders more susceptible to being subjected to emotional and physical
hostility and to being the first target of abuse in living facilities.265 For such
reasons, many LGBTI elders who end up in long-term care institutions feel
forced to closet their sexual orientation.266
Although the Nursing Home Reform Act (“NHRA”) was designed to
protect LGBTI elders from discrimination, abuse, and neglect in federally
certified nursing homes,267 this does not mean that such conduct does not
continue to occur.268 Regardless of the federal protections, the LGBTI elders
are correct in believing that in such institutions “‘[t]hey can[not] be
guaranteed an environment . . . where they will be treated equally.’”269 A
national survey indicated that forty-three percent of 770 LGBTI elders living
in a nursing home “reported some type of mistreatment by staff or fellow
patients” and “about [twenty] percent of LGBT[I] patients were abruptly
discharged from their facility—a far higher rate than their straight
counterparts.”270 Also, since the NHRA protections do not cover living
facilities or nursing homes that are not federally funded, it is up to the states

264.
Jaime E. Hovey, Note, Nursing Wounds: Why LGBT Elders Need
Protection from Discrimination and Abuse Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
17 ELDER L.J. 95, 96 (2009).
265.
Id.
266.
Diane C. Lade, Nursing Home as Closet—‘Gen Silent’ Film on Gay
Seniors Exposes Prejudice, Fear, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2012, at 1A (“More than threefourths of the LGBT[I] survey respondents said gay seniors would hide their sexual
orientation if they ended up in institutional care.”); see also Daniel Redman, They Stood Up
for Us: Advocating for LGBT Elders in Long-Term Care, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
443, 452–53 (2012).
Vera and Zayda were together for fifty-eight years. When Vera’s
Alzheimer’s became too much for Zayda to deal with, they went into an assisted
living facility. Despite the fact that they had been partners for nearly six decades,
they were afraid to be out in this facility, and they presented themselves as sisters
instead. Once Vera passed away, Zayda did not feel like she could speak about
their relationship. She did not put up any pictures or any indications of the fact that
she had lived this life with this person whom she loved, and with whom she had
built a family.

Redman, supra note 266, at 453.
267.
NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR. ET AL., LGBT OLDER ADULTS IN LONGTERM CARE FACILITIES: STORIES FROM THE FIELD 21 (2011), available at http://
www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/NSCLC_LGBT_report.pdf.
268.
Rob Barry et al., Neglected to Death, Part 1: Once Pride of Florida; Now
Scenes of Neglect, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/30/
2194842/once-pride-of-florida-now-scenes.html.
269.
Lade, supra note 266.
270.
Freeman, supra note 263.
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to set those protections.271 Sadly, Florida has not been at the forefront in
enforcing laws protecting the elders in long-term care facilities, let alone
creating laws that would protect the LGBTI elders in long-term care
facilities.272 Instead, “[r]eports have criticized [Florida] nursing homes and
assisted living facilities for not meeting the specialized health and welfare
needs of elderly homosexuals.”273 Until proactive measures are taken by
Florida to hold the long-term care institutions accountable for unfair
treatment towards the LGBTI elders, the LGBTI elders feel forced to hide
their identity in order to diminish the likelihood of abuse, discrimination, and
neglect.274
C.

Adoption

Until recently, Florida had a total ban on homosexual adoption.275
“In 1977, Florida became the first state to enact a [blanket exclusion] on
adoption[] by gay[s] or lesbian[s] . . . .”276 The statute plainly stated “[n]o
person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual.”277 The legislation clearly singled out the LGBTI community
from adopting on the basis that the group was dangerous to children.278
Even though there was a “lack of empirical studies or legislative fact-finding
regarding the harms of adoption by gay or lesbian adults, the legislature[’s]”
hostility was enough to enact the ban on all homosexual adoptions.279 As

271.
NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR. ET AL., supra note 267, at 21–25.
272.
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN
THE U.S. (2013), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/
non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf; Report Reveals Elder Abuse in Florida Assisted Living
Facilities, HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2011, 10:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
05/08/report-reveals-elder-abuse_n_858892.html. The article points out “Florida’s state
regulators’ failure to monitor and enforce the laws protecting some of society’s most
vulnerable residents.” Report Reveals Elder Abuse in Florida Assisted Living Facilities,
supra note 272.
273.
15 JEROME IRA SOLKOFF & SCOTT M. SOLKOFF, FLORIDA ELDER LAW §
24.5 (2012–2013).
274.
Freeman, supra note 263; Lade, supra note 266.
275.
See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G.,
45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91–92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
276.
Tiffani G. Lee, Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services: A Challenge to Florida’s Homosexual Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 151, 151
(1996).
277.
FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.042
(2013)) (emphasis added).
278.
Lee, supra note 276, at 154; FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (1977) (current version
at FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2013)).
279.
Lee, supra note 276, at 155.
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one senator pointed out, the statute “had nothing to do with adoption and
everything to do with discrimination against homosexuals.”280
In Florida, the right to adopt has been incessantly fought for by the
LGBTI community for thirty-six years.281 In many cases like Lofton v.
Kearney,282 homosexual foster parents challenged the constitutionality of
Florida’s adoption ban.283 The courts constantly upheld the adoption ban,
mainly on the reasoning that the best interest of the child was a legitimate
basis for the ban.284 However, it has been clear to many that “the best
interest of the child standard, that was offered as the legitimate purpose
behind the per se denial of homosexual adoption, [was] merely a guise for
discrimination.”285
After previous failed legal challenges to the adoption ban, a Third
District Court of Appeal decision has changed the playing field in the favor
of the LGBTI community.286 In 2010, the Third District Court of Appeal
deemed the law banning homosexuals from adopting unconstitutional.287
The court held that “the best interests of children are not preserved by
prohibiting homosexual adoption,” and “the [law] violated . . . equal
protection rights of the children [and their prospective parents].”288 For now,
the prohibited adoption by gays and lesbians is no longer in effect.289 But the

280.
Id. Oddly enough, members of the LGBTI community could become
foster parents, but could not adopt those foster children until the legal challenge was initiated
by a gay foster father. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.
Nov. 25, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. &
N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The Florida Circuit Court of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit found the prohibition against adoption unconstitutional. Id. at *29.
281.
See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.042
(2013)); Lofton v. Kearny, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374–76 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Cox v. Fla. Dep’t
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 902–03 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
282.
157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
283.
Id. at 1374.
284.
See, e.g., id. at 1383–84.
285.
Carolyn S. Grigsby, Note, Lofton v. Kearney: Discrimination Declared
Constitutional in Florida, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 199, 224 (2002); see also Timothy
P.F. Crowley, Case Note, Lofton v. Kearney: The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida Holds Florida’s Statutory Ban on Gay Adoption Is Not Offensive
to the Constitution, 11 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 253, 263 (2002).
286.
See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G.,
45 So. 3d 79, 81, 91–92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Susan Spencer-Wendel, Gay Adoption
Ban Overturned; an Appeals Court Rejects Nation’s Last Prohibition; State Stops Enforcing
It, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 23, 2010, at A.1.
287.
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d at 92; Spencer-Wendel, supra
note 286.
288.
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d at 87, 91.
289.
Spencer-Wendel, supra note 286.
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fight is far from over; a backlash against gay and lesbian adoption continues
to ensue.290 There remains the lingering possibility of another Florida
appellate court ruling differently on the matter, which would take it to the
Supreme Court of Florida to make the final ruling.291
D.

Child Custody

In Florida, a LGBTI parent might face child custody and visitation
issues in two main factual contexts: 1) “[A] person who enters into a
heterosexual marriage and has children, [but] later divorce[s] after
discovering that he or she is gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender,” or 2) “[a]
same-sex couple[] . . . rais[es] a child or children together [and later]
separate[s].”292 In the first scenario, the legal issues for the LGBTI parent
arise due to his or her sexual orientation and/or gender identity.293 While in
the second scenario, the legal issues for the LGBTI parents typically arise
because only one of the LGBTI parents is the legal parent of the child.294
Under Florida law, there is a lot more guidance on how to deal with child
custody or visitation issues if the LGBTI parent had the child from a prior
heterosexual relationship.295
In a custody decision, it is the court that decides which parent is
better fit to retain custody over his or her child.296 A “family court judge
applying a ‘best interest of the child’ test, has broad discretion in defining
which family members or forms are deviant and which are normal and
healthy.”297 In Florida, the problem for the LGBTI parent lies in the broad
discretion that the judges have.298 Many court decisions show that judges
decide child custody matters based on the social stigma of homosexuality,
rather than what is truly in the best interest of the child.299 Take, for

290.
See id.
291.
Id.
292.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES
FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PARENTS IN FLORIDA 1 (2009), available at
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2007_10_02_FLCustodyPub.pdf.
293.
See Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (per curiam).
294.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 1–2.
295.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2013).
296.
Id.; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kelly Reese, Reflections on
Loving and Children’s Rights, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 19 (2009).
297.
Woodhouse & Reese, supra note 296, at 19 (emphasis added).
298.
See Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (per curiam); Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 543.
299.
Packard, 697 So. 2d at 1293; Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 540.
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example, Maradie v. Maradie,300 where the trial court below removed child
custody rights from a lesbian-mother on the basis that the “‘homosexual
environment is not a traditional home environment and can adversely affect a
child,’”301 or Packard v. Packard,302 where the trial court below reasoned
that due to the mother’s sexual orientation, the father would “provide a more
traditional family environment for the children.”303 Even though the Florida
appellate courts have clarified that sexual orientation of an LGBTI parent
should only be considered in determining custody matters if it has a direct
bearing on the “‘welfare of the child,’” these types of rulings exemplify how
social stereotypes disfavor the LGBTI parent in Florida.304
Unlike LGBTI parents from prior heterosexual relationships,
“[s]ame-sex parents in Florida . . . face unique legal issues” because,
typically, “both partners in a same-sex couple cannot establish a legally
recognized parental relationship to the couple’s child.”305 Since same-sex
couples in Florida cannot gain parental rights on the basis of marriage, there
are very few avenues available for a LGBTI non-legal parent to form legal
ties with his or her child.306 A recent avenue that has become available to
Florida’s LGBTI non-legal parents is second-parent adoption.307 “Secondparent adoption in Florida is when an unmarried parent adopts her partner’s
biological or adoptive child. This adoption generally gives the second parent
full legal parental rights, legal and custodial.”308 This adoption option only
recently became available to Florida’s LGBTI community as a result of
Florida’s lift on the ban of homosexual adoption.309 Although the secondparent adoption option might be available, it remains a new and unsettled law
in Florida.310
If a LGBTI non-legal parent is unable to establish legal ties to the
child, Florida case law precedent does not favor his or her fight in obtaining

300.
680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
301.
Id. at 540.
302.
697 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
303.
Id. at 1293.
304.
See id. (quoting Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 542); see also Jacoby v. Jacoby,
763 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
305.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 7 (emphasis added).
306.
See supra Part IV.A.
307.
Second Parent Adoption, GIDEON I. ALPER ATT’Y & COUNS. LAW, http://
www.galperlaw.com/gay-law/second-parent-adoption/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
308.
Id.
309.
See supra Part IV.C; Second Parent Adoption, supra note 307.
310.
The Law Firm of Adam B. Cordover, P.A., A Story of Second Parent
Adoption, ABC FAM. L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2012), http://abcfamilyblog.wordpress.com/2012/04/
28/an-interesting-story-of-second-parent-adoption/.
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child custody or visitation rights.311 “Florida’s appellate courts have
consistently held that parental rights cannot be extended or established based
upon the emotional or psychological bond that develops over time when one
treats a child as his or her own, even with the legal parents’ knowledge and
consent.”312 The Florida judiciary is continually unwilling to apply the legal
theories that could grant the LGBTI non-legal parent custodial rights to the
child.313 More often than not, Florida courts treat the LGBTI non-legal
parent as a legal stranger to the child.314 In Wakeman v. Dixon,315 the court
rejected the former domestic partner’s claim of parental rights as a de facto
or psychological parent as there is “no right to claim court-ordered visitation
as a psychological parent, and the court lacks the inherent authority to award
it.”316 Florida’s Judiciary justifies its reluctance to extend theories of de
facto parent or psychological parent with the argument that those “‘rights
are, with regard to a non-parent, statutory, and the court has no inherent
authority to award’” them.317 Not surprisingly, the Florida Legislature has
taken no action in granting the court such authority.318 Quite obviously, the
inaction of Florida’s Judiciary and Legislature in this matter stems from legal
animus towards the LGBTI community.319

311.
See T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(Lawson, J., dissenting) (citing Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (per curiam)), aff’d in part, disapproved in part, No. SC12-261, 2013 WL
5942278 (Fla. Nov. 7, 2013); Lamariatata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2002); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Music
v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Meeks
v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)); Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d
270, 271–72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
312.
T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 807 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
313.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 10–12.
314.
See id. This is a growing issue especially when “[a]n increasing number
of same-sex couples are choosing to have children. . . . Reproductive options for same-sex
couples who desire to parent include adoption, foster care, embryo adoption, surrogacy, donor
sperm insemination (“DI”), donor oocyte with gestational carrier (“GC”), and shared
maternity.” Deborah Smith, What are the Reproductive Options When a Same-Sex Couple
Wants a Family?, SEXUALITY, REPROD. & MENOPAUSE, Aug. 2011, at 30, 30–31.
315.
921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
316.
Id. at 672–73 (citing Swain v. Swain, 567 So. 2d 1058, 1058 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
317.
Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(per curiam) (quoting Meeks v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992));
see also Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673 (quoting Music, 654 So. at 1235).
318.
See Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 672.
319.
See Memorandum from Williams Inst. On Florida—Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity Law and Documentation of Discrimination 8 (Sept. 2009), available at
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Florida.pdf.
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Employment Discrimination

“[T]he Florida Civil Rights Act does not cover employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.”320 It has
been clearly documented that, in Florida, LGBTI individuals experience
employment discrimination at a high rate.321 Yet, the Florida Legislature has
failed to take action to prevent such injustices from continuing.322 To this
day, Florida does not have a “statute prohibiting employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.”323 In 2008, the Florida
Legislature made attempts to add sexual orientation and gender identity as
impermissible grounds for discrimination, but since animus towards the
LGBTI community is prevalent within the legislature, no protection has
passed.324 Take, for example, Florida House Representative D. Alan Hays,
who believes that LGBTI individuals “‘need psychological treatment.’”325
Until such animosity towards LGBTI individuals is extinguished, it is
unlikely that LGBTI individuals will have a legal remedy in matters of
employment discrimination.326 Until then, cases like that of Steven
Stanton—who was employed for seventeen years as a city manager but fired
once he announced plans of getting a gender change—will continue to
occur.327
V.

WHAT THE LESBIAN LAWYERS OBSERVED ABOUT THE LEGAL
SYSTEM

Lesbian lawyers have multiple challenges relating to the legal
system.
The first is that the law itself was written by males and to
advantage males.329 Women were a later addition.330 Deborah L. Rhode
gives due credit to contemporary changes in regard to sex and the law, noting
328

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 1.
See id. at 1–8, 17–30.
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 1.
Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
See id.; Willie Howard, Stanton Starts Work as City Manager,
SUNSENTINEL
(May
5,
2009),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-05-05/news/
0905010127_1_city-manager-steve-stanton-gender-identity.
327.
See Howard, supra note 326.
328.
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem
Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2002).
329.
See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 3–4 (1983 ed. 1983).
330.
See id. at 219 tbl.12.1. Less than 5% of the lawyers were women in the
1960s and fewer than 2% were law professors. Id. at 4 tbl.I.1, 219–20 tbl.12.1.
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that “[t]oday, the legal landscape has been transformed.”331 But she contends
that even with more women in law and the abiding belief that “the woman
problem has been solved,”332 inequities remain a serious problem from
salaries to mentoring to promotions.333 Rhode believes that these and other
areas remain—and often continue—to present obstacles and challenges to
lesbian lawyers and their clients.334
All of our interviewees described a changing legal system and a
changing world for lesbian lawyers, although they described different
degrees of systemic change.335 Most felt the law was more or less equal in
its treatment of lesbian and gay clients and lawyers336 and seemed to feel that
“for the most part, [they thought] judges just care about the law. They [are]
not—they [are] not [sic] going to necessarily care about is he gay or
Jennifer Travieso expressed mixed feelings—shared by
straight.”337
several—that if a jury knows, it may, but it would probably not affect a judge
because they mostly just use the law.338 On the other hand, Robin Bodiford
stated flatly that there is “[n]o such thing as someone not bringing biases to
[the] bench.”339 And Michelle Parker, when asked to describe her angriest
moment—as all interviewees were—answered, “[m]y angriest moment is that
there is bias everywhere. You [are] not always going to get a fair deal, like
life is [not] fair . . . .”340 Monica Salis affirms, “[m]y job is to make the court
be fair. . . . There [is] bias everywhere. Every case. Every case.”341
Interestingly, even most of those who described the legal system as primarily
fair, later went on to describe incidents of unfairness within the system or in

331.
Rhode, supra note 328, at 1001.
332.
Id.
333.
Id. at 1001–04.
334.
See id. at 1003–06.
335.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 5;
Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18; Interview with Linda F. Harrison &
Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 22; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 5;
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 17; see Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra
note 3, at 18; Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 11–12; Interview with
Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 19–20.
336.
See Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 4–
5; Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra
note 4, at 19.
337.
Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 8.
338.
Id.; see also Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 17; Interview
with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 9; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9.
339.
Interview with Robin L. Bodiford (Aug. 3, 2012), supra note 4, at 5.
340.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 12.
341.
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9.
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individuals within the system;342 for example, how heterosexual women
lawyers found more success,343 how men still outnumber women in many
courtrooms,344 how juries might deal unfairly with LGBTI individuals, how
opposing lawyers might use a person’s sexual orientation as an issue,345 how
some judges demonstrated biased language or behavior, and the difference in
perspectives between urban courts compared to courts in North Florida.346
The interviewees agreed that same-sex marriages deserved equal
legal footing—no matter whether they saw marriage itself as a positive
institution or not.347 Yet same-sex marriage remains unavailable in most
states and has found inconsistent support in the courts at best.348
In addition, our research experience in the snowball sample done for
this project contradicts the idea that we have achieved equality, in terms of
sexual orientation, within the legal profession.349 Monica Salis, one of our
interviewees who works with the local GLLN, also commented:
A lot of gay attorneys are not out. They [are] out socially.
They [are] out in organizations. We have, I [would] say, a good
[thirty] percent of GLLN members that [will not] put their name
on a list, do [not] want their name anywhere, and then there [are] a
whole bunch of people that [will not] join . . . at all or come to our
events, and they [are] known in the community as gay, not any
350
question.

In a truly equal legal world, lesbians in the legal profession would not need
to self-censor interviews or organizational memberships.351 Indeed, some of
the comments in our interviews suggest that this is still necessary, especially
for beginning lawyers at larger firms.352 One experienced attorney
interviewee, when asked for advice for young lawyers, said, “bear in mind
that most of the people in the world are heterosexual and . . . you have to

342.
See, e.g., id. at 9.
343.
See Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 1.
344.
See Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 18.
345.
Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 9.
346.
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 9–10, 17–18.
347.
Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 8; Interview with Seril L.
Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 17; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra
note 4, at 16–17; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 6; Interview with Michelle M.
Parker, supra note 4, at 10; Interview with Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 12–13.
348.
See supra Part IV.A.
349.
See supra Part III.
350.
Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 11.
351.
See id.
352.
See, e.g., Interview with Seril L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 22–23.
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deal with them” and that “there [are] still a lot of conservative firms. If that[]
[is] where you want to have [the] job, you have to abide by their rules.” 353
She finished by noting that a young lawyer “[cannot] be radical if you want
to work for a [big] firm. . . . Once you[] [are] inside . . . you might be able to
shake things up . . . .”354
Although some interviewees stressed the fairness of the law to gays
and lesbians,355 some also wanted to see a lesbian on the Supreme Court of
the United States.356 One said, “it would be [nice] to have someone on [our]
team up there.”357
All our interviewees spent years practicing, teaching, or studying law
in South Florida.358 However, while many interviewees emphasized the
concept of fairness for all within the legal system, 359 only one interviewee
mentioned the many years in which gays and lesbians were treated unfairly
in terms of law and forbidden to legally adopt in Florida––though they were
considered fit foster parents.360
VI.

CONCLUSION: SOME MUSINGS ON IDENTITY AND LAW

It may seem at first that the issue of identity is a personal one, best
examined through sociology or psychology, and irrelevant to law. However,
in reality, for LGBTI and all those whose sexuality does not fit into
mainstream categories—identity, society, and law are strongly intertwined.361
Why is identity important in law? Courts of law, like people, have the power
to define, restrict, or even liberate an identity.362 The Court has done each of
these in its history.363 For instance, in Romer v. Evans,364 one side singled
people out, based on their identity, for a lack of protection under the law.365

353.
Id. at 22.
354.
Id. at 23.
355.
E.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 7.
356.
E.g., Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 12–13.
357.
Id. at 13.
358.
See supra Part I.
359.
E.g., Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 7.
360.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 3–
4; see also Lofton v. Kearny, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
361.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627–30 (1996).
362.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–
29.
363.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–29; Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188–90 (1986).
364.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
365.
Id. at 624.
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They said that Coloradans could not enact local laws to protect a group366—
homosexuals—and three dissenting members of the Court evidently saw that
as acceptable.367 Another example is Bowers v. Hardwick,368 which upheld
sodomy laws that declared homosexual sex a crime—the Court essentially
criminalized people’s identities.369 Of course, this decision was later
overturned in Lawrence v. Texas,370 but consider the devastating effects of
the original ruling on identity from societal and personal standpoints.371 The
effects linger today—as people and groups continue to attempt to use the
courts to restrict homosexual identity.372
Thus, finding out how lesbian lawyers identify and what their
triumphs and challenges have been in the legal field provide an important
historical perspective, and inform us about contemporary evolutions in the
field. Our interviewees were a wonderfully diverse group of women that
shared some qualities in common, such as lesbianism and a legal degree, but
differed in race, ethnicity, class, political beliefs, family, generation, and
disclosure of identity—by method, time, and impact of coming out.373 They
did share one other quality—a passion for justice in the legal system.374
Perhaps that passion manifests itself in their choices related to the practice of
law.375 None were corporate lawyers, for example.376 It may be that
corporate lawyers are less likely to be involved in the GLLN for various
reasons and were, therefore, not reached by this snowball sample. Most—
but not all—saw the legal system as generally fair to LGBTI, even while
surrounded by examples—particularly in Florida—of when it is not.377 This

366.
Id. at 624, 635–36.
367.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
368.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
369.
Id. at 187–89.
370.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
371.
See id. at 578; Adams, supra note 193, at 751–52; Ihrig, supra note 97, at
558; supra Part II.
372.
Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (per curiam); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 540–41 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (per curiam).
373.
See supra Parts I–III.
374.
Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra note 4, at 8;
see also Interview with Michelle M. Parker, supra note 4, at 6.
375.
See supra Parts I–II.
376.
See Interview with Lilas Ayandeh, supra note 3, at 4; Interview with Seril
L. Grossfeld, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with Linda F. Harrison & Phyllis D. Kotey, supra
note 4, at 8; Interview with Lea P. Krauss, supra note 4, at 11; Interview with Michelle M.
Parker, supra note 4, at 11; Interview with Monica I. Salis, supra note 4, at 1; Interview with
Jennifer Travieso, supra note 3, at 1.
377.
See supra Part V.
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may speak to optimism, it may speak to the increasing changes and ongoing
evolution of the legal system, or it may be influenced by the loyalty; all seem
to relate to principles of law and to the legal system in the United States.
Lesbian lawyers are faced with contradictions within the system.378 They
have been taught respect for the rule of law in law school, yet the same
system and associated set of laws still discriminate against them at an
identity-based level.379 They remain both insiders and outsiders to the
system.380 This is another quality they share and one that puts them in a very
different place from lawyers who are not lesbians.381

378.

See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra Part

379.

See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra Part

380.
Parts IV–V.
381.
Parts IV–V.

See Memorandum from Williams Inst., supra note 319, at 2–8; supra

IV.
IV.
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ABSTRACT
Hollywood East! The honorific title bestowed upon a bewitching
state known for her sandy beaches, warm winter days, and mosquito-filled
Everglades. Florida and the Film Industry: A tale of an alluring titan and a
powerful behemoth behaving like two lovers enmeshed in an affair, complete
with wooing, courting, and rebuffs. A relationship that has lasted over a
century and continues to blossom amidst healthy competition, tax incentives,
innovative legislation, and cooperation. Florida’s commitment to a thriving
film industry—through its legislature, government administrative agencies,
and incentives—has allowed its economy to grow and its citizenry to
flourish, while showcasing Florida to the world.
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This article chronicles the development of the Florida film and
entertainment industry, from its inception to the present day, as a product of
environment, opportunity, economics, law, and policy.1 The film and
entertainment industry is one of the most significant contributors to Florida’s
local, regional, and global image, through depiction of its people, cities,
industry, and nature. As an ever-growing contributor to the state’s economy
through job creation, service industry revenues, and tax collections, Florida’s
relationship with the film and entertainment industry has gone from an ad
hoc approach to a carefully strategized, multi-year effort, fueled by the
Florida Film and Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive Program, to
encourage the use of the state as a location for all facets of digital, film, and
television production.2
This article will address in Part I the earliest history of film in
Florida from the late nineteenth century birth and flourishing through the
1917 transfer to California and revitalization during World War II. 3 Part II
considers the state’s economic, political, and legal enticements for the film
industry to grow in the state and to match the public relations campaign to
draw tourism to the Sunshine State.4 Part III outlines the essence of 1950s
blockbuster hits that gave impetus to rules and laws to solidify the state’s
relationship with the film industry.5 As commented upon in Part IV,
Florida’s compelling call to the industry reached New York City and beyond,
bringing rare talent that would further expand the industry’s reach and hold
in Florida.6 Worthy of Part V’s particular focus, mesmerizing Miami
reached international recognition as a thriving hub for both television and
film from the 1950s onward, and industry contractual practices there set the
standard for the entire film and television industry thenceforth.7 Part VI
summarizes the background, legislative authority, and practical efforts of the
Governor’s Office of Film and Entertainment, followed by the tax incentives
under state and federal law which caused the film and television industry
efforts in Florida to expand exponentially in the twenty-first century onward
in Part VII; specifically with some of the most notable progeny of this effort
and their value to state, regional, and the national economies showcased in

1.
See infra Part I–X.
2.
See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment
Industry Financial Incentive Program, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/
incentives.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t,
Florida Film & Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive Program].
3.
See infra Part I.
4.
See infra Part II.
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
See infra Part IV.
7.
See infra Part V.
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Part VIII.8 Part IX highlights how past is prologue for Florida film and
television, why current state and federal initiatives will prevent major
production efforts from becoming runaway boons to other states and
countries, and the demonstrable economic benefits those laws and policies
have already produced for Florida in particular, and the United States in
general.9 In conclusion, Part X predicts how faithfulness and fidelity to the
film and television industry will continue to reap benefits in a multi-billion
dollar relationship continuing into its second century, with over 120 films
and television shows to its credit and counting.10
I.

FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY: THE LOVERS MEET

The story begins “in 1898, [when] the Spanish-American War
newsreels [entitled] U.S. Cavalry Supplies Unloading at Tampa Florida”
captured and permanently recorded a glimpse of Florida’s story.11 Film fever
took hold in Miami and Jacksonville at the turn of the century.12 “The years
1907 to 1909 marked the first attempt by the [film] industry to mass-produce
narratives,”13 and “Klutho, Edison and Biograph were [the giants] . . . among
more than thirty silent film [studios] based in Jacksonville, [the so-called]
‘Winter Film Capital of the World,’ . . . [welcoming] The Keystone Kops,
Oliver Hardy, and Lionel Barrymore.”14 “The [nation’s] first permanent
filming studio, Kalem Studios, [was] opened in . . . 1908” in Jacksonville,
and the port city became a major innovator in the African-American film
industry as well.15 Aside from these innovations, Jacksonville would be
8.
See infra Parts VI, VII, VIII.
9.
See infra Part IX.
10.
See infra Part X.
11.
JAMES PONTI, HOLLYWOOD EAST: FLORIDA’S FABULOUS FLICKS 2
(Kathleen M. Kiely & Dixie Kasper eds., 1992).
12.
See id. at 2–3, 6.
13.
THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 22 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985).
14.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 3; see also BLAIR MILLER, ALMOST HOLLYWOOD:
THE FORGOTTEN STORY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 1, 3, 41 (2013).
15.
Jacksonville’s Place in Film History, OFFICIAL WEBSITE CITY
JACKSONVILLE, FL, http://www.coj.net/departments/office-of-economic-development/filmand-television/film-history-in-jacksonville.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). Jacksonville’s
official online history notes that:
In 1916, producer Richard Norman came to Jacksonville and opened a movie
studio. Norman, a white man, began his career in the 1910s making movies for
white audiences. Soon afterwards, he began making movies for African-American
audiences, opened his Jacksonville studio and joined the ranks of others, including
Oscar Micheaux and the Lincoln Motion Picture Company, in being a pioneer in
producing movies not only geared towards African-Americans, but that showed
them in a positive light and employed them in the production side of the film
industry. Norman Studios continued to make African-American films, also known
as race movies, throughout the 1920s.
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responsible for one of the world’s largest movie studios of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries; Joseph Engel’s 1915 Metro Pictures later merged with
another company to become Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”).16 Florida’s
relationship with Hollywood was moving quickly, but with competing
priorities and no established rules, a clash was inevitable.17 As the industry
grew, these silent film companies began to lock horns with the conservative
Florida folks.18 Irate residents were sick and tired of the way the movie
people manhandled their town; in one instance, a script called for a shot of a
red fire engine roaring down Main Street, so the production crew simply
called in a fake fire and rolled cameras as the fire truck screamed to the
rescue, and in another instance, pastors and their congregations lodged
protests that bank robberies were being filmed on Sundays.19 Safety became
a major issue.20 During the 1916 filming of The Clarion, a riot broke out,
requiring forty police officers to clear out more than 1300 extras.21 During
that same year, while filming of The Dead Alive, the actors, following
instructions from the director, sped down the main thoroughfare of
Jacksonville and “plunged [their movie car] into the St. Johns River.”22
Apparently, the director had confided in the crew—but did not tell the
actors—that he had saved this scene for last, just “in case the actors [did not]
survive the crash.”23
This type of crass “behavior made the film industry the [major topic
of the] Jacksonville[] mayoral election of 1917.”24 The conservatives ousted
the pro-movie industry “incumbent Mayor ‘Jet’ Bowden.”25 This rang the
death knell for the filmmakers in Florida.26 Without the backing and support
of the government, private businesses, and the local community, the movie
industry packed up and headed west.27 California offered a friendlier
environment, mountains, beaches, plentiful talent, and a skilled labor force.28
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
See PONTI, supra note 11, at 3.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
MILLER, supra note 14, at 120; PONTI, supra note 11, at 3. For fascinating
contemporary background on the production of this movie, see Manufacturers’ Advance
Notes, MOVING PICTURE WORLD, Jan. 1, 1916, at 1153, 1310, available at http://
ia700707.us.archive.org/21/items/movingpicturewor27newy/movingpicturewor27newy.pdf.
22.
MILLER, supra note 14, at 120; PONTI, supra note 11, at 3.
23.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 3.
24.
Id. at 3–4.
25.
Id. at 4.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 3–4.
28.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 4.
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The film industry settled in to Los Angeles and the cameras stopped rolling
in Florida—temporarily.29
Florida’s reputation was tarnished and her relationship with
Hollywood was strained.30 It would have been irreparable if not for a bit of
ironic serendipity—“the outbreak of World War II.”31 The Cavalry arrived
as “the military brought cameras back to Florida in the early [19]40s.”32
“Hollywood brought the war . . . to [hometown] theatres across [the
country].”33 The nation’s morale needed a boost and Uncle Sam asked the
studios to help.34 The Federal Government “opened military bases to [the]
movie stars and [film] crews [and asked them to join] the cause.”35
Florida was brimming with military installations and the humid,
palm-tree-lined coast made it the perfect setting to imitate the tropics of the
Pacific Islands.36 Florida cranked out box office smashes like A Guy Named
Joe, 30 Seconds Over Tokyo, and Twelve O’clock High.37 These films were
extremely “successful, as [both] entertainment and . . . propaganda.”38 Most
importantly, this series of events and opportunities reignited the spark
between Florida and the film industry.39
II.

FLORIDA FLAUNTS AND FLIRTS

The State of Florida published Florida, A Guide to the Southernmost
State (“The Guide”) in 193940 in order to lure major industries to the
Sunshine State.41 Capitalizing on this new vitality brought on by the
29.
Id. Actually, the cameras did not stop rolling completely. See The
Yearling—Trivia, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0039111/trivia (last visited Jan. 18,
2014). MGM tried shooting “[m]ost of the ‘atmosphere’ and outdoors animal scenes [for The
Yearling] . . . by a second-unit crew sent to Florida in 1941, when the project was first begun.
The film was shut down soon after the footage was shot, but . . . it was restarted again in 1946,
[using] the 1941 footage.” Id. “During the final days of filming, actor Gregory Peck was
alternating between the Florida set of this movie and a Texas set, where he was
simultaneously filming Duel in the Sun.” Id.
30.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 4.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 5.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 5.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
See id.
40.
FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, WORK PROJECTS ADMIN., FLORIDA: A GUIDE TO
THE SOUTHERNMOST STATE iv (1939).
41.
See John J. Tigert, Foreword to FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, WORK PROJECTS
ADMIN., FLORIDA: A GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERNMOST STATE v, v (1939).
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rekindled flame of the film industry, the government and administrative
agencies of Florida made a conscious decision to keep the flame alive.42 The
Guide, a dense tome describing absolutely everything about Florida,43 was
bound in rich green leather and imprinted with a toothy Florida gator right on
the cover.44 This unabashed exposé of all that is Florida, complete with
flowery language and detailed economic data, legitimized a state that had
previously been known as primeval territory.45
In the Industry and Commerce section, the state’s economic
development is stated in terms of bank resources, which stood at
$500,000,000 in 1927.46 Business life in the state is illustrated by the volume
of retail sales, which stood at $504,523,000 in 1929.47 “Building contracts
awarded during 1936” increased by 35% over 1935, reaching $72,587,000.48
Florida boasted “[f]ifteen [f]ederal highways, [a] [s]tate highway
patrol, [and a] [s]tate gasoline tax [of seven cents].”49 Passenger steamship
lines ran from Miami to Jamaica, the Waterman Line ran from Tampa to
Puerto Rico, and the Mobile Oceanic Line embarked from Tampa to
Europe.50 Extensive rail travel stretched the length of the peninsula.51 But,
one word of caution—some lines had “less than 100 miles of track each.”52
At that time, the Atlantic Coast Line and the Florida East Coast Railway
were built to “penetrate the Everglades, meeting at Lake Harbor, south of
Lake Okeechobee.”53
42.
See PONTI, supra note 11, at 5, 7.
43.
See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, passim.
44.
Id. This was an important moment for Florida. This was the original Film
Florida Production Guide—even though the authors, at the time, did not know it. See id. at iv;
FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE (2003). The spiral bound, color rich guide in 2003, for
example, reports in great detail every aspect of transportation, labor––including union and
non-union workers––permitting, and tax incentives, as “advantages of relocating or expanding
to Florida.” FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44. The Guide from 1939 and the
Film Florida Production Guide in the twenty-first century—although worlds apart in
presentation—embody the same theme. Compare FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK
PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at ix, with FILM FLORIDA
PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44.
45.
See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at 9, 93, 472.
46.
Id. at 93.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. at xvii.
50.
FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF
FLA., supra note 40, at xvii.
51.
See id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
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Labor in Florida included “seven locals [of] the International Cigar
Makers’ Union.”54 The workforce also included Florida longshoremen and
dockworkers, citrus workers, factory workers, canners, packers, and
boatmen.55 By the end of 1937, the American Federation of Labor (“AFL”)
had an estimated membership of “65,000 craft unionists in 400 locals
affiliated with the State Federation of Labor.”56
A [s]tate child-labor law, enacted in 1913 and amended in
1915, established minimum wages and maximum hours for the
employment of children . . . . A State workmen’s compensation
law [was] enacted in 1935 [and] provide[d], with exceptions, for
medical care, compensation, and other assistance to workers
receiving injuries while gainfully employed . . . . A Florida
industrial commission [was] created in 1935 [for the purpose of]
57
exercis[ing] general authority over industrial employment.

Despite union presence in Florida, state laws giving “preference to
the right to work over union membership” allowed Florida to attract
production away from California’s closed shop environment.58
Beautiful sepia photos in the Guide enticed readers to join in the
nightlife of Hollywood Beach, walk the links of the St. Petersburg Golf
Course, or visit the Old Slave Market in St. Augustine.59 An entire chapter is
dedicated to giving detailed touring directions.60 “Tour 5” illustrates the
route from Miami to Naples as a 113-mile trip on US 94.61 The tour
promises a “[h]ard-surfaced roadbed throughout” with “[l]imited
accommodations [and] camp sites.”62 This section of the Tamiami Trail was
constructed by the State Road Department and opened on April 25, 1928 at a
cost of $13 million.63
While traveling Florida in the late 1930s, visitors were encouraged to
photograph the wildlife, respectfully visit the Seminole Villages, and use
caution along the highways, as “[t]he ’Glades [were] thickly overgrown,” the

54.
Id. at 95.
55.
See FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE
STATE OF FLA., supra note 40, at 98.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
NICK HERD, CHASING THE RUNAWAYS 21 (2004).
59.
FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF
FLA., supra note 40, at 162–63 (photos. reprint), 224–25 (photos. reprint).
60.
See id. at 297–538.
61.
Id. at 406.
62.
Id. at 297, 406.
63.
Id. at 406.
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“mangled corpses of snakes” laid on the road, and alligators and buzzards
were everywhere.64
Florida’s wiles have tempted and then transformed out-of-staters for
decades.65 The 1939 Guide describes the transformation this way: “The
person noted for taciturnity in his home community often becomes
loquacious, determined that those about him shall know that he is a man of
substance.”66 A spell, whether brief or extended, in the Florida sunshine was
believed to bring out the best in everyone and everything.67
Over eighty years ago—just as today—Florida understood the
importance of bringing people, industry, and money to Florida: “Regardless
of individual circumstances and preference, one desire seems to be common
to all—the desire to improve Florida.”68
III.

FLORIDA CHARMS A CAPTIVATING CAST OF CHARACTERS

The unspoilt scenery of Florida beckoned to the film industry often
in the early 1940s, with exotic potential film locations close to cities with
Two films
transportation and production-supporting infrastructure.69
depicting the Second Seminole War of 1835–1842 came out in short order,
with all-star casts.70 The first such film, Distant Drums in 1951, featured
Gary Cooper and Mari Aldon in which “American soldiers and their rescued
companions . . . face[d] the dangerous Everglades and hostile Indians in
order to reach safety [in Florida].”71 The journey into the Everglades was
only simulated though, as the actual location of the fort in the film was the
historic Castillo de San Marcos in historic St. Augustine, Florida, near the
sprawling metropolis of Jacksonville, Florida.72 Shortly thereafter came
Seminole, the 1953 American western film directed by Budd Boetticher and
starring Rock Hudson as “[nineteenth]-century army officer Lance
Caldwell,” born and raised in Florida, and returning from his West Point

64.
FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMIN. FOR THE STATE OF
FLA., supra note 40, at 407.
65.
See id. at 8.
66.
Id.
67.
See id. at 8–9.
68.
Id. at 9.
69.
See PONTI, supra note 11, at 5.
70.
See Distant Drums, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043469/ (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014); Seminole, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0046294/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014).
71.
Distant Drums, supra note 70.
72.
See id.
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education to be “assigned to Fort King in the Everglades.”73 Along with
Hudson, notables of the time including Barbara Hale, Anthony Quinn, and
Lee Marvin, and the rest of the cast, actually did endure the steamy, humid
surroundings of the Everglades National Park for much of the film’s
shooting.74
In 1954, Ricou Browning emerged from an eminently hospitable
Wakulla Springs in a $12,000 half-man, half-fish monster suit.75 The
Creature from the Black Lagoon emerged from the murky depths and “saved
Universal [Studios] from impending bankruptcy.”76 “Browning, a swimming
champion, was able to hold his breath for up to four minutes . . . [and] is
credited with creating the . . . torso-twisting creature swimming technique.”77
Creature from the Black Lagoon grossed $3 million78 and helped resuscitate
Florida’s film industry through audiences drawn to its 3-D horror film
appeal, if not for the dramatic acting or scenery.79
73.
Seminole (1953), TURNER CLASSIC MOVIES, http://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/
title/89538/seminole/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
74.
See Seminole, supra note 70. At least forty-four other movies, television
shows, and documentaries to date have similarly featured and have been filmed in the 1.4
million acre UNESCO World Heritage Site at the southern tip of Florida, “the largest
designated sub-tropical wilderness reserve on the North American continent.” Everglades
National Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/76 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); see also
Clambake, Distant Drums, Gentle Ben, Gone Fishin’, Only Fools and Horses. . . ., Stardom,
The Amazing Race, The Mean Season—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/
(search “filmname”; select “filmname”; select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
75.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 35–36. Speaking of springs,
[b]eginning in 1916, when The Seven Swans was filmed in the Silver Springs area
of Central Florida, six Tarzan movies, Creature from the Black Lagoon, Rebel
Without a Cause, and Thunderball, among many movies have been filmed there, as
well as over a hundred episodes of the TV series Sea Hunt, an episode of I Spy, an
episode of Crocodile Hunter with Steve Irwin, and various vacation episodes of a
range of series.

Michael Segers, The Wild Monkeys of Central Florida, YAHOO! VOICES (June 13, 2008),
http://voices.yahoo.com/the-wild-monkeys-central-florida-1530285.html.
76.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 6, 36.
77.
Id. at 36.
78.
Id.
79.
See id. at 6, 36; Blair Davis, The 1950s B-Movie: The Economics of
Cultural Production 73 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University), available at
http://digitool.library.McGill.ca/webclient/streamgate?folder_id=0&dvs=1384119620758~312
; Brian Douglas, Top 10 Horror Films of the 1950s, TOPTENZ (Feb. 14, 2011), http://
www.toptenz.net/top-10-horror-fims-1950s.php. Davis noted that these three-dimensional, or
3-D, movies “utilized stereoscopic cinematography to create the illusion of greater image
depth and a spatially separated foreground, [as seen in] 3-D films such as Bwana Devil (1952),
House of Wax (1953), It Came From Outer Space (1953), and Creature From the Black
Lagoon (1954).” Davis, supra note 79, at 73. The 3-D process in Creature from the Black
Lagoon “was dubbed Thrill Wonder 3-D Horrorscope” as a bit of cinematographic hyperbole.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 35–36.
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What the terrorizing Man-Eating Gill Creature did to help the
industry, the Chairman of the Board succeeded in spoiling.80 In 1959, Frank
Sinatra arrived at the Cardozo Hotel on Miami Beach.81 A Hole in the Head
was the story of a widower—played by Sinatra—who had “dreams of
opening a giant . . . amusement park” in Florida.82 With a star-studded cast,
including Edward G. Robinson and Keenan Wynn, the movie was sure to be
a hit, but Sinatra’s temper tantrums, dame chasing, missed appearances, and
nuisance lawsuits filed by a rival hotel brought more notoriety than good
publicity.83 “[T]he film went on to win an Oscar for [Sinatra’s] song High
Hopes,” but it did not win many friends in Florida.84
Florida’s courtship with the film industry definitely was not boring.85
As she lured a bevy of eligible bachelors, ranging from Ol’ Blue Eyes to
Elvis Presley, she lacked any boundaries in the relationship.86 She needed
rules in order to make the relationship work.87
IV.

FLORIDA’S ALLURING CALL REACHES NEW YORK CITY

During a brutal winter in the 1950s, twenty-seven year old James
Pergola exited his New York City apartment and looked down his street.88
Two blizzards, back-to-back, had buried his car and everyone else’s, in a
pristine blanket of icy snow.89 James shoveled for two days until he finally
found his car.90 He proceeded to pack all of his worldly belongings and
headed south in search of sunshine, beaches, balmy breezes, and a job.91
James had apprenticed under Jack Painter, A.S.C.—the American
Society of Cinematographers—a world-renowned New York cameraman in
the New York local union of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage

80.
PONTI, supra note 11 at 6, 63.
81.
Id. at 63.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 63–64.
84.
Id. at 64.
85.
See PONTI, supra note 11 at 2–3.
86.
See id. at 2–6, 63–64.
87.
See id.
88.
Interview with James C. Pergola (Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library). Pergola worked in the film and
television industry for fifty years. Id. He shot the original pilot episode of Baywatch for NBC
and continued as both a Producer and the Director of Photography of the television series for
ten years. Id. He retired after the conclusion of the final episode of Baywatch in 1999. Id.
For a time, Baywatch was the number one syndicated television show in the world. Id.
89.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
90.
Id.
91.
See id.
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Employees (“IATSE”).92 James took his union card with him, which would
entitle him to work as an assistant cameraman in Florida and earn a lucrative
salary of $400 to $500 per week; but, that was contingent upon the work
available in Florida at the time.93 His departure surprised everyone and,
much to the dismay of his colleagues in New York, James left.94 James was
the number one camera assistant in New York; he was making top dollar and
had a sterling reputation based on his incredible work ethic and talent, but
something was calling him, luring him to Florida.95 He remembered that his
father, Jimmy V. Pergola, had worked in Florida in the 1920s and 1930s
shooting newsreel movie shorts and had also worked on one of bathing
beauty Esther Williams’ aqua ballets in Miami Beach.96
What followed James to Miami was an enormous influx of talent and
the explosive growth of the Florida film industry.97 James had heard the
siren call from the waves off the shore of that lush tropical paradise.98 At
that time, Miami had only one Florida-based assistant cameraman and his
name was Eddie Gibson.99 When James Pergola arrived in Miami, the total
number of Florida film industry, union-card-carrying, New York trained,
assistant cameramen doubled to two.100 Gibson did not mind Pergola’s
entrance into Miami at all.101 He respected James immensely.102 James
Pergola and Eddie Gibson’s fathers had been great friends that worked
together on covering the Cuban Revolution, Mussolini’s rise to power in
Italy, and the hottest car races in Daytona Beach.103
The friendship between Eddie Gibson’s father and James Pergola’s
father abruptly ended on October 17, 1937.104 Veteran Pathé News and Fox
Movietone News cameraman Jimmy V. Pergola was killed when a United
Airlines “Mainliner . . . crashed . . . into . . . Hayden Peak, high in the Uinta

92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
95.
Id.
96.
See Life on the American Newsfront: Worst Air Crash in U.S. History
Takes 19 Lives, LIFE, Nov. 1, 1937, at 32, 38; Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
97.
See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
98.
See id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
103.
Id.
104.
See Life on the American Newsfront: Worst Air Crash in U.S. History
Takes 19 Lives, supra note 96, at 38; James Pergola, Father’s Footsteps: Becoming a
Filmmaker Like His Father, NAPLESNEWS.COM (June 21, 2009), http://www.naplesnews.com/
news/2009/jun/21/fathers-footsteps-becoming-filmmaker-his-father/?print=1.
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Range” resulting in the worst air crash in U.S. history.105 He was shooting a
newsreel story entitled, The Safety of Transcontinental Flying.106 This left
young James with only memories of his dad, now a legend, but he was
embraced by all who had known and worked with his father.107 Florida
opened her arms as well.108
V.

MESMERIZING MIAMI

By the 1950s and early 1960s, Miami had reached international
recognition as a thriving hub for both television and film. 109 Paul Newman
and Joanne Woodward sizzled in The Long, Hot Summer (1958) and Elvis
Presley raised the temperature in the Sunshine State in Follow That Dream
(1962).110 From 1966 to 1970, Jackie Gleason filmed his eponymous Jackie
Gleason Show in Miami.111 From short comedy and melodrama to dramatic
action, the James Bond series thriller Goldfinger (1964) featured luxurious
shots of Millionaire’s Row located at the Morris Lapidus-designed
Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach.112

105.
Life on the American Newsfront: Worst Air Crash in U.S. History Takes
19 Lives, supra note 96, at 38.
106.
Id.
107.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Pergola, supra
note 104.
108.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Pergola, supra
note 104.
109.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 6.
110.
See Follow That Dream, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055992/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); The Long, Hot Summer, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0051878/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
111.
The Jackie Gleason Show, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0195466/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
112.
GOLDFINGER (Eon Productions 1964); see also Overview, FONTAINEBLEAU
MIAMI BEACH, www.fontainebleau.com/web/about_bleau (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). Some
161 road miles and a world apart from Miami, Key West was the film site for a sizeable
portion
of
another
Bond
film.
See
Licence
to
Kill,
IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097742/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). Just ninety-seven road
miles north of Key West lies the island that gained fame as the setting for the 1948 film Key
Largo; apart from background filming used for establishing shots, however, the film was shot
on a Warner Brothers sound stage in Hollywood. See Key Largo–Filming Locations, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0040506/locations (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). Although not a
filming location for the 1951 Lauren Bacall and Humphrey Bogart movie, The African Queen,
Key Largo is also home port to a newly restored 100-year-old riverboat figuring prominently
in the movie’s plot and after which the movie was named. See The African Queen Sets Sail
Again, CBSNEWS (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31749_16257413816-10391698/the-african-queen-sets-sail-again/.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

63

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY

55

Elsewhere in Miami, Ivan Tors Studios was producing Flipper and
Gentle Ben, two of the hottest prime time shows on television.113 Ivan was
born in Budapest in 1916 and immigrated to the United States just prior to
World War II.114 He produced the smash hit motion picture Flipper for
MGM and the film grossed over $23 million.115 To put this success in
perspective, MGM had produced Mutiny on the Bounty, starring Marlon
Brando, that same year, and Mutiny lost $23 million at the box office.116
“The television series Flipper [aired] on Saturday night[s] at 7:30
p.m.” on CBS and was the number one show on television; it upstaged The
Jackie Gleason Show, which had to be moved to a later time slot in order to
survive.117 That friendly dolphin, along with Ranger Porter Ricks and his
sons, Sandy and Bud, turned all eyes to Miami, Florida.118 Luke Halpin, who
played teen heartthrob Sandy, was featured on the cover of the debut issue of
Tiger Beat magazine in September 1965, sending millions of teenage girls to
the newsstands and making the fictitious town of Coral Key Park their dream
destination.119 Today, at fifty years and counting, the ripple effect of
Flipper’s success is still impacting Florida.120 The Miami Seaquarium still
boasts “[television] [s]uperstar Flipper and his Atlantic bottlenose dolphin
friends” in their daily live show Flipper’s Beach Bash.121 Prior to this huge
boon, friendly Florida provided the gorgeous scenery, but only to local
craftsmen.122 The keys—or team-leaders of the various crews—were still
being sent down from New York or east from California.123 The keyelectricians and key-grips brought their top assistants with them from New
York City or Hollywood, “and hired locals for the third or fourth
113.
PONTI, supra note 11, at 6; see Flipper, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0057748/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Gentle Ben, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0061255/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
114.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.; Mutiny on the Bounty, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0056264/
?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
117.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88; see also Paul Mavis,
Flipper—The Original Series:
Season One, DVD TALK (Apr. 24, 2007), http://
www.dvdtalk.com/reviews/27578/flipper-the-original-series-season-one/.
118.
About
Us:
History,
MIAMI
SEAQUARIUM,
http://
www.miamiseaquarium.com/AboutUs/History (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Flipper, supra note
113.
119.
See The Things That Flip “Flipper’s” Friend Luke Halpin!, LLOYD
THAXTON’S TIGER, Sept. 1965, at 48, 49; see also Flipper, supra note 113.
120.
About Us: History, supra note 118.
121.
Flipper Dolphin, MIAMI SEAQUARIUM, http://www.miamiseaquarium.com/
Explore/Shows/Flipper-Dolphin (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
122.
See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
123.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

64

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

56

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

electrician,” camera, grip, or set construction positions.124 James Pergola
was quickly hired for his expertise and worked under camera operators and
directors of photography from California.125 As a result of this symbiotic
relationship, the local Florida crews became highly skilled technicians,
having trained under the best teachers in the industry.126 It was not long
before Florida was boasting that it could provide everything a movie
company needed without shipping in entire crews from Los Angeles and
New York.127 By the mid-1960s, “Hollywood was happy to come” to
Miami, Florida.128 There were enough set builders, art directors, soundmen,
camera crews, and equipment to fully stock two films simultaneously.129
Meanwhile, back in New York City, the movie industry was
dying.130 The unions in New York “had gotten so demanding and difficult
that New York [p]roducers went to Los Angeles.”131 There was a mass
exodus from New York, formerly the television capital of the world, to
California.132 In order to stop this crippling flight, “New York Mayor, [John]
Lindsay, came up with the Lindsay Plan.”133 He instituted a plan that he
hoped would enable filmmakers to easily tour locations, have access to fire
and police, shoot in museums and government buildings, and secure permits
quickly and easily.134 Mayor Lindsay “made deals with the [International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees] (“IATSE”) to hold costs down” and
forced them to make sacrifices—no more Triple Golden Time.135 New York
was forced to mend fences and cooperate with the film and television
industry.136 They had to rebuild their relationship from the ground up.137

124.
Id.
125.
See id.
126.
Id.
127.
See Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
LYNN SPIGEL, TV BY DESIGN: MODERN ART AND THE RISE OF NETWORK
TELEVISION 138 (2008); Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
133.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
134.
See id.; The City of N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Media & Entm’t, Office
History, NYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/film/html/about/office-history.shtml (last visited Jan.
18, 2014); see also James Sanders, Adventure Playground: John V. Lindsay and the
Transformation of Modern New York, DESIGN OBSERVER GROUP (May 4, 2010),
http://places.designobserver.com/feature/adventure-playground--john-v-lindsay-and-thetransformation-of-modern-new-york/13338/.
135.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
136.
See The City of N.Y.C Mayor’s Office of Media & Entm’t, supra note
134.
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As they watched the painful destruction of such a storied and
honored industry in the Empire State, the filmmakers and television
craftsmen in Florida took action.138 Greed could have easily destroyed them,
too, and then everything they had built would have crumble. James Pergola
met with the producers, directors, and government agencies in Florida, and
all agreed that it was necessary to use the same idea in Miami.139 James met
with the Stage Hands local and every other specialty union from Miami to
Tampa, in order to get a consensus.140 It took over three months to come up
with the Florida Standard Agreement.141
The Standard Agreement contract fixed the start time, end time, and
realistic overtime wages within all the unions across the state.142 “‘I sent
every producer in the country, in concert with [the] business agents, this
standard agreement,’” explained Pergola.143 “As films and television shows
came in to Florida, they used our Standard Agreement.”144 Pergola and his
crew formed The Florida Motion Picture and Television Association
(“FMPTA”), which grew to seven chapters by the end of the 1970s.145 The
FMPTA wanted to influence the governor.146 Governor Reubin Askew
needed to have a hard sell.147 Unfortunately, Deep Throat and other
pornographic films were being shot in Florida,148 and the Governor was
137.
See Remembering Steve D’Inzillo, IATSE (Oct. 20, 2000), http://
www.iatse-intl.org/news/remembering-steve-dinzillo; see also The City of N.Y.C. Mayor’s
Office of Media & Entm’t, supra note 134.
138.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
144.
Id. Not to be confused with the Jacksonville, FL newspaper Florida
Standard. See, e.g., Florida Newspapers, FLA. ST. U. LIBR., http://guides.lib.fsu.edu/
content.php?pid=46594&sid=343596 (last updated Nov. 26, 2013).
145.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
146.
See id.; Florida’s Entertainment Industry Success Is Counting on YOU!!!,
FLA. MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION ASS’N, http://www.fmpta-mo.com/Home_Page.html (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (explaining both the mission and composition of the association).
FMPTA is still very much active today. Florida’s Entertainment Industry Success Is
Counting on YOU!!!, supra note 146. For the past thirty-nine years, FMPTA has been a vital
part of the motion picture and television industry in Florida. Id. FMPTA is organized to
promote Florida’s “motion picture, television, audio recording, theater, and digital media”
industries, by providing assistance and information to all interested organizations in regards to
Florida’s skilled personnel, locations, services and fiscal incentives. Id.
147.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
148.
Id.; Kyle Munzenrieder, Coconut Grove Mansion Where Deep Throat’s
Most Infamous Scenes Were Filmed is For Sale, MIAMI NEWTIMES (May 2, 2012, 1:28 PM),
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/riptide/2012/05/coconut_grove_mansion_where_de.php.
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apprehensive about supporting filmmaking in the Sunshine State.149 It was
not until July 1, 1973, that the new Florida Film Coordinator, Sunny Fader,
was appointed to change Florida’s filmmaking opportunities and image for
the better with a modest $50,000 budget.150
The Governor also assigned a man named Ben Harris who was
instrumental in the formation of the FMPTA and “ran the nationally envied
Florida Film Bureau out of the state’s Department of Commerce.”151 Harris
explained that the group would have to show the Governor that the Florida
film industry was economically beneficial to the state of Florida.152 And so it
did.153 The group compiled data and appealed to the Governor to supply
government assistance to this viable industry.154 Through the ease of
obtaining permits, use of state facilities, access to the Florida Highway
Patrol, ability to block off and use state roads, and developing liaisons and
healthy relationships with the administrative agencies in Tallahassee—as
well as county and city governments—the relationship would thrive.155
The Governor agreed and the Florida Film Commission was born.156
James Pergola and his dedicated group deeply believed they had “[a]
sleeping giant just waiting to be awakened,” and by all indications, they were
right.157 As with any love story, there are periods of time when lovers may
quarrel and stop speaking158—possibly because there has been a
misunderstanding or because one of them has taken the other for granted.159
In any event, the relationship between Florida and the film industry is a
relationship that has withstood the tests of time, and has survived undulating
periods of undying support and unchivalrous repudiation.160

149.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
150.
Fred Wright, State Urged to Lure Film-Makers, EVENING INDEPENDENT,
May 31, 1973, at 5B, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=
19730531&id=0n1QAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9lcDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7236,5206907.
151.
Jack Zink, Film Wars Solution: Rewind, SUN-SENTINEL, May 23, 1999, at
1D; see also Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
152.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
153.
See id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Interview with James C. Pergola, supra note 88.
158.
See id.
159.
See id.
160.
See id.
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THE GIANT AWAKENS TO CONCEIVE A NEW FILM LAW AND
COUNCIL
The Florida Film & Entertainment Advisory Council was formed
as a result of legislation signed into law by [then] Governor Jeb
Bush, July 1, 1999. Created in accordance with Chapter 288.1252
of the Florida Statutes, the . . . Council consists of [seventeen]
members, seven appointed by the Governor, five appointed by the
President of the Senate, and five appointed by the Speaker of the
161
House of Representatives.

The Florida Office of Film and Entertainment (“OFE”) notes that,
“[t]he Film Commissioner, a representative of Enterprise Florida, Inc., a
representative of Workforce Florida, Inc., and a representative of the Florida
Tourism Industry Marketing Corporation (Visit Florida) serve as ex officio,
nonvoting members of the council, and are in addition to the [seventeen]
appointed members of the Council.”162 Aside from the very significant
changes to law and bureaucracy intended to grow Florida’s connections to
the film industry, Governor Bush also endorsed a five-hundred-page Film
Florida Production Guide, produced in 2003.163 The guide provides a “direct
link to more than [forty] local film offices throughout the state—from
Pensacola to Key West” and lists “producers, post-production facilities,
crews, studios, equipment, support services, government assistance,
associations, and accommodations . . . all over Florida.”164 Governor Bush
stated, “[t]he Sunshine State’s entertainment industry has grown over the
past decade for one reason: [P]roducers find everything they need in
Florida.”165

161.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Film & Entertainment
Advisory Council, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/about/feac.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Film &
Entertainment Advisory Council]; see also FLA. STAT. § 288.1252 (2013). See supra notes
150, 156, and accompanying text for previous commentary about the role of the Florida Film
Coordinator, as well as the Florida Film Commission.
162.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Film & Entertainment
Advisory Council, supra note 161.
163.
Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor of Fla., to Friends, (Jan. 2003) (on file
with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); Letter from the Staff
of the Governor’s Office of Film & Entm’t, Office of the Governor of Fla., to Friends (Jan.
2003) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); see
also FILM FLORIDA PRODUCTION GUIDE, supra note 44.
164.
Letter from Jeb Bush to Friends, supra note 163.
165.
Id.
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The Staff of the Governor’s OFE queries, “[s]ound like a production
paradise? It is. From any angle.”166 The Governor’s OFE is committed to
the mission of functioning as “an effective link between industry and all
levels of government to improve the business climate for the growth and
expansion of the entertainment industry in Florida.”167 The mission includes
accountability, innovation, partnering, and “strategic focus to capitalize on
[the] opportunities . . . that set Florida apart from the rest of the world.”168
In order to encourage success at every level, Florida has instituted
major incentives for filmmaking, and empowered administrative agencies to
implement them.169 Introduction of legislation that benefits filmmakers—as
well as easy to use permitting forms, and an abundance of grants and
assistance—have contributed to the overwhelming success of the film
industry in Florida.170
VII.

FLORIDA PROPOSES WITH TAX INCENTIVES AND THE FILM
INDUSTRY SAYS, “I DO!”

In May of 2010, Governor Charlie Christ “inked legislation that
create[d] a five-year, $242 million transferable tax credit for the state’s film
and entertainment industry.”171 Qualified “projects . . . receive a rebate of
20% to 30% on qualified Florida expenditures.”172 There is “an $8 million
cap for major productions.”173 The tax exemption “allocates a 5% bonus for
family-friendly projects and an additional 5% for activity taking place during
hurricane season.”174

166.
Letter from the Staff of the Governor’s Office of Film & Entm’t to
Friends, supra note 163.
167.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Vision & Mission,
FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://filminflorida.com/about/vm.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Vision & Mission].
168.
Id.
169.
Rebecca Martel Koegel, Florida’s Financial Incentive Program Lures
Film & Entertainment Production to the State with Good Ol’ Cash, BRIEFS, Mar. 2008, at 15,
15–16, available at http://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication/fc1af85a-869e-43f2-9b8798c071ceb2e7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a75426cd-5cc2-4b27-85f7014a855657a0/51905.PDF.
170.
See id.
171.
Peter Caranicas, Florida OKs Tax Breaks for Film, TV, VARIETY (June 2,
2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/2010/film/news/florida-oks-tax-breaks-for-film-tv1118020076/.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
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“[This] program covers [both] in-state and out-of-state productions .
. . .”175 It also benefits post-production and digital productions.176 The
governor “authorize[d] $53.5 million in transferable tax credits for the 2010–
[20]11 fiscal year.”177 The total increased to $74.5 million for 2011–2012.178
Suzy Spang, Vice President of the Metro Orlando Film and Entertainment
Commission, explained, “‘[w]e never knew from one year to the next what
the rebate would be. . . . This stabilizes everything.’”179 The impact of these
tax incentives has far ranging implications from Los Angeles, California to
little towns in Florida.180
When Warner Brothers executives were budgeting for the hit “rock
musical Rock of Ages, with Tom Cruise, there was no doubt that [the film
would be shot] in Los Angeles . . . where the story is set.”181 But, as the
budgeting process began, producers were scanning the country, even the
world, “tabulating tax credits and exchange rates.”182 Producers looked from
Sydney to Louisiana before settling on Miami, Florida; but they had to
transform Miami into “Reagan-era [1980s] rock ‘n’ roll Hollywood.”183
“‘We needed to reroute traffic, turn a one-way street into a two-way street,
repaint lines and put up traffic signs,’ sa[id] producer Garrett Grant, ‘and the
city was just fantastic, along with the State of Florida, making sure we got
everything we needed.’”184
While Florida’s climate, topography, and architecture convincingly
doubled for Los Angeles, what “sealed the deal was the state’s production
incentive, which offer[ed] a [twenty percent] base tax credit on in-state
spend[ing], capped at [eight] million [dollars] per production, with [an]
additional [five percent] . . . for shooting . . . off-season.”185 The potential
was a total of thirty percent.186
The tax incentives caused an infusion of projects into Florida.187 The
abundance of work came in the “nick of time for local film and [television]

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
2011,
4:00
1118045382/.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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Caranicas, supra note 171.
Id.
Id.
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See Todd Longwell, Sun Shines, Taxes Fall, Biz Rocks, VARIETY (Dec. 16,
AM),
http://variety.com/2011/film/news/sun-shines-taxes-fall-biz-rocksId.
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Id.
Id.
Longwell, supra note 180.
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workers who [were] underemployed or idle.”188 “[C]ostume supervisor
Emae Villalobos, a [twenty-five]-year veteran of the [movie] biz, [said], ‘I
was thinking of getting out of the business completely and going into
retail.’”189 But, then the incentives kicked in, and she was inundated with
work for A&E network, including the show The Glades, and movies such as
Dolphin Tale and Rock of Ages.190
Despite the overwhelming success of the tax incentives, there was an
amendment that went into effect on July 1, 2011.191 It mandated that “no
more than [twenty-five percent of] its funds go to high-impact television
shows.”192 Although certain series were “grandfathered in through 2015, [it
left little room] for any major new series or pilots.”193
In true Floridian form, Film Florida representatives volunteered to
take legislators on a detailed tour of Florida film and television sets.194 Their
goal was to make certain that all members of Florida’s Congress thoroughly
understood the significant domino effect of Florida’s film industry.195
“‘They were blown away by how many people were employed and the
amount of construction materials used,’ sa[id] Sandy Lighterman, [F]ilm and
[E]ntertainment [I]ndustr[y] [L]iaison for Miami-Dade County. ‘Hopefully,
they [will see] those images in their minds at the next legislative session.’”196
In addition to monetary incentives, the State of Florida is committed
to assisting filmmakers through various administrative agencies.197 The
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“FDEP”) was instrumental
in the production of Basic, starring John Travolta and Samuel L. Jackson in
2003.198 “‘When a . . . set is doubled to look like another area of the country,
or the world, for that matter, attention to detail is paramount,’ said [Basic]

188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Longwell, supra note 180.
191.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(4)(b)(1)(b) (2010) (current version at
FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013)), with FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(4)(b)(1)(b) (2011) (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013)). See also Longwell, supra note 180.
192.
Longwell, supra note 180.
193.
Id. (emphasis added).
194.
Id.
195.
See id.
196.
Id.
197.
See Bashirah Muttalib, Reeling in the Sunshine State, VARIETY (Mar. 4,
2009, 7:08 PM), http://www.variety.com/2009/film/news/reeling-in-the-sunshine-state1118000858/.
198.
See id.; Basic, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0264395/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014).
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location manager Mitch Harbeson,” who made the former Naval Air Station
at Cecil Field stand in for Panama.199
After the tragedy of 9/11, the Basic location crew had to refocus and
change their international settings to domestic.200 The plot demanded a
location that would allow “several months of filming machine gun firefight
scenes” amidst special effects created to produce a hurricane—all without
disturbing the peace or alarming local residents.201 Florida saved the day and
provided paradise for the filmmakers.202 While working in the Florida
wetlands, near Jacksonville, the team worked night hours.203 They had to
build “a road that would surround the set and was also strong enough to
support production trucks during Florida’s heavy rainfall.”204 “‘We had to be
very careful how this road was cut into the dense tropical vegetation and
forest,’ said Harbeson. ‘Prevention of senseless tree cutting and trimming
had to balance with a road designed not to impact camera sight lines during
filming.’”205 “To create . . . jungles, . . . the team placed 120 truckloads of
dirt into the area . . . and added two truckloads of plant[s] . . . .”206
“‘This was only permitted by the [FDEP] because of my guarantee
that I would not introduce foreign soil or water into the area and that it would
be brought back to its original condition, within an inch,’ Harbeson
explained.”207 Based on his relationship with the FDEP and their past
experience working together, Harbeson was confident that “all would go as
planned.”208
Years later, Harbeson returned to scout locations for a new HBO
project.209 Navigating these locations would “require[] the assistance of the

199.
Muttalib, supra note 197. Other Jacksonville, Florida films not already
mentioned include, but are not limited to: Brenda Starr, Forces of Nature, G.I. Jane, Like
Dandelion Dust, Lonely Hearts, Sunshine State, The Devil’s Advocate, The Manchurian
Candidate, The New Adventures of Pippi Longstocking, Tigerland, & Why Do Fools Fall in
Love—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ (search “film name”; select “film
name”; select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Projects Filmed in Jacksonville,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE CITY JACKSONVILLE, http://www.coj.net/departments/office-of-economicdevelopment/film-and-television/projects-filmed-in-jacksonville.aspx (last visited Jan. 18,
2014).
200.
Muttalib, supra note 197.
201.
Id.
202.
See id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Muttalib, supra note 197.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. (emphasis added).
209.
Id.
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supervisor of elections, committee leaders, the governor, and [the] mayor.”210
Towards the end, Harbeson observed that “‘[r]egardless of what jersey [they]
wore, [whether] Democrat or Republican, Floridians wanted to be a part of
this film and represented the film well.’”211 Florida’s dedication to the film
industry has moved the love affair into a profitable, deeply committed
marriage of sorts.212 And this marriage has been blessed with fertility.213
Their Florida-born progeny will leave a legacy for generations.214
VIII.

FLORIDA’S FILM INDUSTRY PRODUCES PROGENY

“In the summer of 1980, a group of overeducated, authority-defying
comedy writers from the Second City improv[isation] troupe and National
Lampoon magazine delivered perhaps the funniest sports movie ever
made.”215 Caddyshack was born.216 Over the past thirty years, the lowbudget $6 million movie has generated over $20 million in video and DVD
rentals, $40 million in sales at the box office, and a place on American Film
Institute’s (“AFI”) top one hundred funniest American movies of all time—
with the special effects talents of George Lucas and other talented producers
and directors enhancing the eleven-week shoot.217
Caddyshack is
particularly memorable, amongst other reasons, for Davie’s gorgeous golf
greens,218 Key Biscayne’s blue yachting waters, and, not to mention, some of
the funniest lines in film history.219
210.
Muttalib, supra note 197.
211.
Id.
212.
See FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY & OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T,
FISCAL YEAR 2011/2012 FILM AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY FINANCIAL INCENTIVE
PERFORMANCE REPORT 2–3, 10 (2012), available at http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/PDFs/
annualReports/Entertainment%20Industry%20Financial%20Incentive%20Annual%20Report
%202011%202012.pdf.
213.
See id. at 2–3.
214.
See id. at 9–11.
215.
Chris Nashawaty, Caddyshack, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2–9, 2010, at
64, 64, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1172571/
index.htm.
216.
CADDYSHACK (Orion Pictures 1980).
217.
AMERICAN FILM INST., AFI’S 100 YEARS 100 LAUGHS: AMERICA’S
FUNNIEST MOVIES (2002), available at http://www.afi.com/docs/100years/laughs500.pdf;
Caddyshack—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/business (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014); see also Nashawaty, supra note 215, at 64, 72. Specifically, the
animatronic gopher—with the same sound effects voice as Flipper, no less—was created at
Lucas’ Industrial Light and Magic (“ILM”). Nashawaty, supra note 215, at 72; Caddyshack—
Trivia, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080487/trivia (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
218.
On Location . . . Caddyshack Filming Locations, ‘80S MOVIES REWIND,
http://www.fast-rewind.com/locations_caddyshack.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). Although
“[t]he gates to the country club where Danny rides his bike [in] the opening” scene were
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In addition to the aforementioned comedies, the AFI compilation of
the top one hundred funniest American movies also includes another Florida
sibling from 1994: Ace Ventura, Pet Detective.220 Ace Ventura—played by
Jim Carrey—is a private detective who is hired when the Miami Dolphins’
mascot, Snowflake, the bottle-nosed dolphin, is kidnapped.221 Ace embarks
on a veritable tour of Miami and Collier County as he searches for clues to
the kidnapper’s identity and Snowflake’s location.222 Ace Ventura grossed
over $12 million when released in theatres the first weekend.223 With a
production budget of $12 million,224 the film went on to gross over $107
million worldwide.225 Former Miami Dolphins’ quarterback Dan Marino,
Courtney Cox, and Tone Loc helped to make Ace Ventura a splashing
success, as priceless gems of dialogue flowed from Jim Carey’s lips.226
Caddyshack and Ace Ventura were not award winning for acting or
cinematography, but are excellent examples of small budget Florida films
with major impact.227 Together, grossing over $100 million at the box office
filmed in Bel Air, California on Sunset Boulevard, “Caddyshack was filmed on location at the
Boca Raton Hotel [and] Country Club, Boca Raton and The Rolling Hills Golf & Tennis Club,
Davie, Florida.” Id. “The pool scene was filmed at the Plantation Preserve Golf Course in
Plantation, [Florida]” and clubhouse scenes at Rolling Hills. Id. “The yacht club scene was
filmed at the Rusty Pelican Restaurant . . . [in] Key Biscayne, . . . Florida.” Id.
219.
See CADDYSHACK, supra note 216. For example, the line uttered by Carl
the greens keeper: “On your deathbed, you will receive total consciousness. So I got that
going for me, which is nice.” Id. Another nice—but some would argue utterly forgettable—
movie made in St. Petersburg was Summer Rental, a 1985 comedy film directed by Carl
Reiner, starring John Candy. Summer Rental, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090098/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014). It was filmed in St. Petersburg Beach near St. Petersburg, and
includes as part of its soundtrack one of the only Jimmy Buffett songs which is impossible to
get on iTunes or in any legitimate—non-bootleg—album: “Turn It Around.” See Mikey
Hersh, Out There!: “Turning Around” by Jimmy Buffet, MISENPOPIC (Jan. 2, 2010), http://
misenpopic.blogspot.com/2010/01/out-there-turning-around-by-jimmy.html;
Summer
Rental—Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090098/locations (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
220.
AMERICAN FILM INST., supra note 217; Ace Ventura: Pet Detective,
IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0109040 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
221.
ACE VENTURA: PET DETECTIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1994).
222.
See id.
223.
Ace Ventura:
Pet Detective—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0109040/business (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
224.
Id.
225.
Ace Ventura: Pet Detective, NUMBERS, http://www.the-numbers.com/
movies/1994/0ACV1.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
226.
Ace Ventura: Pet Detective, supra note 220.
227.
See PHYLLIS K. POOLEY, HAAS CTR. FOR BUS. RESEARCH & ECON. DEV.,
UNIV. OF W. FLA., ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA FILM AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 179
(2009),
available
at
http://www.filminflorida.com/docs/pdf/
Analysis%20of%20the%20Florida%20Film%20and%20Entertainment%20Industry.pdf; Ace
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and landing on AFI’s top one hundred funniest films of all time are
accomplishments that any parent could be proud of.228
And the dolphin does it again.229 A 2012 study conducted by the
University of South Florida College of Business shows that the little Florida
movie “Dolphin Tale, which was shot on location in Pinellas County and
produced a direct local economic impact of more than $18 million during the
three-month shoot alone,” is set to generate “an economic impact of $580
In addition to Pinellas County’s St.
million in 2013.”230
Petersburg/Clearwater Film Commission assessment,231 the University of
South Florida report shows the far-reaching impact of the film across all
sectors of Florida’s economy, but especially in Clearwater, and most directly
at the Clearwater Marine Aquarium, where Winter, the dolphin star,
resides.232 The film has generated jobs and increased tourism, with a
forecasted 2.3 million visitors to the St. Petersburg/Clearwater area and to
the Aquarium in 2016.233 The economic impact of these visitors totals $5
billion to the Florida economy234 including actual on location vacation
tourism around Florida and those pursuing cast extra opportunities.235
Ventura:
Pet Detective—Box Office/Business, supra note 223; Caddyshack—Box
Office/Business, supra note 217.
228.
AMERICAN FILM INST., supra note 217; Ace Ventura: Pet Detective—Box
Office/Business, supra note 223; Caddyshack—Box Office/Business, supra note 217. And if
grossing over $40 million dollars is not honor enough, Caddyshack prominently appears in a
law review article entitled Lightning: A Double Hit for Golf Course Operators, by Michael
Flynn, quoting Carl Spackler—in the middle of a torrential thunder and lightning storm—“‘I’d
keep playing, I don’t think the heavy stuff is going to come down for quite a while.’ The
Bishop responded, ‘you’re right, anyway the good Lord would never disrupt the best game of
my life.’ The Bishop was then struck down by lightning.” Michael Flynn, Lightning: A
Double Hit for Golf Course Operators, 6 MARQUETTE SPORTS L.J. 133, 134–35 n.11 (1995)
(quoting CADDYSHACK, supra note 216).
229.
See Study: ‘Dolphin Tale’ Creates Millions in Economic Impact, TAMPA
BAY BUS. J. (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2012/08/
16/study-dolphin-tale-creates.html.
230.
Id.; VISIT ST. PETE CLEARWATER, PINELLAS CNTY. GOV’T, 2013 VISIT ST.
PETE/CLEARWATER ANNUAL PLAN 9 (2013), available at http://www.pinellascvb.com/files/
2013_visit_st._petersburg_clearwater_annual_plan(reduced).pdf.
231.
VISIT ST. PETE CLEARWATER, supra note 230, at 9.
232.
MARIA LUISA CORTON & MALING EBRAHIMPOUR, UNIV. OF S. FLA., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DOLPHIN TALE: ON THE ST. PETERSBURG/CLEARWATER LOCAL ECONOMY
2 (2012).
233.
Id.
234.
Study: ‘Dolphin Tale’ Creates Millions in Economic Impact, supra note
229.
235.
See CORTON & EBRAHIMPOUR, supra note 232, at 2; ‘Chu and Blossom’
Needs Extras in Largo, FL This Weekend, OLV (Aug. 18, 2012),
www.onlocationvacations.com/2012/08/18/chu-and-blossom-needs-extras-in-largo-fl-thisweekend/.
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One of the longest running, if not most flattering, depictions of
Miami in film or television, were “[t]he adventures of the vice squad
detectives of the Miami Police Department,” as portrayed over seven seasons
from 1984 through 1990 in Miami Vice, and the movie adaptation by the
same name in 2006.236 This “massively successful national and international
hit” featured “[t]he Art Deco buildings of South Beach . . . as a backdrop for
much of the show,” the plot “glamorized the very real crime problems the
area was suffering, and city officials were concerned about the image it was
giving of their community.”237 As tourists came to visit the exotic splendor
of the series’ locations and other Miami area movies and television shows,238
businesses invested more in renovating South Beach and city leaders
increased law enforcement vigilance.239 By 2008, “[t]he Art Deco District
and South Beach were the top tourist attractions in Miami-Dade County . . .
visited by nearly 52% of its 12 million visitors.”240 During a fourteen year
period “[f]rom 1995–2009, these visitors to Miami Beach spent . . . $15
billion for food, drinks and lodging, with historic South Beach [accounting
for] nearly 75% of [that] spending.”241

IX.

FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

More than any other time in filmmaking history, the latter portions
of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were marked by the
cinematographic equivalent of outsourcing, also known in the film industry
as runaway productions.242 This term describes filmmaking and television
productions that are “intended for initial release/exhibition or television
236.
Miami Vice (1984–1990), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086759/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Miami Vice (2006), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0430357/
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
237.
Jedediah Drolet et al., Chapter Seven: South Beach, Miami Beach, Florida
Case Study: Synthesis of Historic Preservation and Economic Development, in ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION UPDATE 2010 83, 96–97 (2010), available at http://
mimoonthebeach.com/pdfs/South%20Beach%20Economic%20Case%20Study.pdf.
238.
Id. at 97; see also Bad Boys, Bad Boys II, The Bird Cage, & True Lies—
Filming Locations, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ (search “film name”; select “film name”;
select “filming locations”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
239.
See Drolet et al., supra note 237, at 96–97.
240.
Id. at foreword.
241.
Id.
242.
See STEPHEN M. KATZ, CTR. FOR ENTM’T INDUS. DATA & RESEARCH, THE
GLOBAL SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES AND THE MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM
PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO THE WORLD: YEAR 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT 1–2 (Mark A.
Rosenthal ed., 2006), available at http://www.ceidr.org/2005CEIDRReport.pdf; SCREEN
ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., U.S. RUNAWAY FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION
STUDY REPORT 2 (n.d.), available at http://www.hhill.org/images/uploads/monitor_report.pdf.
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broadcast in the U.S., but are actually filmed in another country.”243 Hardly
a new complaint in the media industry, film crews often “left Los Angeles to
shoot in exotic [often overseas] locales—creative runaways—but in the
1970s and 1980s, technological changes related to the advent of television
production methods made filmmaking more mobile.”244 In some instances,
the choice to produce creative runaways was based on requirements of the
script, setting, or due to preferences of the actors or director.245
Alternatively, economic runaways are and have been productions made in
other countries to reduce costs.246 For instance, in 2002, only one of the five
Best Picture nominees, The Hours, for that year’s Academy Awards was shot
in Hollywood—Hollywood, Florida, that is.247
The United States Federal Government and many states, including
Florida, recognized “the substantial economic damage inflicted by [r]unaway
[p]roductions” proliferating in the 1980s and beyond.248 In turn, “Congress
enacted section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“the
Code”),249 as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.”250 “Section
181 allows for certain expenses associated with films and television
productions costing less than $15 million to be immediately deducted in the

243.
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 2; see
also HERD, supra note 58, at 40–41 (U.S. production went offshore to Australia, in part,
because of government incentives). For runaway productions in Canada, see Debra Felstead,
Toronto TV Production Is Fading to Black; Actors Scrambling to Find Work Funding Cuts,
SARS to Blame, TORONTO STAR, July 6, 2003, at D03. For an appreciation of the global effect
of creative and economic runaways, see KATZ, supra note 242, at 1–2.
244.
Susan Christopherson, Divide and Conquer: Regional Competition in a
Concentrated Media Industry, in CONTRACTING OUT HOLLYWOOD: RUNAWAY PRODUCTIONS
AND FOREIGN LOCATION SHOOTING 21, 21 (Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher eds., 2005).
245.
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 6.
246.
Id.
247.
CONTRACTING OUT HOLLYWOOD: RUNAWAY PRODUCTIONS AND FOREIGN
LOCATION SHOOTING 1, 3 (Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher eds., 2005).
248.
KATZ, supra note 242, at 57; JORGE MEDINA & PATRICK S. KLEIN, TAX
DEDUCTIONS FOR FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTIONS UNDER SECTION 181, 2 (n.d.), available
at http://www.lacba.org/files/main%20Folder/sections/taxation/files/8.pdf.
“U.S. states
offering significant incentives include: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, South Carolina, with more are [sic] on the way.” KATZ, supra note 242, at 2.
249.
MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 248, at 2 (emphasis added). See T.D. 9603,
2013-3 I.R.B., 273, for “final regulations that amend[ed] 26 CFR part 1 to reflect amendments
made to [the] . . . Code by section 502 of the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-343 (122 Stat. 3765) (October 3, 2008).”
250.
MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2; see also KATZ, supra note 242, at
60 (“The language allows producers of films with budgets under $15 million to immediately
write off their costs in a single year—if 75% of their principal costs are incurred via shooting
in the [United States]. Previously, producers had to amortize those costs over several years.”).
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year incurred.”251 At present, section 181 of the CodeTreatment of certain
qualified film and television productionsprovides that “[a] taxpayer may
elect to treat the cost of any qualified film or television production as an
expense which is not chargeable to capital account. Any cost so treated shall
be allowed as a deduction.”252 As currently in force, “[s]ection 181 has the
potential to be very effective in limiting the negative economic impact of
[r]unaway [p]roductions,”253 encouraging television and film productions in
the United States in general and, with economic enticements, in Florida in
particular.254
The Governor’s OFE commissioned an independent assessment of
Florida’s film and entertainment industry, conducted by the Haas Center for
Business Research and Economic Development.255 The study revealed that
“[t]he estimated . . . impact of . . . Florida[’s] [f]ilm and [e]ntertainment
[i]ndustry grew from . . . $27 billion in 2003 to [almost $30] billion in
2007.”256 In no small part, this growth was fueled by Florida’s own financial
incentive program for the entertainment industry, codified in section
288.1254 of the Florida Statutes.257 Florida’s Entertainment Industry
Financial Incentive Program—which became effective July 1, 2007—“was
created within the Governor’s . . . (OFE) to ‘encourage the use of this state as
a site for filming and to develop and sustain the workforce and infrastructure
for film and entertainment production.’”258 “To further support this mission
[of maximizing film and entertainment production in Florida], the Governor
and the Florida Legislature provided $25 [million] in funding for the 2007–
2008 fiscal year, . . . up $5 million from the previous fiscal year.”259 In its
present inception as a six-year program—which “began on July 1, 2010 and
sunsets June 30, 2016”—some $12 million have been allocated by the State
Legislature in tax credits beyond the initial 2010 allocation of $242
million.260 In “2012, the legislature allocated an additional $42 million in tax
credits to the program, totaling $296 million.”261 As a cost-to-benefit bottom

251.
MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2.
252.
I.R.C. § 181(a)(1) (2006).
253.
MEDINA & KLEIN, supra note 247, at 2.
254.
Id.; see also KATZ, supra note 242, at 62; Koegel, supra note 169, at 15.
255.
POOLEY, supra note 227, at 1.
256.
Id. at 20.
257.
FLA. STAT. § 288.1254 (2013); see also Koegel, supra note 169, at 15.
258.
Koegel, supra note 169, at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(2) (2007)
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 288.1254(2) (2013))).
259.
Id.
260.
FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY & OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, supra
note 212, at 2.
261.
Id.
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line, Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity claims that since the
program’s inception, the OFE has:


[S]ubmitted and processed 481 applications;



[Q]ualified and certified 230 of those productions for tax
credits with projected Florida expenditures of
approximately $1.3 billion; [and]



[Estimated that] [w]ages to Floridians associated with the
230 productions are currently projected to be close to
$760 million and are associated with 161,000 positions
262
for Florida residents.

Governor Charlie Crist renewed and re-enforced his public
commitment to the program by stating: “‘As we continue to seek growth
opportunities for Florida’s economy, it is important to remember the
significant role film and entertainment plays in our state, directly employing
more than 100,000 Floridians.’”263 Crist was well aware that ‘“[t]hese
findings highlight how important it is for Florida’s businesses and workforce
to ensure this revenue stream continues flowing into our state.’”264
The study reiterated the unique benefits that are generated by the
film and entertainment industry.265 “[T]he economic benefits extend into
other industries: . . . [R]estaurants, lodging, retail, construction, and
tourism.”266 The economic benefits set in motion “an additional estimated
105,000 related spinoff jobs in 2007 [alone].”267 “[I]n 2007, the [film and
entertainment] industry [in Florida] accounted for: $17.9 billion in Gross
State Product (“GSP”); $8.5 billion in income to Floridians; and $498
million in tax revenue.”268
262.

Id.

The production types certified to date [as of 2011/2012] include: 58 motion
pictures (theatrical, made for [television], direct to video, documentaries, visual
effects sequences in conjunction with a motion picture); 42 digital media
productions; and 101 television productions ([television] series, including highimpact, drama, comedy, game shows, variety, entertainment shows, reality),
[television] series pilots, telenovelas, and award shows; and 29 commercials.

Id.
263.
Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment
Industry in Florida, FILM FLA. (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.filmflorida.org/news/
view.aspx?item=86.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment
Industry in Florida, supra note 263.
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In 2012, Ernst & Young was commissioned by the Motion Picture
Association of America (“MPAA”) to complete a study evaluating the
effectiveness of film tax credits.269 In that report, Ernst & Young noted
[t]he net fiscal benefit for state and local budgets is
generally determined by comparing the cost of incentives to the
additional state and local taxes generated by the film industry
expansion. The net fiscal effect could be positive or negative
depending upon both the features of state film credits and the
270
economic characteristics of each production.

Elsewhere in the report, Ernst & Young found Florida comparable to
California when comparing “film tax credit programs in selected states with
highest FY2010 credit program expenditures,” yet not as generous as eight of
its peer-competitor film-making states—Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania—with
respect to “[s]tatutory credit rates by type of qualified expenditure.”271
The Association of National Advertisers (“ANA”) published a white
paper titled The Found Money of State Commercial Production Incentives
highlighting that:
The list of states that offer commercial production
incentives and the specific details for each state, are continually
evolving.
Commercial production incentives are currently
available from Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,

269.
ANDREW PHILLIPS ET AL., ERNST & YOUNG, EVALUATING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAMS: ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsPI/Evaluating_the_
effectiveness_of_state_film_tax_credit_programs/$FILE/1203-1342731%20Motion%
20Picture%20assoc.%20film%20credit%20study.pdf.
270.
Id. at 7. In the report, Ernst & Young cited how
[t]he advertising value of film and television productions, at a minimum, can be
evaluated by comparing the costs of generating similar awareness of a state through
paid advertising. For decades, states have purchased advertising in magazines and
on television to promote awareness of their states as a destination for tourists.
Examples include Michigan’s “Pure Michigan” campaign, which cost nearly $30
million in 2009; California’s “Find Yourself Here” campaign, which has cost $50
million annually since 2007–08; Hawaii’s leisure and sports marketing budget of
$44 million in 2010; Florida’s marketing cost of $23 million in 2002; and Las
Vegas’ $87 million spent on advertising in 2009, including its “What Happens in
Vegas, Stays in Vegas” campaign.

Id.
271.
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Id. at 21 tbl. A-2.
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Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
272
Puerto Rico, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.

The Florida Film and Entertainment Industry Financial Incentive
Program, overseen by the Governor’s Office of Tourism, Trade, and
Economic Development—in the Governor’s OFE—builds, supports and
markets the high-wage, high-growth motion picture and entertainment
industry sectors in Florida.273 With offices in Tallahassee and Los Angeles,
Florida is able to implement innovative strategies to attract world-class
productions to the state that provide economic benefits to residents and
businesses.274 A study released in March 2013
on the economic impact of The Florida Film and Entertainment
Industry Financial Incentive Program found a return on investment
(“ROI”) of 4.7, with estimated state and local tax revenues in
Florida last fiscal year totaling $547 million and the present value

272.
Bill Duggan, The Found Money of State Commercial Production
Incentives, ASS’N NAT’L ADVERTISERS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.ana.net/blogs/show/id/
23341. The ANA cross-references “The Official Guide to United States Production Incentives
at http://www.easecommercial.com/” as “[o]ne resource available to help stay up to date on
the various state policies.” Id.; see also DAMA CLAIRE & MIKE ROSE, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
U.S. PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 6 (Russ Nissen & Garrett
Hauenstein eds., 2013), available at http://easeentertainment.com/wp-content/themes/
ease/images/ECS_Incentives_Guide_Summer_2013.pdf. For other updates by jurisdiction—
within the United States and abroad—see also Updates by Jurisdiction, ENT. PARTNERS (May
30, 2012), http://www.entertainmentpartners.com/result/?nid=6872.
273.
See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment
Industry Financial Incentive Program, supra note 2. A brief overview of the program
benefits identified included:
20%–30% transferable tax credit; 20% base percentage; 5% Off Season Bonus (for
certain production types); 5% Family Friendly Bonus (for certain production types);
5% Underutilized Region Bonus (for General Production Queue only); 5%
Qualified Production Facility/Digital Media Facility Bonus (for General Production
Queue, on expenditures associated with production activity at a Qualified
Production Facility/Digital Media Facility); 15% Florida Student/Recent Graduate
Bonus (for General Production Queue, on student/recent grad wages and other
compensation). The priority for qualifying/certifying projects for tax credit awards
is determined on a first-come, first-served basis within its appropriate queue.

Id. For a comparison and contrast of Florida’s peer-competitor states seeking film industry
revenues, and second-order-of-effect tourism and service industry benefits, see, for example,
EMILY PATRICIA GRAHAM, COMPILED COMPARISON OF FILM TAX INCENTIVES IN LOUISIANA,
FLORIDA, TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO (n.d.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/entertainment_sports/film_incentives_compiled_compa
rison.authcheckdam.pdf.
274.
See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Film & Entertainment
Industry Financial Incentive Program, supra note 2; The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t,
Location Resources, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/lr/default.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location Resources].
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of the tax credit totaling $117 million. The ROI is 4.7 when the
state and local tax revenue effects of film-induced tourism,
production spending, and infrastructure spending are taken into
275
account.

That means, “for every $1.00 of credit distributed, the state and local
governments received a combined $4.70 in taxes.”276 The incentive also
supported an estimated 87,870 jobs and $7.2 billion in economic spending
across the state, both through production spending and induced tourism.277
Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice President for State Government Affairs
at the MPAA, aptly pointed out in 2013 that the range of “major theatrical
releases like Magic Mike and Dolphin Tale to some of television’s most
watched shows like Burn Notice and The Glades [in] the entertainment
industry is a fundamental element to Florida’s economy.” 278 Indeed, “[t]he
Emmy-nominated show [Burn Notice] infused more than $28.6 million into
South Florida’s economy during [its] first two seasons [alone of a seven
season run], and . . . created more than 2700 jobs”279 while receiving $5.2
million of the 2009 State of Florida incentive budget totaling $10.8
million.280 “[H]oliday box office [hit] Marley & Me . . . injected more than
$10 million into South Florida’s economy, employing nearly 1400
Floridians,” as the number one hit at the box office for two weeks and
“effectively market[ed] South Florida[] [as the perfect] . . . destination[] [for]
millions of winter moviegoers.”281
For over a billion warm climate moviegoers in India, Mumbai’s socalled Bollywood has traditionally satisfied cinematic cravings,282 at least

275.
Press Release, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture &
Television Production Incentive Program Results in Significant Economic Impact, Investment
Return in Florida (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.mpaa.org/resources/53dedf92dbf0-45f1-9d63-dce86a488c70.pdf.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment
Industry in Florida, supra note 263.
280.
Lee Logan, Burn Notice Star Stumps for Film Tax Credits, MIAMI HERALD
(Nov. 3, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2009/11/burn-noticestar-stumps-for-film-tax-credits.html.
281.
Study Shows $29.2 Billion Economic Impact for Film and Entertainment
Industry in Florida, supra note 263.
282.
See Richard Corliss, Hooray for Bollywood!, TIME MAG., Sept. 16, 1996,
at 88. Bollywood is the informal term popularly used for the Hindi-language film industry
based in Mumbai (Bombay), Maharashtra, India. EJVIND VOGG, DANSK INDUSTRI, THE INDIAN
BOLLYWOOD INDUSTRY (2012), available at http://di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/
DIBD/sektoranalyser/The%20Indian%20Bollywood%20Industry_2013.pdf.
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until Miami beckoned for a creative runaway283 to its sandy shores and hot
nightlife.284 Dharma Productions’ feature film Dostana—Friendship in
Hindi and Urdu—starring John Abraham, Abhishek Bachchan, and Priyanka
Chopra, produced by Karan Johar, was “the first major Bollywood [f]ilm to
shoot in Miami-Dade County.”285 The romantic-comedy Dostana went on to
become the eighth highest grossing film at the Indian box office,286 grossing
one billion Indian rupees, or $16.8 million, in its first four weeks alone at the
box office287—no small measure in the world’s largest movie market—which
“had a revenue of . . . $3 [billion] in 2011, and has been growing at
approx[imately] 10.1% a year. The revenue is expected to reach . . . $4.5
[billion] by 2016.”288 As a low budget sequel of five hundred and six
thousand—compared to two million dollars for the original Dostana289—
actor “John Abraham promises [a] kid-friendly Dostana 2,” with Abraham
and Bachchan “migrat[ing] from Miami to Punjab,”290 as only a partial
creative runaway.291
Because of this unprecedented governmental support, “there is an
established film office and film liaison infrastructure within Florida.”292 In
addition to the “Florida[] film office . . . housed in the Governor’s office, . . .
there are [fifty-four] film liaisons located throughout the [s]tate.”293 The
Sunshine State is also the only state with a full time Los Angeles film office

283.
For a discussion of creative versus economic runaways, see SCREEN
ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note 242, at 2.
284.
M. BARRON STOFIK, SAVING SOUTH BEACH 239–41 (2005).
285.
Don’t Miss the Miami Premiere of the Bollywood Feature Film Dostana .
. ., FILMIAMI.ORG, http://www.miamidade.gov/filmiami/home-TS-110608-1.asp (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014); Dostana Grosses Rs 1 Billion Worldwide in Four Weeks, BUS. CINEMA (Dec.
11,
2008),
http://businessofcinema.com/bollywood-news/dostana-grosses-rs-1-billionworldwide-in-four-weeks/26099.
286.
Box Office 2008, BOXOFFICEINDIA.COM, http://www.boxofficeindia.com/
showProd.php?itemCat=215 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
287.
Dostana Grosses Rs 1 Billion Worldwide in Four Weeks, supra note 285.
Conversion calculated based upon June 23, 2013 foreign currency exchange rate of one Indian
rupee to .0168703764625 United States dollars. INR to USD Rate, FOREX MONEY CHANGER,
http://www.fxmoneychanger.com/inr/usd/rate/?q=180 (last updated Nov. 10, 2013).
288.
Vogg, supra note 282.
289.
See Dostana—Box Office/Business, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt1185420/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
290.
Shalvi Mangaokar, John Abraham Promises Kid-Friendly Dostana 2,
HINDUSTAN TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/Entertainment/
Bollywood/John-Abraham-promises-kid-friendly-Dostana-2/Article1-1079368.aspx.
291.
Id.; see also SCREEN ACTORS GUILD & DIRS. GUILD OF AM., supra note
241, at 2.
292.
POOLEY, supra note 227, at 22.
293.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

83

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

2013]

FLORIDA AND THE FILM INDUSTRY

75

whose goal is to bridge the gap between Hollywood and Florida.294
Extending Florida’s reach to California cements a strong and enduring
relationship with Hollywood and exemplifies Florida’s steadfast commitment
to the film industry.295 Florida is aggressively implementing innovative
strategies to attract productions from all over the world.296 World-class
productions provide billions of dollars of economic benefits to Florida
residents and businesses.297
X.

FLORIDA’S FUTURE: FAITHFULNESS AND FIDELITY TO THE FILM
INDUSTRY

Florida is not about to take its relationship with the movie industry
for granted.298 Dedicated to the successful growth of the industry, Florida
continues to find ways to reinforce the bonds, reveal weaknesses and reaffirm its strengths.299 The Tourism Committee of the Florida House of
Representatives State Infrastructure Council authored a report in 2006,
entitled Florida’s Entertainment Industry Infrastructure: Are We Growing
the Indigenous Industry as well as Supporting Production?300 The report
made recommendations for the operations within the Governor’s Office and
the film industry within the state.301 Recommendations included reevaluation of Florida’s tax incentives, fully funding and staffing the
Governor’s Office of Film and Entertainment, and aggressively bringing in
production from other states.302
The 2009 Haas Analysis of the Florida Film and Entertainment
Industry (“Haas Analysis”) explored Florida’s strengths, weaknesses, and
opportunities.303 Florida’s “[u]niqueness of place . . . offers a wide variety of
filming locations,” and Miami is now internationally recognizable because of
Florida’s film industry.304 Notably, Matt Nix, Executive Producer of Burn
294.
Id.
295.
See id.
296.
See, e.g., FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, FLORIDA’S ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE: ARE WE GROWING THE INDIGENOUS INDUSTRY AS WELL AS
SUPPORTING PRODUCTION? i–iii (2006), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?PublicationType=Committees&committeeId=2235&Sessio
n=2006&DocumentType=Reports&FileName=Entertainment%20Industry%20Infrastructureo
nline.pdf.
297.
POOLEY, supra note 227, at 1920.
298.
See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at i.
299.
Id.
300.
Id.
301.
Id. at i, v, xi–xv.
302.
Id. at v, xi–xv.
303.
POOLEY, supra note 227, at 21–24.
304.
Id. at 21.
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Notice, explained about Miami, “Miami [is] just a very convenient place for
[the lead character, Michael]. It [is] a place where you can blow things up
and nobody notices.”305
The Haas Analysis report points out a weakness in labor rates.306
“[T]he current structuring of labor rates by unions, [especially the] IATSE,
results in wage rates [of] $5.25 to $6.00 . . . higher on productions taking
place in Florida as compared to . . . competing states. There is also a[] . . .
perception that unions are [hard] to deal with in Florida.”307 Also, recent
severe weather, tropical storms, and hurricanes add an additional concern to
productions choosing Florida.308
But, there are opportunities for increased production in niche
markets.309 Florida is looking to get a competitive edge by appealing to
Spanish-language television and the Spanish-language workforce.310 The
overall conclusion, as a result of all the industry analysis, is that if Florida
wants to attract on-location filming to the Sunshine State, it will have to
provide the most attractive incentive programs.311 A statement from Warner
Brothers Worldwide Television summed this up: “[I]n the past few years,
financial incentives have overwhelmed the where to shoot equation. Major
studios and smart independents are going to locations that have the best
incentives. It [is] as simple as that.”312
The Film in Florida website—www.filminflorida.com—is the new
guide to the Florida Film Industry for 2013, highlighting the Florida OFE’s
mission to support, build, and market Florida’s entertainment industry.313
The mission reaffirms the importance of “collaborat[ion] with the indigenous
. . . community [and dedication] to implement[ation of] innovative ways to
grow [the] industry.”314 The OFE strives to provide “hands-on, world-class
service that our clients need and deserve, and exceed our annual business
goals to become the number two global . . . leader.”315 They are committed
305.
April MacIntyre, USA’s ‘Burn Notice’ Matt Nix Interview, M & C (Aug.
5,
2008),
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/smallscreen/features/article_1421668.php/
USA_s_Burn_Notice_Matt_Nix_interview.
306.
POOLEY, supra note 227, at 23.
307.
Id.
308.
Id.
309.
Id. at 170–71.
310.
Id. at 24, 31.
311.
See POOLEY, supra note 227, at 30.
312.
Id.
313.
FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com (last visited Jan. 18,
2014); The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Vision & Mission, supra note 167.
314.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, About Us: Vision & Mission, supra
note 167.
315.
Id.
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to integrity, inclusiveness, accountability, partnering, empowerment, and
innovation.316 Links from the website include easy on-line permitting,
federal incentive programs, and contact information to guilds, unions and
associations.317
The film office website has launched the Florida Green Production
Plan, which includes guidance to production companies so that they can
“make environmentally-wise decisions at every phase of production” in
Florida.318 This initiative involves interaction with multiple Florida
agencies.319 The Forest Stewardship Council, recycling centers, the Florida
Green Lodging program, hazardous waste centers, and regulations are clearly
linked and articulated to ease production companies in going green in
Florida.320
The Governor’s Office also provides, through the Film in Florida
organization, a Hurricane Preparedness Plan for filmmakers.321 It explains
specific insurance provisions through Insuring Florida, links to the Central
Florida Hurricane Center, numerous phone numbers and links for emergency
evacuation assistance, mayors’ offices, disaster preparedness centers, and
storm surge evacuation maps.322
The website includes an almost limitless library of photographs and
a rich inventory of locations that showcase the expansive diversity of
Florida.323 This is incredibly helpful to out-of-state producers, who can scout
locations in cyberspace without the expense of physically traveling to Florida
during the early phase of production planning.324
It appears that by 2014 and beyond, the Governor’s Office, Florida
administrative agencies, and film liaisons will have covered every
conceivable whim, wish, want, sine qua non, and exigency.325 The Film in
Florida website is a fascinating display of Florida’s undying dedication to
Hollywood and the film industry.326
316.
317.
318.

Id.
Id.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Green Production Plan,
FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/prl/gpp.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
319.
See id.
320.
Id.
321.
FILM FLA. & GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, FLORIDA FILM,
TELEVISION, AND ENTERTAINMENT HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS PLAN 1 (n.d.), available at
http://www.miamidade.gov/filmiami/hurricane-preparedness.pdf.
322.
Id. at 8–10.
323.
The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location Resources, supra note 274.
324.
See id.
325.
See FILM FLA. & GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF FILM & ENTM’T, supra note 321,
at 1–3; FILMINFLORIDA.COM, supra note 313; The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Location
Resources, supra note 274.
326.
See FILMINFLORIDA.COM, supra note 313.
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A recent study commissioned by the MPAA is a revealing
quantification of the economic impact of the film industry in Florida, as
already experienced in fiscal year (“FY”) 2011/2012.327
Florida Impacts FY 2011/2012
Production Impacts
Production Expenditure ($2005 millions)
$1512
Output ($2005 millions)
$2536
Gross State Product ($2005 millions)
$1507
Employment (FTEs)
19,308
Labor Income ($2005 millions)
$761
State and Local Taxes (Nominal $
$140.44
millions)
Figure 1—Estimated Florida Economic Impacts of Production Spending in
328
FY 2011/2012

What may well be most telling of the future economic impact of
Florida’s film industry was the study’s estimates for the exponential revenue
growth, employment increases, and raised tax revenues in the five-year
period beginning in 2011 forward.329
Florida Impacts
IMPLAN
REMI Tax-PI
Midpoint
(2011–2016)
Estimates
Estimates
Production
$3769
$3769
$3769
Expenditure ($2005
millions)
Output ($2005
$6235
$6389
$6321
millions)
Gross State Product
$3631
$3885
$3758
($2005 millions)
Employment (FTEs)
53,466
42,803
48,134
Labor Income ($2005
$1984
$1812
$1898
millions)
State and Local Taxes
$350.1
Not Reported
$350.1
(Nominal $ millions)
Figure 2—Midpoint of IMPLAN and REMI TAX-PI Estimated Florida
330
Economic Impacts of Production Spending
327.
MNP, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE FLORIDA FILM AND
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM 2 (2013), available at http://
www.mpaa.org/Resources/0a432ae0-5b5e-4c7f-b3de-dc6693722914.pdf.
328.
Id.
329.
See id. at 1.
330.
Id. Note: IMPLAN=Impact Analysis for Planning; REMI=Regional
Economic Models, Inc.; TAX-PI=a ready-to-use, “dynamic fiscal and economic impact
model” that captures the direct, indirect, and induced “fiscal and economic effects of
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CONCLUSION

Florida and the film industry: A match made in heaven, or rather,
paradise. Florida’s ineradicable dedication to the needs and desires of the
film industry proves her unwavering commitment to this treasured
relationship.331 Globally, grateful members of the film industry show respect
and loyalty in return.332 This allegiance allows the benefits of the
relationship to flow both ways, and ultimately the citizens of the Sunshine
State reap the greatest rewards.333
Proof of Florida’s steadfastness continues as Governor Rick Scott
highlighted Dolphin Tale 2’s production in Florida highlighted earlier.334
Dolphin Tale 2 is the true story of baby dolphin, named Hope, who was
rescued and rehabilitated by the Clearwater Marine Aquarium in 2010.
Florida Representative Ed Hooper said, “Its’ great news that Dolphin Tale 2
will be filmed in Clearwater, creating an economic benefit to the entire
area.”335 Hooper went on to thank Governor Scott for “focusing on creating
jobs in Florida.”336 According to the Governor’s Office, the 2013-2014
Florida Families First budget includes $5 million in general revenue funds to
be allocated to the production.337 Also anxiously anticipated for its
entertainment prospects, and much appreciated from a jobs and revenue
perspective, is the May 2015 release of an upcoming science fiction mystery
film, Tomorrowland; it is being filmed at various Disney theme parks, and
directed, co-written, and produced by Brad Bird and produced and co-written
by Damon Lindelof, starring the non-Delphinidae human actors Britt
Robertson and George Clooney, with Hugh Laurie as the primary villain.338
tax[ation] [and other] policy changes” over multiple years. Statewide Policy Analysis Tools,
FLA. OFF. ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RES., http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/statewide-policyanalysis-tools/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
331.
See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at i–ii.
332.
See id. at ii, iv, viii; Longwell, supra note 180.
333.
See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at v; Longwell, supra
note 180.
334.
Visit St. Pete Clearwater, supra note 230, at 9.
335.
Governor Rick Scott Announces Dolphin Tale 2 to be Filmed in
Clearwater, RICK SCOTT (July 26, 2013), http://www.flgov.com/governor-rick-scottannounces-dolphin-tale-2-to-be-filmed-in-clearwater.
336.
Id.
337.
Id.
338.
Tomorrowland, is being filmed at the Tomorrowland attraction at Walt
Disney World, Lake Buena Vista, Florida, as well as various locations around Titusville and
New Smyrna Beach, Florida. See, e.g., Anthony Breznican, Disney’s Mysterious ‘1952’
Movie Has a New Name . . . ‘Tomorrowland’–Exclusive, ENT. WKLY. (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:15
PM), http://insidemovies.ew.com/2013/01/28/disneys-1952-is-tomorrowland/; Mike Fleming,
‘Lost’s Damon Lindelof Makes 7–Figure Disney Deal to Write Secret Sci-Fi Feature,
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As this multi-billion dollar relationship continues into its second
century, with over 120 films and television shows and counting,339
filmmakers and Floridians can look forward to many more success stories—
especially if they focus on diligent collaboration, economic incentives, and
absolutely any tale about a bottlenose dolphin.340

DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 9, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.deadline.com/2011/06/lostsdamon-lindelof-makes-7-figure-disney-deal-to-write-secret-sci-fi-feature/; Eugene Garcia, Is
‘Tomorrowland’ Movie Tied to Disneyland Area?, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.ocregister.com/news/movie-409540-disney-tomorrowland.html; Tomorrowland—
Filming Locations, IMBD, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1964418/locations?ref_=tt_dt_dt (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014). For those unfamiliar with the Delphinidae family by its Latin name,
Bottlenose dolphins, the genus Tursiops, are the most common and well-known members of
oceanic dolphins. See Scientific Classification: Bottlenose Dolphins, SEAWORLD PARKS &
ENT., http://seaworld.org/en/Animal-Info/Animal-InfoBooks/Bottlenose-Dolphins/ScientificClassification (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
339.
See The Fla. Office of Film & Entm’t, Florida Entertainment Industry
Financial Incentive Recipients, FILMINFLORIDA.COM, http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/fir.asp
(last visited Jan. 18, 2014); Films Made in Florida, WORLDWIDE GUIDE TO MOVIE LOCATIONS,
http://www.movie-locations.com/places/usa/florida.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2013). This has
been an incomplete and non-exclusive chronicling of movies and television shows in Florida.
Films Made in Florida, supra note 339. For more resources for cinephiles to explore noted
movies, television shows, and more, see ‘Chu and Blossom’ Needs Extras in Largo, FL This
Weekend, supra note 235, and see J.A. Jones, Florida on Film, FLORIDA MOVIES, SPRING
2013, http://faculty.scf.edu/jonesj/hum2230/FLORIDAMOVIES.html#pre, and Pictures:
Movies
Filmed
in
Orlando,
Orlando
Sentinel, October
11,
2013, http://
www.orlandosentinel.com/entertainment/movies/os-movies-filmed-in-orlandopictures,0,6105676.photogallery. For information on the sixty-two film festivals in Florida,
and counting, see, e.g., Film Festivals, filminflorida.com, 2014, http://www.filminflorida.com/
wh/ff.asp.
340.
See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON TOURISM, supra note 296, at ii; Flipper Dolphin,
supra note 121.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three cases this past year
involving juveniles, all in the delinquency field involving significant but
technical matters.1 In the first case, the court held that it was necessary to prove
that a school police officer was the designee of the school principal in order for a
juvenile to be adjudicated for committing trespass on school grounds.2 In the
second case, the court held, over a dissent, that a juvenile who committed several
acts of indirect criminal contempt could be sentenced to consecutive periods of
secure detention for each of the two offenses,3 thus resolving a conflict in the
district courts of appeal.4 In the third case, the court held that a juvenile detention
center falls within the criminal law definition of a detention facility.5
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy in the juvenile
delinquency field, deciding both important issues and also reversing regretful
fundamental errors by the trial courts.6 In the dependency and termination of
parental rights (“TPR”) field, the appellate courts were less busy, but
*

Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. This
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. The
author thanks law librarian Robert Beharriell, Esq. for his help in the preparation of this survey.
1.
J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. II), 101 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
Hopkins v. State (Hopkins II), 105 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427–
28 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
2.
J.R., 99 So. 3d at 428.
3.
Compare J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356, with J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357
(Quince, J., dissenting).
4.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 353, 357. Compare J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. I), 53 So. 3d
1245, 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011), (unpublished
table decision), aff’d, 101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d
1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
5.
Hopkins II, 105 So. 3d at 471.
6.
P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 981, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.G. v.
State, 84 So. 3d 1162, 1163–64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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nonetheless, decided several important cases.7 And again, some of the opinions
involved rudimentary trial court error.8
II.

DEPENDENCY

Issues regarding non-offending parents come up regularly in the
appellate decisions in Florida, including issues of due process.9 In A.S. v.
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of E.G-S.),10 a
dependency petition was filed against a mother who was divorced and in which
the petitioner made no allegation against the father.11 After a trial on the
petition, the court found the child dependent and ordered the child placed with
the non-offending father, terminated its jurisdiction along with Department of
Children and Families’ (“DCF” or “Department”) supervision.12 The mother
based her appeal on a violation of her due process rights, resulting in the court’s
termination of jurisdiction and supervision, without a hearing.13 The appellate
court agreed.14 The mother was entitled to notice that the court would determine
the child’s permanent placement at the dispositional hearing, and further that “a
court may not place [the] child permanently with [the] non-offending parent
when the offending parent is either in substantial compliance with [the]
reunification . . . plan or the time for compliance has not expired.”15 The court
then remanded for an “evidentiary hearing to determine whether allowing the
case to remain pending while [the mother] complete[d] her case plan would be
detrimental to the child’s interest, and . . . whether a preponderance of the
evidence support[ed] changing the goal of [the] case plan” to custody for the
father.16
In F.O. v. Department of Children & Families,17 a father appealed an
order after the adjudicatory hearing found no evidence that he abused,
abandoned, or neglected the children, and entered the mother consent plea to the
petition for dependency.18 The problem was that the trial court nonetheless

7.
See infra Parts II, III.
8.
See id.
9.
See Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 180
(2011) [hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law].
10.
113 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
11.
Id. at 78.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 79–80.
14.
Id. at 80.
15.
In re Interest of E.GS., 113 So. 3d at 79.
16.
Id. at 80.
17.
94 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
18.
Id. at 709–10.
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ordered the father to participate in the case plan.19 Relying upon two earlier
intermediate appellate court decisions, but without any discussion, the appellate
court held that even when the parent had not been found to have abused,
neglected, or abandoned the child at issue, the parent could be ordered to
participate in the case plan.20
In M.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of
T.B. & T.P.),21 the issue was whether temporary legal custody could be shared
with DCF in a case where the dependency adjudication by consent was made as
to the father, but an order of dependency was withheld as to the mother, except
for the case plan for the children.22 In its order, the trial court determined that
remaining in the mother’s custody, with protective supervision, was in the best
interests of the children.23 However, the order also determined that the mother
“share temporary physical custody of the children” with the DCF.24 Given the
trial court’s grant of legal custody of the children to the mother, it was reversible
error to also order temporary physical custody of the children to the
Department.25
Once parents have completed tasks assigned to them pursuant to a case
plan after a finding of or consent to dependency, they may seek reunification
with their children.26 However, a trial court must determine if the parents
“compli[ed] with the case plan” and if “reunification [is] detrimental to the
child” before considering an order of reunification.27 In addition, “[t]he court is
also [obligated] to make written . . . findings as to the six statutory factors.”28 In
Department of Children & Families v. W.H.,29 the trial court failed to make
findings on a number of the statutory factors.30 Nor was there competent
evidence in support of finding the factors; DCF did not have notice that a
hearing may result in the possibility of reunification, and no evidence of the issue

19.
Id. at 710.
20.
Id.
21.
107 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
22.
Id. at 516.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 516–17.
26.
FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2) (2013); see also id. §§ .521(d)(9), .6011(1).
27.
Id. § 39.522(2); Dep’t of Children & Families v. W.H., 109 So. 3d 1269,
1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families,
974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
28.
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10); W.H., 109 So. 3d at 1270.
29.
109 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
30.
Id. at 1270.
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was presented at trial.31 The appellate court reversed given the absence of both
notice and “an evidentiary hearing on reunification.”32
In State Department of Children & Families v. B.D.,33 the trial court
adjudicated the child dependent and placed the child with her maternal cousin as
permanent guardian.34 Subsequently, the mother’s motion was granted and DCF
was ordered to reinstate protective supervision, “without scheduling or holding
an evidentiary hearing or setting out specific findings of fact.”35 From that order,
the Department sought certiorari.36 The appellate court issued a writ quashing
the trial court’s order.37 The appellate court opined that the trial court order
departed from the essential requirements of law as it “failed to make specific,
required findings of fact addressing the child’s best interest[s], stating the
circumstances that caused the . . . dependency, and explaining [why the]
circumstances [were] resolved.”38 The appellate court then added:
“Time is of the essence for . . . children in [a] dependency
system.” . . . [T]he court’s failure to comply with the express
requirements of the law significantly disrupts what was supposed to
be a permanent guardianship, leav[ing] the child’s status in a
continuing state of uncertainty, subject[ing] the child to [a] risk of
harm, and requir[ing] immediate relief that cannot be provided at
39
some uncertain future time on plenary appeal.

In a third case, a mother appealed from an order granting the state’s
motion for reunification with her two children, closing the case as to a third
child, and placing that third child with the father.40 The appellate court held,
quite simply, that an evidentiary hearing must be held where there are disputed
facts concerning the “detriment to the child,” allowing an offending parent to
contest the issue.41 As “the [trial] court made findings of fact without
conducting an evidentiary hearing,” this was a reversible error.42

31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
102 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
34.
Id. at 708.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
B.D., 102 So. 3d at 710.
39.
Id. at 711 (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.621(1) (2013)).
40.
B.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 114 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2013) (per curiam).
41.
Id. at 249.
42.
Id.
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For over two decades, the Florida courts have dealt with dependency
determinations based upon prospective neglect.43 In the leading case, Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,44 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in order to make a finding of prospective neglect, there must be “a
nexus between the parent’s problem and the potential for future neglect.”45 The
issue arose again in J.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re
Interest of J.J.V.).46 In that case, a father appealed an order adjudicating his son
dependent.47 The basis for the petition to adjudicate the child dependent was
that the father was a danger to the son because the father was a member of the
Bloods gang; the police officer testified that the father’s gang involvement was
proven by his numerous tattoos.48 The twenty-three year old father obtained
some of the tattoos as a teenager.49 Both the DCF and the Guardian Ad Litem
(“GAL”) Program conceded error, and the appellate court recognized that while
tattoos may indicate previous gang association, there was nothing to indicate his
involvement in any criminal activity since he was released from prison two years
earlier; further, all other testimony was that he “had been . . . diligent in visiting
his son and offering financial support.”50
Finally, in a case of first impression, perhaps nationally, in R.L.R. v.
State,51 a seventeen-year-old minor in a dependency case sought a writ of
mandamus to compel a reversal of the trial court’s order, “directing the [child’s]
Attorneys Ad Litem [(“AAL”)] to disclose the [child’s] whereabouts,” to whom
the child had formerly provided this information and requested that it not be
shared.52 The trial court “recognize[d] the attorney-client privilege, but [found]
the disclosure [was] required ‘for the proper administration of justice.’”53
Finding no exception to the attorney-client privilege that would support the trial

43.
See 1 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 4.14(4)(d)
(2013); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 182; Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of
Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397, 413 (2005).
44.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
45.
See id. at 568, 571; see also S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re
Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 3d 827, 833–34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); R.M. v. Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 40 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing N.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
46.
99 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
47.
Id. at 578.
48.
Id. at 579.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 578, 580.
51.
116 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
52.
Id. at 571, 572 n.2.
53.
Id. at 571.
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court’s order to disclose, the appellate court reversed.54 In doing so, it relied in
part on the brief of amicus curiae the Florida Association of Counsel for
Children, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, the National Association of
Counsel for Children, and the Youth Law Center of San Francisco55 for the
proposition that any exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege in certain lower
court cases were inapposite.56 Finally, the appellate court recognized that
“[c]ourts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have recognized and enforced the
attorney-client privilege in dependency proceedings.”57
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Just as parents are statutorily entitled to counsel in dependency
proceedings in Florida by statute, they are entitled to counsel in TPR proceedings
as a matter of constitutional right.58 The same court in Miami that failed to
provide counsel in a dependency case in G.W. v. Department of Children &
Families59 during the course of a staccato-case shelter hearing—as discussed in
last year’s survey article60—was reversed in F.M. v. State Department of
Children & Families,61 when it defaulted a father in a termination of parental
rights case when he failed to appear personally, although he appeared
telephonically at the advisory hearing.62 At that hearing, as quoted by the
appellate court, both the mother and father appeared by telephone.63 “When the
judge discovered the father was appearing telephonically, the following brief
exchange took place”:
The Court [calling]: Well that [is] not good enough. You’re
supposed to be here.
The Father [calling]: I could [not] afford it.
The Court [calling]: Well, that [is] really too bad.
DCF [calling]: How is he on the phone?
54.
Id. at 573–74.
55.
Brief on file with the Nova Law Review.
56.
R.L.R., 116 So. 3d at 571, 573 n.5.
57.
Id. at 574 n.8.
58.
In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, 2011
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 179.
59.
92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
60.
Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 37 NOVA L. REV. 333,
334 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law].
61.
95 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
62.
Id. at 382–83.
63.
Id. at 380.
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The Court [calling]: Okay, so go ahead.
Counsel for the mother: With the mother?
DCF [calling]: No, that [is the father]. Judge, well, [the father] is
present via phone. There is publication. His attorney over there [in
Louisiana] was noticed to be present.
The Court [calling]: He is not present. I am granting the termination
of parental rights and closing the case. Mr. M. has no contact with
his children.
....
The Court [calling]: . . . Well, he [is] not here, and a default has been
issued. Mr. M., your parental rights have been terminated and you
64
have no contact whatsoever with these children.

Citing prior case law to the effect that the “‘termination of parental
rights [ought] never be determined on a default basis or by gotcha practices
when [the] parent makes a reasonable [attempt] to be present at [the] hearing and
is delayed by circumstances beyond [that parent’s] control,’” the appellate court
reversed the termination of parental rights.65
The issue of whether parental rights can be terminated based upon the
abuse of a sibling or another child in the family, is predicated upon a showing of
a totality of the circumstances surrounding the current petition by applying the
Padgett nexus test.66 The issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
A.J. v. Department of Children & Families67 was whether a father’s parental
rights to five children should be terminated because, while there was proof of
sexual abuse as to two daughters, the record did not provide support for a finding
harm or a risk of harm with regard to their two brothers.68 While there was
evidence of mental health problems with the two boys, it was unclear if the
issues stemmed from the domestic abuse.69 On that basis, the appellate court
reversed as to the brothers.70

64.
Id. at 380–81 (alteration in original).
65.
Id. at 381, 382–83 (quoting B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So. 2d
1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
66.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991).
67.
97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
68.
Id. at 986.
69.
Id. at 987–88.
70.
Id. at 986.
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In G.O. v. Department of Children & Families,71 the appellate court
reversed as a matter of statutory construction because the general magistrate who
presided over the advisory hearing found that the parents gave constructive
consent for TPR by not appearing, and later allowed the guardian ad litem to
testify as to the child’s best interest.72 The trial court signed an order that
conformed to the general magistrate recommendation for TPR.73 Under Florida
law, general magistrates are prohibited from presiding over advisory hearings.74
The hearing at which the guardian ad litem testified “was an adjudicatory
hearing on the petition for [TPR].”75 The appellate court reversed, since the
proper court presiding over the adjudicatory hearing should have been the trial
court.76
The rights of putative fathers in TPR and adoption cases are limited in
Florida by statute.77 In only one case, Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A.,78 has the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of the adoption statute
as it relates to putative fathers.79 In S.C. v. Gift of Life Adoptions,80 an adoption
agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as a precursor to an
adoption involving a biological mother who intended to place the child up for
adoption with the agency.81 The appellate court affirmed and granted the
petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights, but avoided any
constitutional claim, finding that there was abandonment, which independently
supported the granting of the petition.82 The father had argued that he was not
appointed counsel in a timely fashion “until the first hearing on the petition.”83
The court did recognize “that the filing requirements [were] very technical and
might be a challenge to the nonlawyer biological father,”84 and in his
concurrence, Judge Davis expressed his concern that unwed biological fathers

71.
100 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
72.
Id. at 233.
73.
Id.
74.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.257(h); G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.
75.
G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.
76.
Id.
77.
FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053(1), .054(1) (2013).
78.
963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
79.
Id. at 191. See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33
NOVA L. REV. 357, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law] for a
discussion of the possible constitutional infirmities in the Florida law.
80.
100 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
81.
Id. at 774–75.
82.
Id. at 775.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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should be entitled to all the due process rights of other parties, including the right
to counsel.85
IV.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The question of how indirect criminal contempt applies in juvenile
delinquency cases was before the Supreme Court of Florida in J.M. v. Gargett
(J.M. II).86 The specific issue was whether, when an adjudicated delinquent
violates a single probation order on multiple occasions, that juvenile may be held
in contempt and placed in a secure detention facility for consecutive periods.87
In the case at bar, the juvenile was placed on probation and was held in indirect
criminal contempt as a result of violating curfew, as well as violation of a second
order to obey household rules.88 The juvenile was placed in secure detention for
both offenses; five days for the first offense and fifteen days for the second.89
Specifically, after the first period was satisfied, the second period began.90 The
Supreme Court of Florida—recognizing a split in opinions between the Second
and Fifth District Courts of Appeal—held that the consecutive sentences could
properly be instituted.91 Justices Quince and Pariente dissented on the grounds
that there was “only a single act of indirect contempt” under the Florida
dependency statute.92
In the second case before the Supreme Court of Florida this year, the
issue involved a school-related matter.93 Juveniles are often the subject of
delinquency cases that arise out of events which occur at school.94 The issue in
J.R. v. State95 was whether a juvenile could be found to have committed a
trespass on school grounds without evidence that the juvenile had formerly been
warned by the school principal’s designee for trespassing.96 The Supreme Court
85.
S.C., 100 So. 3d at 776 (Davis, J., concurring).
86.
101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
87.
Id. at 355.
88.
Id. at 353.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 353–54.
91.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356–57. Compare J.M. I, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d,
101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
92.
J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 (Quince, J., dissenting).
93.
J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
94.
See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 10.07(1)
(2013).
95.
99 So. 3d 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
96.
Id. at 427 (citing D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table decision), and quashed, 67 So. 3d
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of Florida held that the failure to present evidence at trial that the individuals
who warned the child were designees of the school’s principal was reversible
error.97 In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court failed
to properly comply with the conditions for taking judicial notice under Florida’s
rules of evidence.98
The third case in the Supreme Court of Florida was Hopkins v. State
(Hopkins II),99 in which the court decided the question of whether a detainee’s
act of battery at a juvenile detention center, and charged with battery falls under
Florida’s criminal law within this setting.100 Resolving a question of conflict
between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal—as a matter of statutory
construction—the court found that a detention center does qualify as a detention
facility for purposes of the criminal law.101
In what would seem like a simple proposition, juvenile court jurisdiction
over a subject child in delinquency ends at age nineteen.102 In State v. E.I.,103 the
appellate court—in a one-paragraph opinion—dismissed the State’s appeal as
moot, as the juvenile had reached his nineteenth birthday.104 However, the court
explained that the trial court was correct and that its jurisdiction ends over any
child at any time after the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, “[u]nless [the] child is
already under commitment, in a transition program, or subject to a restitution
order.”105
The rules concerning a determination of whether a juvenile is
incompetent to proceed in a delinquency case are quite clear.106 Among them is
the provision that the court must base its competency determination on the
evaluation of at least “two . . . experts appointed by the court.”107 In State v.
D.V.,108 following an unauthorized absence, the juvenile was charged with
threatening school personnel.109 The juvenile allegedly slapped another student
1029 (Fla. 2011)).
97.
Id. at 430.
98.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.201(1) (2013).
99.
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012).
100.
Id. at 471.
101.
Id.; see also State v. Hopkins (Hopkins I), 47 So. 3d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 63 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d,
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012); T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per
curiam).
102.
FLA. STAT. § 985.0301(5)(a).
103.
114 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
104.
Id. at 310.
105.
Id.
106.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.19.
107.
Id. § 985.19(1)(b).
108.
111 So. 3d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
109.
Id. at 235.
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seven weeks later.110 Formerly, the juvenile had been adjudicated incompetent
to proceed after allegations were raised with respect to the commission other
crimes.111 The first expert appointed by the court evaluated the mental condition
of the child and “determined that [the child] was not competent to proceed.”112
The court did not appoint a second expert, relying upon an earlier report from an
expert who had been appointed by the Department of Children and Families, on
the grounds that one could save money in so doing.113 The appellate court
reversed, finding that as a matter of statutory construction the trial court is
required to base determinations of competency on the evaluations of at least two
court-appointed experts.114 As the court only appointed one expert, reversal was
required.115
Issues of the suppression of inculpatory statements by juveniles have
been the source of discussion in this survey on a number of occasions.116 In
State v. M.R.,117 one of the issues on appeal was whether a statement that the
juvenile—who was subsequently “charged in a petition for . . . possession with
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis within 1000 feet of a school”—
made in front of his mother and in the presence of a police officer could be
suppressed.118 The police officer had called the mother, and when the mother
arrived, the juvenile was sitting, handcuffed, in the rear of a police car in custody
and in the presence of the officer.119 The child said to his mother that he did not
wish to talk to her in the presence of a police “officer and that she . . . knew why
he was selling marijuana.”120 In this case, the respondent child did not request to
speak with the third person––his mother––but rather, it was the police officer
that brought the mother to the scene.121 The court held that “these statements . . .
were an exploitation of the initial illegality,” citing a prior District Court of
Appeal case as distinguishable in Lundberg v. State.122
This survey does not usually discuss evidentiary issues, as they are
generic in nature and not necessarily specific to juvenile delinquency cases.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 235–36.
113.
D.V., 111 So. 3d at 236–37.
114.
Id. at 237.
115.
Id.
116.
See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 151
(2010); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 384–85.
117.
100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
118.
Id. at 274, 279–80.
119.
Id. at 275, 280–81.
120.
Id. at 275.
121.
Id. at 275, 280–81.
122.
M.R., 100 So. 3d at 280–81 (citing Lundberg v. State, 918 So. 2d 444, 445
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
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However, on occasion, the issue is germane to juvenile delinquency law.123 In
D.D.B. v. State,124 the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile
called “‘911 for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint or reporting
false information.’”125 In an adjudicatory hearing, “the State . . . introduce[d] an
audio recording of [the] two calls purportedly made.”126 The problem was quite
simple.127 The identification of the child’s voice on the recording required
“authentication, [which] would also require . . . evidence, including [the fact]
that the recording was of a telephone call received and handled by the 911
system on the relevant date.”128 Since there was no such evidence under section
90.901 of the Florida Evidence Code, the court was obligated to reverse.129
The second evidentiary matter, also seemingly basic in nature, arose in
K.A.A. v. State.130 In that case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the
unlawful possession of gun on school property.131 The trial court would not
allow the respondent “to cross-examine the State’s juvenile witness about
criminal charges pending against the witness.”132 Citing an earlier case to the
effect that “‘[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses . . . outweighs the [interest of
the State] in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records,’”133
the appellate court reversed.134 It ought to have been obvious that the
prosecution witness’s credibility would be an issue.135
It has been forty-six years since the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in In re Gault136 that children have the right to counsel in juvenile
delinquency cases.137 In C.W. v. State,138 a juvenile appealed from an order
adjudicating her as delinquent based upon a battery on a law enforcement
officer.139 The issue was the court’s action in taking the case to trial in the

123.

See, e.g., D.D.B. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

109 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.
See id.
Id.
D.D.B., 109 So. 3d at 1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (2013).
109 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Tuell v. State, 905 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See K.A.A., 109 So. 3d at 1176.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 41, 55.
93 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 515.

2013).

2005)).
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absence of a lawyer for the child.140 At the child’s arraignment, the child
indicated that she hired an attorney.141 The court asked if she was sure that she
would have the attorney represent her, since the attorney had not yet filed any
pleadings.142 On the date of trial, the child indicated that she was not sure where
her attorney was, and the court said that it was going to trial.143 After the trial,
but before the disposition, an attorney was hired and filed a motion for
rehearing.144 Incredibly, the court denied the motion for rehearing, noting that
the child ‘“did indeed have a fair trial.’”145 Citing to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure which require notification of the right to counsel at each
stage of the proceeding and—if the child chooses to waive counsel—conducting
a thorough inquiry to determine if the waiver was freely and intelligently made,
the appellate court reversed.146
In Florida, determinations of whether an alleged juvenile delinquent is to
be securely detained are based upon the use of a Risk Assessment Instrument
(“RAI”).147 In J.L.B. v. Kelly,148 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention during the course of the juvenile
delinquency proceeding.149 Although he was released from detention while his
writ was pending—and thus the matter was moot—the court on appeal ruled that
“improper scoring of [a RAI] . . . is capable of repetition yet evading review,”
and thus it resolved the issue.150 The claim involved impermissible double
scoring.151 The trial court added points to the scoring process on the basis of two
factors: “[T]he high risk nature of [a] prior commitment and the circumstances
of the current burglary offense.”152 The problem was that by doing so, the court
impermissibly double-scored by acknowledging circumstances that had already
been taken into account by the RAI, there was nothing in the State statute that
would allow the court to do so.153

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
C.W., 93 So. 3d at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515–16 (quoting FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a), (b)(2)).
Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 380–81.
93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 1138.
Id. (citing T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1138.
J.L.B., 93 So. 3d at 1139 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.24 (2013)).

2002)).
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The State charged a juvenile with felony criminal mischief—valued at
$1000 or more—for $2600 of damage to an automobile.154 The auto body shop
owner testified in support of the value of the damage, based on an employee’s
estimate.155 The estimate was made in the regular course of business, but the
estimate was never admitted into evidence.156 When the trial court refused to
strike the oral testimony, trial counsel objected, and the matter in A.S. v. State157
went up on appeal.158 The appellate court reversed on the basis of the Florida
Rules of Evidence, specifically section 90.803(6), regarding the business records
exception to hearsay.159 Here, the estimate itself would have qualified as a
business record.160 “[H]owever, the testimony explaining the contents of the
estimate,” where the estimate was not in evidence, did not fall within the
exception.161 As a result, there was no competent proof of the underlying felony
crime and the court reversed.162
Restitution issues come up regularly at the dispositional stage of
delinquency cases in Florida; issues also regularly discussed in this survey.163 A
blatantly obvious reversal took place in X.G. v. State,164 where the juvenile
appealed from the revocation of juvenile probation where the court’s basis for
revocation and probation was the failure to pay restitution.165 The problem
concerned a plea agreement, which stated that “no restitution would be ordered
on the [underlying] charge.”166 Thus, the disposition order did not list restitution
as a condition of probation.167
In A.P. v. State,168 the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a restitution order.169 The source of the evidence resulting in an order of
$220 in restitution was the victim’s testimony, which was based upon the

154.
A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
91 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
158.
See id. at 271.
159.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (2013) (amended by Act effective May
30, 2013, ch. 2013-98, § 1, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–2).
160.
A.S., 91 So. 3d at 271.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 60, at 346; Michael J. Dale,
2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of
Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 378.
164.
106 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
165.
Id. at 91.
166.
Id. at 90.
167.
Id.
168.
114 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
169.
Id. at 395.
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replacement value of the item, and the source of the testimony was unknown.170
Thus, according to the appellate court, the State failed to present competent
substantial evidence of the item’s fair market value.171
Among the requirements at the dispositional stage of the delinquency
proceeding in Florida, is that the court strictly comply with the statutory
provisions governing proper procedure at a juvenile disposition hearing.172 In
K.P. v. State,173 while the court ordered a predisposition psychiatric evaluation of
the child, the court entered a dispositional order before the psychiatric evaluation
was available.174 That constituted failure to strictly comply with the statutory
procedures, and the appellate court reversed.175 Similarly, at the dispositional
stage, the trial court is obligated to prepare a written dispositional order that
complies with its oral pronouncements.176 In L.D. v. State,177 the trial court
failed to do so.178 It was conceded that the court’s written dispositional order
was not consistent with its oral pronouncements.179 On the basis of the lower
court’s failure to comply with the statutory obligations, the appellate court
reversed.180
Similarly, in R.V. v. State,181 the appellate court reversed the
dispositional order of the trial court because there had been no articulation
regarding why the dispositional alternative of a moderate risk commitment
program is more appropriate than the Department of Juvenile Justice’s
recommendation that the child’s rehabilitative needs should result in the least
restrictive setting.182 The appellate court reversed, authorizing the “trial court
[to] amend [its] disposition[al] order to include the required findings.”183
Perhaps even harder to understand is the situation which required a
reversal of a disposition in M.A.L. v. State.184 In that case, the trial court
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
K.P. v. State, 97 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing K.D.
v. State, 911 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2)
(2013).
173.
97 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
174.
Id. at 967.
175.
Id.
176.
L.D. v. State, 107 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2).
177.
107 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
178.
Id. at 515.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2).
181.
107 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
182.
Id. at 536.
183.
Id.
184.
110 So. 3d 493, 495–96, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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conducted a dispositional hearing outside of the appellant and her father’s
presence, in a sidebar.185 The juvenile “claim[ed] that [the] sidebar conference
violated her due process rights to be present and meaningfully heard prior to the
disposition.”186 Shockingly, the State argued that this was harmless error.187 The
appellate court reversed, recognizing that the issue of disposition prior to
determination, in noncompliance with the Florida statute governing how the
hearing should be held, constituted fundamental error.188
Under Florida law, there is a variety of dispositional alternatives in
addition to restitution;189 such alternatives encompass placement in a various
residential facilities, including those described as high-risk.190 In D.H. v.
State,191 the trial court committed a youth to a high-risk facility for a
misdemeanor offense in its dispositional order.192 Florida law limits the trial
court’s commitment authority and placement of the juvenile misdemeanant in a
high-risk facility.193 Thus, the most restrictive facility to which the child could
be sent was a moderate-risk facility; therefore, the appellate court reversed.194
In G.W. v. State,195 juveniles in three consolidated appeals challenged
the constitutionality of a Florida Statute governing sentencing enhancement
when the crime committed was against a school officer.196 The appeal was based
on equal protection grounds and the appellants claimed that the statute created
“‘an elite class of untouchables’” because of the additional protection provided
by the law to school employees.197 Applying a rational basis equal protection
test,198 the appellate court affirmed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the
statute.199
In two major cases decided over the past four years, the Supreme Court
of the United States dealt with questions of appropriate punishment for

185.
Id. at 495.
186.
Id. at 496.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 496, 499; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.433(4)(d) (2013).
189.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 985.437, with id. § 985.441.
190.
Id. § 985.441(1)(b); see also id. § 985.03(46).
191.
114 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
192.
Id. at 497–98.
193.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.441(2)).
194.
Id. at 498.
195.
106 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla.
2013) (unpublished table decision).
196.
Id. at 84; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
197.
G.W., 106 So. 3d at 84.
198.
Id. at 85 (citing Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996
(Fla. 2003)).
199.
Id. at 86; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes.200 In
Roper v. Simmons,201 the Court held that the death penalty for individuals who
committed criminal offenses while juveniles was unconstitutional in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.202 In
Graham v. Florida,203 the Court held that life without the possibility of parole
for a juvenile was also unconstitutional in a felony murder setting where the
juvenile did not commit the homicide.204 Then, in Miller v. Alabama,205 the
Court ruled that state sentencing statutes making life imprisonment without
parole appropriately mandatory for juvenile non-homicide offenders also violated
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.206 In
three intermediate appellate court opinions decided this past survey year, the
courts dealt with the application of Graham and Miller to three juveniles tried as
adults.207 The first case is Walling v. State.208 There, the defendant, who was
sixteen at the time of the offense, was convicted of felony murder for
participating in the planning of the robbery and supplying the gun, although he
had been “waiting a few blocks away when the fatal shot was fired.”209 He was
tried as an adult by a six-person jury.210 The appellate court held that under
Roper, Graham, and Miller, the juvenile was not entitled to a twelve-person jury
because the twelve-person jury is required when death is a possible penalty and
that death no longer controls the question of a jury’s size when the case involves
a juvenile.211
In Reynolds v. State,212 the defendant had been found guilty by a jury
and sentenced to life in prison on one count of robbery with a firearm in 2002.213
The appellate court vacated the sentence of life without parole under Graham.214

200.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
201.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
202.
See id. at 578.
203.
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
204.
Id. at 2034.
205.
132 S. Ct 2455 (2012).
206.
Id. at 2475.
207.
See Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013);
Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 931–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 2013 Fla. LEXIS
2223 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); Walling v. State, 105 So. 3d 660, 661–62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
208.
105 So. 3d 660, 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
209.
Id. at 661–62.
210.
Id. at 662.
211.
Id.
212.
116 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
213.
Id. at 559.
214.
Id.
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The second issue before the court on remand was “‘the concept of aggregate
sentencing on interdependent offenses, as it relates to [the] trial judge’s desire to
effect the original sentencing plan.’”215 The appellate court held that there is no
right to “‘modification, on remand after appeal, of [the] sentences on convictions
[that were] not challenged on [the original] appeal.’”216 The appellate court
further acknowledged the lack of legal decisions on point with this issue after the
Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in Graham, although it recognized
general support for the proposition.217 Finally, as the court noted that it was not
unconstitutional for a juvenile to receive a life sentence for a non-homicide
crime.218 Rather, it “is unconstitutional . . . for the State not to give [the]
juvenile offender[] . . . ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”219
In a third post-Graham decision, Young v. State,220 the juvenile was
sentenced to four consecutive thirty-year sentences and then was resentenced
pursuant to Graham.221 One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was
that the trial court violated Graham by “fail[ing] to consider [his] rehabilitation
and newfound maturity.”222 The juvenile’s claim was that he was entitled to a
hearing to prove his change in circumstances.223 The appellate court rejected this
argument under Graham.224 Under the facts of the case, because the juvenile
was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison, after which he would be
released, he did have a sentence that specifically provided for his eventual
release.225 Therefore, Graham did not apply.226 Finally, the appellate court held
that a resentencing hearing does not require the opportunity to review
rehabilitation.227 On those bases, the court affirmed.228

215.
Id. at 562 (quoting Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1984)).
216.
Id. (quoting Fasenmyer, 457 So. 2d at 1366).
217.
Reynolds, 116 So. 3d at 562.
218.
Id. at 563.
219.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
220.
110 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 5C13-929, 2013
WL 5614109 (Fla. 2013).
221.
Id. at 931–32 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034).
222.
Id. at 932.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. at 933.
225.
Young, 110 So. 3d at 934.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. at 936.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three important technical matters
in the delinquency field this past survey year.229 In dependency and termination
of parental rights cases, the intermediate appellate courts decided a large number
of cases, a number of which involved obvious and basic failures to comply with
Chapter 39 by the trial courts.230 One case in particular, R.L.R. v. State, was
particularly noteworthy, as it upheld the right of a juvenile to confidentiality with
his volunteer AAL in a dependency case, over the objections of the GAL
Program and the DCF.231

229.
See J.M. II, 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Hopkins II, 105 So.
3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 430 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
230.
See, e.g., A.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 97 So. 3d 985, 986–87 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
231.
R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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INTRODUCTION

The State of Florida is a leader in many respects. Florida is number
one in beaches;1 number one in tropical hurricanes2 and lightning strikes;3
and at or near the top per capita in mishandling abandoned, abused, and
neglected children.4
Florida actually spends more money on the

* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law School. The author thanks
research assistants Marisa Goldberg Wiggins, Joe H. Baldelomar, and Professor Michael Dale
for their help in the preparation of this article.
1.
The Best Beach in America, Siesta Beach, DR. BEACH (2010),
http://www.drbeach.org/top10beaches.htm.
2.
ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE
DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851
TO 2004 (AND OTHER FREQUENTLY REQUESTED HURRICANE FACTS) 15–16 (2005), available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf.
3.
Betsy Crisp, When Lightning Strikes, U. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION,
http://pasco.ifas.ufl.edu/fcs/Lightning.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
4.
See Sofia Santana, Report: Florida Child Death Rate High, SUNSENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2009, at B.8; see also J. KATE STOWELL, THE POLICY GRP. FOR FLA.’S
FAMILIES & CHILDREN, THE STATE OF FLORIDA’S CHILD: A REPORT FOR THE FLORIDA
CHILDREN AND YOUTH CABINET 5 (2009), available at http://childrensmovementflorida.org/
issues/children/the_state_of_floridas_child_report.pdf; Nat’l Kids Count, Kids Count Overall
Rank, KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/7288-kids-countoverall-rank?loc=11&loct=2#detailed/2/11/false/36,868/any/14344 (last updated June 2013).
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incarceration of children than on the education of children.5 With tens of
thousands of children in the dependency system in Florida every year, the
legal system and child protective services system are stressed.6 One glaring
weakness in the Florida process is that each dependent child is not provided a
lawyer for representation, except in exceptional circumstances.7 Although a
minority of states fail to provide a dependent child his or her own lawyer, in
Florida, it is actually much worse.8 Take the following example.
Billy is a fourteen-year-old ninth grade high school student. Along
with his ten-year-old brother, Stevie, Billy lives with his mother, Julie, and
his stepfather, Dave, who have been married for seven years. Billy’s
biological father abandoned Billy, his mother, and little brother many years
ago. Billy, his mother, and little brother have had a hard life. Billy’s
mother, Julie, did not graduate high school and has never held a steady job.
Until she met and married Dave, Julie regularly relied on government
benefits to help feed, house, and clothe herself and her children.
When Julie married Dave, things changed. Dave is a carpenter
who—until the recent downturn in the housing market—had steady work,
made enough money for the family to buy a small house, and provided for
the children. With the downturn in the housing market, Dave began losing
work. The family struggled to pay the bills despite Dave’s best efforts to
find work. The financial pressure finally got to Dave and he began drinking
more heavily. Julie took a job at a fast food restaurant to try to help out.
This resulted in many nights of Dave coming home late, drunk, and picking
arguments with Julie. These arguments got progressively worse when Dave
started physically hitting Julie. When Billy tried to stop Dave from striking
Julie, Dave hit Billy too.
This kind of physical violence continued for several months until
one day, the high school physical education teacher noticed the bruising and

5.
Education vs Prison Costs, CNN MONEY, http://www.money.cnn.com/
infographic/economy/education-vs-prison-costs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
6.
See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 5, 7 (2011), available at http://www.guardianadlitem.org/
documents/GALAnnualReport2011.pdf.
7.
See FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217(a)–(b); In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d
83, 87 (Fla. 1980) (citing Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 705–06 (Fla. 1975)); Michael J.
Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV.
305, 327–28 (2011).
8.
See CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN
16, 18–20, 45–46 (3d ed. 2012), available at www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/3rd_Ed_
Childs_Right_to_Counsel.pdf.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

110

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

2013]

APPLICATION OF STATE UDAP STATUTES TO AGENCIES

103

scarring on Billy’s face, which could not have been from football or
wrestling practice. The high school teacher called child protective services
to report what he saw. Child protective services, after investigating—and
over the objection of Billy—removed both Billy and Stevie from the home
where Julie and Dave lived, and placed both boys in foster care.
In the time period before the dependency court hearing, Billy, who
was at best confused by what was happening, was approached by child
protective service caseworkers. Billy was told—and received a business card
stating—that the lawyers representing the child protective services
government agency were part of the “‘Law Firm for Florida’s Children.’”9
Further, Billy received a visit from a guardian ad litem who told Billy that
the Guardian Ad Litem Program (“GAL Program”) would represent Billy’s
legal interests. Billy has consistently maintained that he wants to go back
home to be with his brother, his mother, and Dave, despite what Dave did to
him and his mother. Billy believed in his heart that the family, with help,
could be together again. Billy relied on the representations made by the
child protective services’ caseworker and the guardian ad litem that Billy’s
wish to reunite his family would be represented in court by both. Billy,
therefore, had no idea that he might want to hire a lawyer, or that he might
need to hire a lawyer, or that it might be in his best interest to hire a lawyer.
Billy thought he was covered.
Such, of course, is not the case in Florida specifically, nor in other
10
states. The state government agency involved in child protective services,
the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in Florida, is, in fact, the
petitioner who brings a dependency petition on behalf of the state, and is not
authorized to, and does not, act as the lawyer for an alleged dependent
child.11 Further, in Florida, the guardian ad litem is a representative of the
statewide GAL Program.12 The Florida GAL Program is a separate party to
the dependency proceeding.13 Consequently, the GAL Program does not
provide legal services or representation for an alleged dependent child.14
Needless to say, Billy appeared in court without a lawyer and watched as
both the DCF and the GAL Program advocated for Billy and Stevie to be
permanently removed from their home with their mother and Dave. No

9.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334.
10.
See, e.g., CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra note 8, at 41, 45, 52.
11.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(21), .501(1) (2013); see also Dale & Reidenberg,
supra note 7, at 327.
12.
FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327, 331.
13.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334.
14.
Id. at 327; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office v. Office of State
Att’y Twentieth Judicial Circuit, 55 So. 3d 747, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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lawyer advocated on behalf of Billy, and Billy was removed from his mother
and stepfather’s home and separated from his younger brother Stevie.
The purpose of this article is not to revisit the legal catastrophe that
is Florida’s child protective services state agency and its GAL Program.15 It
is clear that Florida’s DCF is systematically ineffective and the Florida GAL
Program is legally impotent when it comes to providing legal representation
for children in dependency proceedings.16 It has already been proven so!17
Further, this article is not designed to call into question the unselfish
commitment of so many volunteer guardian ad litems and others who act
with good intentions to protect abandoned, abused, and neglected children in
Florida.18 Rather, the purpose of this article is very different.
The design of this article is to suggest that perhaps—using Florida as
an example—one unexplored avenue to clean up and boost the effectiveness
of the government agencies involved in the dependency process is to first
require that these agencies not unfairly or deceptively lure unsuspecting
children into believing that their legal rights are in any way protected in a
dependency proceeding by these government agencies.19
Therefore, this article begins with examining whether or not state
agencies—in particular the child protective services state agencies—can be
subject to prosecution under state unfair and deceptive trade practice
statutes.20 The first part of this article will outline the fundamental concepts
that define a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice.21 Next,
this article will examine whether such state consumer protection laws have
ever been applied to government entities and activities.22 Then, this article
will analyze if an alleged dependent child could successfully maintain a
cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice against these child
protective services government agencies when the state agencies

15.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334–35.
16.
Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency
Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 773 (2001); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7,
at 334; see also Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office, 55 So. 3d at 750.
17.
See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 5.
18.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 327–28. There are roughly 9600
volunteer guardian ad litems in Florida who must be applauded for their service. Volunteer,
Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, http://
www.guardianadlitem.org/vol_faq.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
19.
See infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part II.
21.
Id.
22.
See infra Part III.
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misrepresent their role in the dependency process.23 Finally, this article will
conclude by outlining how the seemingly inapplicable state unfair and
deceptive trade practice statutes may be used to protect dependent children.24
II.

STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE STATUTES

“All fifty states . . . have enacted at least one statute” designed to
protect consumers from deceptive or unfair trade practices.25 In most states,
the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes
unambiguously provide for a private right of action against a person or entity
that commits unfair or deceptive trade practices.26 These UDAP statutes
routinely advise that great weight and due deference be given to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the federal courts’ interpretation of the FTC
Act as to what comprises an unfair or deceptive practice.27 This deference to
the FTC and the federal courts is designed to aid state courts in establishing
their own judicial determination of what kind of conduct amounts to an
unfair or deceptive trade practice.28
The FTC Act, the FTC guidelines and policy statements, and the
federal courts broadly define and construe what is an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.29 For example, there is federal court precedent backed by
FTC policy statements that defines a deceptive trade practice as any act or
practice that has the tendency or capacity to deceive.30 The most recent FTC
policy statement on deceptive trade practices—which has been adopted by
some federal and state courts—defines a deceptive trade practice as any act
or “practice that . . . is likely to [deceive] consumers acting reasonably under

23.
See infra Part IV.
24.
See infra Part V.
25.
CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (8th ed. 2012).
26.
Id. at 722.
27.
Id. at 197; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (containing a broad and
general definition).
28.
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 197–98. Because the FTC Act
does not provide for a private right of action, it can only be interpreted to evidence “what
conduct is prohibited by [the] state UDAP statute[s].” Id. at 197.
29.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d
676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984); Letter from
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
30.
Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp., 143 F.2d at 680.
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the circumstances.”31 Regardless of which standard a federal or state court
chooses to adopt, neither standard requires proof of intent, negligence, fraud,
or even actual deception to make out a prima facie case.32 In sum, proof of a
deceptive trade practice focuses on the act or practice, and whether such act
or practice might mislead or deceive a person.33 This is similar to the
definition and interpretation of what constitutes an unfair trade practice.34
The federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United
States, have defined and construed an unfair trade practice to include an act
or practice that “offends established public policy and . . . is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or . . . injurious to consumers.”35 In
particular, the Court endorsed such a broad and sweeping definition of an
unfair trade practice because it noted that “‘[t]here is no [end] to human
inventiveness’” for those who choose to treat people unfairly.36 Further, just
like with deceptive trade practices, the federal courts and the FTC do not
require proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception for an act or
practice to be considered unfair.37
The most recent version of the FTC Act and the FTC policy
statements—adopted in some federal and state courts—revised the definition
of an unfair trade practice.38 In particular, the revised definition of an unfair

31.
In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 164–65; see also FTC v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965) (holding that “misrepresentation of any fact
which would constitute a material factor in a purchaser’s decision whether to buy” will be
deemed a deceptive trade practice); Letter from James C. Miller III, supra note 29.
32.
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that proof of deceptive intent is unnecessary); Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d
1184, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc., 581 N.E.2d
196, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)) (holding that a plaintiff is not required to prove actual
deception, reliance, or fraud); Brandon v. Winnett, No. 01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL
444385, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (finding a negligent misrepresentation sufficient
to render the trade practice deceptive). But see CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 16–17 (2009), available at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.
33.
See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Brandon, 1995 WL
444385, at *5; CARTER, supra note 32, at 16–17.
34.
See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)).
35.
Id. (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5 (1972)).
36.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 631142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)).
37.
See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368; Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5; FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1965);
Spiegel, 540 F.2d at 293 (citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244–45 n.5).
38.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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trade practice requires that the act or practice “‘causes or is likely to cause
substantial [consumer injury that cannot be] reasonably avoid[ed] by [the]
consumer[] . . . and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to [the]
consumer[].’”39
Most states adhere to one or both of these FTC and federal courtgenerated definitions of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade
practice.40 In addition, most states require that such unfair or deceptive trade
practices arise in trade or commerce.41 Trade or commerce is consistently
defined by UDAP statutes as any profit or non-profit oriented transaction.42
In essence, so long as the act or practice in question can be linked in some
way to trade or commerce, the act or practice will be covered by a state
UDAP statute.43
III.

APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE
STATUTES TO GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

Countering this seemingly uninhibited coverage of UDAP statutes,
most states exempt some acts or practices and some persons from the reach
of UDAP statutes.44 Common UDAP statutory exemptions include banks,
savings and loan companies, insurance providers, and utility companies.45
Prohibiting recovery against a state or other government agency is an
uncommon exemption under UDAP statutes.46 However, some states have
addressed the issue via case law.47 For example, in Du Page Aviation Corp.

39.
Neovi, 604 F.3d at 1155 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
40.
See Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 494 & n.12
(Ct. App.), reh’g granted and depublished by B180134, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 919 (Ct. App.
June 1, 2006); State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d
518, 525 (Iowa 2005); State v. Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (Me. 2005); Tucker v. Sierra
Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
41.
See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11, 197.
42.
See id., at 11–12. Moreover, some states include non-profit or not-forprofit activities within the definition of trade and commerce. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8)
(2013).
43.
See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 11.
44.
See id. at 118–20.
45.
CARTER, supra note 32, at 14–15.
46.
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212;
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2013); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (2013).
47.
Hawaii, Massachusetts, and California have permitted suits against the
government. See Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 111 (Ct. App. 1999);
Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1123–25 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v. Dew, 626 F. Supp.
386, 388 (D. Mass. 1986). Illinois, Montana, Texas, Washington, Connecticut, and North
Carolina have excluded government entities from liability under each state’s respective UDAP
statute. See City of Danbury v. Dana Inv. Corp., 730 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Conn. 1999)
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v. Du Page Airport Authority,48 the Illinois court considered the applicability
of its UDAP statute to municipal corporations, and found that such
corporations could not be sued under that statute.49 The court reasoned that
municipal corporations do not fall under the definition of person as required
by the UDAP statute.50 Since the statute specifically mentioned both
domestic and foreign corporations as possible defendants, the court
concluded that the failure of the statute to specifically mention municipal
corporations indicated that the legislature intended to exempt municipal
corporations from an unfair or deceptive trade practice lawsuit.51
Similarly, in Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Montana,52 the Montana court found that the state’s UDAP statute could not
be enforced against a government defendant, since the plain meaning of
person could not be construed to include a government entity.53 The court
went on to note that the government entity in the case––a school district––
was not engaged in a business activity at the time and therefore, could not be
sued under the state’s UDAP statute.54 This analysis suggests that had the
school district or other government agency been engaged in trade or
commerce—as defined by the Montana UDAP statute and the Montana
courts—a UDAP cause of action would be cognizable.55
Texas also exempts the government agencies from liability under the
state’s UDAP statute.56 According to Texas law, “[g]overnmental immunity

(concluding that municipalities fall under the exemption for “actions . . . permitted under law
as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the
state”); Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Auth., 594 N.E.2d 1334, 1341 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992); Montana Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mont., 78 P.3d 499, 505–06
(Mont. 2003); State v. Furio, 148 S.E.2d 275, 277 (N.C. 1966); Rea Constr. Co. v. City of
Charlotte, 465 S.E.2d 342, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sperry Corp. v. Patterson, 325
S.E.2d 642, 644 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding that neither a state, city, town, nor agency of
the state may be sued under North Carolina’s UDAP statute); Jefferson Cnty. v. Bernard, 148
S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App. 2004); Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of
Snohomish Cnty., 459 P.2d 633, 636 (Wash. 1969) (finding that the legislature’s failure to
include municipal corporations under the section listing entities subject to the statute renders
municipalities exempt from suit).
48.
594 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
49.
Id. at 1341.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
78 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2003).
53.
Id. at 505–06.
54.
Id.
55.
See id.
56.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013); Jefferson Cnty. v.
Bernard, 148 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Tex. App. 2004).
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protects governmental units of the [s]tate from” UDAP lawsuits.57
Therefore, UDAP claims against the government or its agencies will be
permitted only if there is a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.58 In
Jefferson County v. Bernard,59 the Texas court was faced with determining
whether the inclusion of the term governmental entities in the UDAP
statute’s definition of persons covered in the statute constituted a waiver of
sovereign immunity.60 The court reasoned that the waiver of sovereign
immunity must be clear and “[a]ny ambiguities in a statute are to be resolved
in favor of retaining immunity.”61 Therefore, the court held that the
inclusion of the phrase governmental entities was insufficient to indicate a
waiver of governmental immunity.62 However, it is important to note that
the Texas UDAP statute is one of the weakest in the country,63 and unlike the
majority of states, Texas chooses to interpret its UDAP statute narrowly. 64
Consequently, it is unlikely that other states faced with this issue would
come to the same conclusion.65
The purpose of UDAP statutes is to provide extensive protection
from the broadest range of unfair and deceptive practices.66 The holding, set
forth in the Texas case, seems to contradict this purpose by exempting
governmental entities from the scope of the statutes.67 By narrowly
interpreting terms such as person or governmental entities, these states are
allowing injured consumers to go without a remedy.68 In order to advance
the true purpose of UDAP statutes, courts should interpret each aspect of the
statute as liberally as possible in order to ensure coverage to the most
consumers.69 Despite the results in Texas and other states, some other states

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 700.
Id.
148 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 701.
Id. (citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex.

2003)).
62.
Id.
63.
See CARTER, supra note 32, at 11.
64.
See id.
65.
Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 109 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (distinguishing the narrow Texas UDAP statute from the broad UDAP statute of
Florida).
66.
See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972).
67.
See Bernard, 148 S.W.3d at 702.
68.
See id. at 701–02.
69.
See Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 239–40.
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have reached the opposite result and permit consumers to bring UDAP
claims against governmental entities.70
UDAP statutes have been applied against government agencies in a
few states.71 However, the majority of states have not yet had occasion to
decide this issue.72 Unless there is a specific statutory exemption regarding
lawsuits against the government, there appears to be no absolute obstacle in
applying UDAP statutes to government agencies engaging in deceptive
practices.73
Further, if the government engages in an unfair or deceptive trade
practice in which consumers suffer a loss, such consumers should have a
method of recovery under the UDAP statutes.74 Permitting such lawsuits
would advance the exact purpose of UDAP statutes; namely, to protect the
public from unfair and deceptive practices.75
Both Hawaii and Massachusetts permit state agencies to be sued
under their respective UDAP statues.76 Several entities are exempt under the
Hawaii UDAP statute; however, the statute is silent as to municipalities.77 In
Daly v. Harris,78 the Hawaii court concluded that this silence indicated that

70.
Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2002); Pierce v.
Dew, 626 F. Supp. 386, 387–88 (D. Mass. 1986).
71.
Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.
72.
See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387.
73.
See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 118. Other articles have
addressed how statutes have been extended to cover other entities not explicitly noted in the
statutory provisions. See also Michael Flynn, Physician Business (Mal)practice, 20 HAMLINE
L. REV. 333, 345–46 (1996) (finding that the “scarcity of . . . statutory provisions and case
law”—regarding UDAP statutes’ application to learned professionals—support the notion that
the statutes could extend to learned professionals); Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are
Saying is Give Business a Chance: The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-toBusiness Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 87–89 (2003) (discussing which states
permit a business to sue another business).
74.
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 10–11.
75.
Id.
76.
Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; see also Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.
California has also permitted suits against state agencies in violation of the state UDAP
statute, though inconsistently. Compare Trinkle v. Cal. State Lottery, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496,
499–500 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that “[o]nly through an unreasonable, strained
construction” can the government entity fall under the term person; thus, the cause of action
failed), and Janis v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 553 (Ct. App. 1998)
(finding a government entity is not a person subject to suit; thus, the cause of action failed as a
matter of law), with Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1999)
(permitting suit against a government entity, but relying on specific language that authorized
the fund in question).
77.
See Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23.
78.
215 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2002).
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the statute did indeed permit UDAP lawsuits against the government.79
According to Hawaiian “legislative history and judicial interpretation,” a
strong movement in the direction of increased consumer protection has
developed.80 The court noted that the legislature consequently utilized
“‘broad’ and ‘sweeping terms’” in the UDAP statute to provide protection to
as many consumers as possible.81 Therefore, when in doubt, the language of
the statute should be interpreted liberally.82 The court further determined
that the sole limitation set forth in the UDAP statute is the requirement that
“acts or practices be done ‘in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’”83
Taking into account such considerations, the court held that so long as the
government agency in question is engaged in trade or commerce, such
agency may be sued under Hawaii’s UDAP statute.84
In making this ruling, the Hawaii court looked to the Massachusetts
courts, which were also faced with the same issue.85 In Pierce v. Dew,86 the
Massachusetts court had to determine whether a governmental entity may be
held liable under the state UDAP statute.87 The Massachusetts UDAP statute
allows for suits against “‘natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships,
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.’”88
As similarly mentioned by the Daly court above, the Massachusetts UDAP
statute is intended to be a “‘statute of broad impact.’”89 Therefore, when in
doubt, it is in the court’s best interest to interpret the UDAP statute in the
most liberal manner.90 Consequently, since there was no legislative evidence
that indicated otherwise, the court found the phrase “‘any other legal entity’”
to include governmental agencies.91

79.
Id. at 1123–25.
80.
Id. at 1122.
81.
Id. (quoting Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)).
82.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 43
(Haw. 1995)).
83.
Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37).
84.
Id. at 1122–23 (quoting United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee,
521 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1988)).
85.
Id. at 1123 (citing Cieri, 905 P.2d at 37–38).
86.
626 F. Supp. 386 (D. Mass. 1986).
87.
Id. at 387.
88.
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1(a) (2013)).
89.
Id. at 388 (quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772
(Mass. 1975)); see also Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (citing Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997)).
90.
Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting Cieri, 905 P.2d at 43).
91.
Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88 (citing Keane, Inc. v. Boston Water &
Sewer Comm’n, No. 50133 (Suffolk Superior Court, Dec. 16, 1981)).
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In United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee,92 the
Massachusetts court further developed its stance regarding whether a
governmental entity may be a proper defendant in a UDAP lawsuit.93 The
court recognized that the legislature had maintained its silence on this issue;
thus, the court found it necessary to focus its analysis on whether the
potential government defendant engaged in trade or commerce.94 Though
the defendant in the case had not been participating in any business-like
endeavors, the analysis set forth by the court suggests that had the defendant
engaged in such activities, the UDAP statute would have applied and been
violated.95
Both the Hawaii and Massachusetts courts promote a broad
interpretation of each state’s UDAP statute’s text.96 Though most courts
have yet to face the issue of whether a government entity may be a proper
defendant under state UDAP statutes,97 Hawaii and Massachusetts indicate
that such lawsuits may well fit within the reach of UDAP statues.98 Since the
majority of state UDAP statutes are both expansive in scope and contain
broad prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts, state courts should be
able to permit lawsuits against the government and its entities when such
parties are engaging in unfair and deceptive acts or practices.99
IV.

APPLICATION OF STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE
STATUTES BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A DEPENDENT CHILD

There has yet to be a case in this country in which a dependent child
has maintained a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade practice
against a state agency, when such agency misrepresented to the child its role
in a dependency proceeding.100 Yet, UDAP statutes seem to be broad

92.
521 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1988).
93.
Id. at 744.
94.
Id.; Genesco Entm’t, Inc. v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 750–51 (S.D.N.Y
1984) (finding courts must focus on whether the practice in question arose out of trade or
commerce).
95.
United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 521 N.E.2d 741, 744
(Mass. 1988); see also Bedrosian, L.L.C. v. Costanza, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 459, 459–60 (Super.
Ct. 1999) (concluding that municipality may be subject to suit so long as the municipality
engaged in trade or commerce).
96.
Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122 (D. Haw. 2002) (quoting Han
v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604, 619 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)); Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 388 (quoting
Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Mass. 1975)).
97.
See, e.g., Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.
98.
Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Pierce, 626 F. Supp. at 387–88.
99.
See CARTER, supra note 32, app. at 24–29.
100.
See id.
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enough to enable a dependent child to initiate such a claim when the state
agency deceives or treats a dependent child unfairly.101 The key to such a
claim is to examine the nature of the dependent child’s claim and determine
if such a claim fits within the UDAP statute prohibitions.102
Florida provides an example of how the courts could permit a UDAP
claim against government agencies on behalf of dependent children.103 The
Florida UDAP statute, which is typical of most state UDAP statutes,
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce.”104 Florida specifically requires that the provisions of the statute
be construed liberally in order to promote the policies set forth in the statute,
which includes protecting the consuming public.105 Therefore, the Florida
UDAP statute is a broadly written statute.106
In order to determine whether a cause of action could indeed be
brought against a state agency for misrepresenting its role in a dependency
proceeding, the facts set forth in the opening anecdote involving Billy’s
dependency proceeding will be analyzed. First, the Florida UDAP statute
defines a consumer as “an individual; child, by and through [the child’s]
parent or legal guardian; business; firm; . . . corporation; any commercial
entity, however denominated; or any other group or combination.”107 Billy is
a child and, therefore, fits within the definition of a consumer.108
Next, the Florida UDAP statute requires that unfair or deceptive
practices arise in trade or commerce.109 The phrase trade or commerce is

101.
102.

See id. at 24–29.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.203(7), .204 (2013); CARTER, supra note 32, app.

at 7–10.
103.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.204.
104.
Id. § 501.204(1).
105.
Id. § 501.202.
106.
Hanson Hams, Inc. v. HBH Franchise Co., No. 03-61198-CIV, 2003 WL
22768687, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2003) (citing Day v. Le-Jo Enters., Inc., 521 So. 2d 175,
178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)) (finding courts have regarded the Florida UDAP statute as
extremely broad); see also, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
107.
FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7). At least thirty-four states would grant a private
right of action to a person or a consumer like Billy. See id.; see also ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-3(2),
(5), -10(a) (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1402(1), (8), :1409(A) (2013); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 75-24-3(a), -15(1) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1(I), :10(I) (2013); 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-2(2), -9.2(a) (West 2013).
108.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.203(7) and see supra hypothetical Part I.
109.
FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1). Many states require that the unfair or deceptive
trade practice arise from trade or commerce. ALA. CODE § 8-19-5; ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.471(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480-2(a) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601 (2013); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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defined as “the advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing,
whether by sale, rental, or otherwise, of any good or service, . . . whether
tangible or intangible, . . . wherever situated.”110 This is an expansive
definition of trade or commerce and seems to cover more than what would
conventionally be considered business activities.111 The actions of both the
child protective services caseworkers and the GAL representatives fit this
definition.112 By providing Billy with a business card, the child protective
services caseworker engaged in a form of advertisement.113 The business
Further, the
card is tangible evidence of trade or commerce.114
representation that the child protective services government agency is the
law firm for Florida’s children is tangible evidence that a service is being
offered to Billy.115 In addition, the GAL Program representative declared to
Billy that the GAL Program represented him in the dependency
proceeding.116 This kind of statement also fits within the definition of trade
or commerce because the GAL Program is providing legal services.117
The Florida UDAP statute requires that “due consideration and great
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the [FTC] and the federal
courts.”118 Therefore, the FTC and the federal court definitions of unfair and
deceptive trade practices apply to the Florida Statutes.119 Under FTC and
federal court precedent, an act or practice is a deceptive trade practice if the
act or practice is likely to, or “has the tendency [or] capacity to . . . deceive”
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.120 Further, proof of

505/2 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170(1) (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1405(A); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1)
(2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (2013); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 59-1602 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-3
(2013); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2013); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-3;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-18-104(a) (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (West 2013); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-5-2.5(1) (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2013); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6-104 (2013).
110.
FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8).
111.
Id.
112.
See id. and see hypothetical supra Part I.
113.
See Florida Bar v. Matus, 528 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 1988) and see
hypothetical supra Part I.
114.
FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8); Matus, 528 So. 2d at 895.
115.
FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
116.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
117.
FLA. STAT. § 501.203(8).
118.
Id. § 501.204(2).
119.
See id.
120.
In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 153 (1984) (citing Chrysler Corp.
v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
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intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not required to establish such
a prohibited practice.121 The FTC and federal court definitions are intended
to be flexible and do not require a specific rule to be violated in order for
deception to be found.122
The FTC has determined that oral
misrepresentations and failures to disclose material facts both violate the
FTC Act.123 Therefore, any oral misrepresentation or failure by a party to
disclose a material fact will be deemed sufficiently deceptive under the
Florida UDAP statute.124 Further, federal courts have held that if a practice
“offends established public policy, . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,” such practice is
unfair.125 Again, proof of intent, negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not
required for an act to be deemed unfair.126
Viewed from the perspective of Billy, he reasonably believed that
both the state child protective services caseworker and the GAL Program
were his legal representatives and would advocate on his behalf.127 When the
child protective services caseworker handed Billy a business card stating that
his agency was the law firm for Florida children, a reasonably prudent
person—even if not a child like Billy—would have every reason to believe
that the caseworker would indeed be his legal representative in court.128 The
caseworker failed to mention that he is in fact the petitioner who brings the
dependency petition on behalf of the state.129 By failing to properly disclose
the child protective services worker’s true role in the dependency
proceeding, the caseworker failed to disclose material facts that may have
impacted Billy’s decision to even think about obtaining his own lawyer.130

121.
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988);
Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d 1184, 1187–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Brandon v. Winnett, No.
01A01-9411-CH00529, 1995 WL 444385, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995).
122.
Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (citing Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1984)).
123.
In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1556 (1975).
124.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (2013).
125.
Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)).
126.
See Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368.
127.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
128.
See id.; see also Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving &
Storage, Inc., 643 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC,
561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (stating that “an advertisement is considered deceptive if
it has the capacity to convey misleading impressions to consumers”).
129.
FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
130.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532,
1556 (1975) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
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The caseworker misled Billy, who acted reasonably under the
circumstances.131 Such deceptive actions by the caseworker are prohibited
under the Florida UDAP statute.132
Further, when the GAL Program representative visited Billy, the
representative explained that the GAL Program served as Billy’s
representative in court and would advocate on his behalf.133 Billy
consistently maintained that he wanted to return to his home and be with his
mother, brother, and stepfather.134 Instead, the GAL Program advocated for
Billy’s separation from his mother, brother, and stepfather, and
recommended Billy’s removal from his home during the actual
proceeding.135 Again, a reasonably prudent person in Billy’s position would
have had every reason to believe that the GAL Program would advocate for
what Billy wanted.136 By relying on the oral misrepresentations made by the
GAL Program representative, Billy acted reasonably when he did not hire a
lawyer.137 Such deceptive actions by the GAL Program are prohibited under
the Florida UDAP statute.138
Moreover, both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative
engaged in unfair practices by misrepresenting their respective roles to
Billy.139 Billy is a child faced with a very difficult and emotionally
demanding situation—Billy is at least scared, worried, confused, and
vulnerable.140 Both the caseworker and the GAL Program representative
have an ethical, if not moral, responsibility to properly advise Billy, and the
failure to do so breaches their duties as public officials to carry out the
legislative policy to protect dependent children.141 Instead, both parties
treated Billy unfairly by denying him legal representation when Billy

131.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
132.
FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
133.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
134.
See id.
135.
See id.
136.
See Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & Storage, Inc., 643
So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363
(D.C. Cir. 1977)) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
137.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
138.
FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2013).
139.
See id.
140.
See hypothetical supra Part I.
141.
See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 n.5 (1972)) (reasoning that under the Florida
UDAP statute, immoral acts are unfair practices); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468
So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Spiegel, Inc., 540 F.2d at
293).
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reasonably believed he was covered.142 Billy had no way to know that he
could even ask for a lawyer, much less that he needed a lawyer, and that the
GAL Program was prohibited from acting as his lawyer in the dependency
proceeding; the GAL Program’s actions would fit as an unfair trade practice
under the Florida UDAP statute.143
Next, Billy must contend with the exemptions section of the Florida
UDAP statute.144 The Florida UDAP statute does not specifically mention
that the government or government agencies are exempt from lawsuits
claiming deceptive or unfair trade practices.145 However, no Florida court
has determined if this absence from the exemptions section of the UDAP
statute permits unfair and deceptive trade practice claims against a
government agency, like the child protective services state agency or the
GAL Program.146 Yet, the Florida courts have determined this same issue
with reference to professionals.147 In Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Associates,
P.A.,148 a Florida district court was asked to determine whether an attorney
may be sued under Florida’s UDAP statute.149 Like government agencies,
neither attorneys specifically, nor learned professionals in general, are
mentioned under the exemptions section of the statute.150 The court reasoned
that the legislature’s unambiguous failure to mention attorneys in the statute
exemptions indicates that attorneys are not exempt from a UDAP claim. 151
The court noted that neither a Florida District Court of Appeal nor the
Supreme Court of Florida has decided otherwise.152 Therefore, since the
legislature similarly made no mention of government agencies under the
exemptions section of the statute, such agencies are not exempted from
suit.153 Therefore, Billy’s claim against both the child protective services
government agency and the GAL Program is not exempt from enforcement
under the Florida UDAP statute.154

142.
FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(20) and see hypothetical supra Part I.
143.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1); Urling, 468 So. 2d at 453 (quoting Spiegel,
Inc., 540 F.2d at 293 (noting that if an act results in a substantial injury, such act is unfair));
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 334.
144.
FLA. STAT. § 501.212.
145.
See id.
146.
Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Assocs., P.A., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371
(S.D. Fla. 2010); see also FLA. STAT. § 501.212.
147.
Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
148.
681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
149.
Id. at 1371.
150.
FLA. STAT. § 501.212.
151.
Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
152.
Id.
153.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
154.
FLA. STAT. § 501.212; Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
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In sum, there appears to be no impediment to Billy—as a dependent
child—bringing a lawsuit against the child protective services government
agency or the GAL Program for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
V.
EFFECT OF APPLYING STATE UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICE STATUTES TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Perhaps the use of a UDAP statute as a remedy for a dependent
child’s denial of legal representation seems a bit strange and stretched.
However, such use of a UDAP statute seems no more strange or stretched
than the failure to provide dependent children with a lawyer in a dependency
proceeding. After all, the purpose of the dependency proceeding is to
provide government protection to children who have been abused, neglected,
or abandoned.155 Denying such dependent children their own legal
representation subjects these children to abuse, neglect, and abandonment
within the dependency process.156 The lack of legal representation for
dependent children—when cloaked with deception and unfairness—cries out
for a legal remedy.157 State UDAP statutes provide just such a remedy. 158
Most state UDAP statutes—just like Florida’s—provide as remedies for an
unfair or deceptive trade practice injunctive relief, economic damages, and
the prospect of prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs.159 In Billy’s case,
an injunction mandating that the child protective services state agency and
the GAL Program refrain from misrepresenting their function and not
advising Billy that he needs to at least consider, if not obtain, his own lawyer
to represent him in a dependency proceeding, would ensure that these
government agencies refrain from deceptive and unfair acts or practices.160
Although economic damages might be difficult to prove, the prospect of
recovering attorney’s fees and costs would encourage lawyers to take on the
representation of Billy in a state UDAP claim.161

155.
FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(a).
156.
See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Developmental Issues for Young Children in
Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145, 1148 (2000); CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra
note 8 at 15–17; Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 352; Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child
Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV.
1583, 1589 (2007).
157.
See CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INST. ET AL., supra note 8, at 15–17.
158.
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 1.
159.
Id. at 2.
160.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.207(b); CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 1–2.
161.
See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 25, at 2, 721.
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CONCLUSION

By allowing state UDAP claims against government entities, courts
would accomplish two goals. First, such a determination would place the
government on the same legal footing as any other illegitimate business that
uses unfair or deceptive trade practices to gain an advantage.162 Second, in
the context of dependent children, such a determination would prevent the
government from further abusing abused, neglected, and abandoned
children.163 Both of these goals fit well within the purpose of the state
UDAP statutes and the child protection statutes.164 Absent legislation
requiring that every dependent child receive legal representation in a
dependency proceeding, the least the courts can do is prohibit government
entities from tricking an abused, neglected, or abandoned child, and treat
these vulnerable children to a legal process that is not riddled with unfairness
and deception.

162.
163.
164.
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INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking is one of the most highly organized—and highly
elusive—crime epidemics, claiming victims internationally.1 However,
many people do not realize that human trafficking is not just a foreign issue;
trafficking is occurring within the United States and a majority of victims are
American citizens.2 While there are many forms of human trafficking, each
case almost always “includes psychological coercion, threats against family,
. . . and in sex trafficking cases, the threat of being ousted in the victim’s
community.”3 One reason why this crime epidemic is so elusive is because
the victims are very difficult to identify.4 This is because most victims are
locked away in a house and rarely allowed outside.5 However, not all
victims constantly seek a way out; some victims feel that working for the
trafficker is their only choice, or that they owe the trafficker, and the only
way to pay them back for giving them a place to live is through sex.6
A.

A Little Girl’s Story
Keisha is a [sixteen]-year-old African American female
originally from Florida. She was raised by an aunt until she was
[ten] years old and then placed in the foster care system. At the
age of [fourteen], Keisha first ran away from her foster family to
avoid sexual harassment from one of her foster family’s relatives.
During that time, she met “Mastur D,” a [twenty-six]year-old man who offered to help her get back to her biological
family. He said he would be able to pay for some of the expenses

1.
FRANCIS T. MIKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30545, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 1–2 (2006), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70330.pdf.
2.
DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS,
2008–2010 6 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf; HUMAN
SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., DOMESTIC HUMAN TRAFFICKING—AN INTERNAL ISSUE 2
(2008), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/113612.pdf.
3.
Natalia Zea, South Florida Human Trafficking Victim Shares Her Story,
CBS MIAMI (Aug. 17, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/08/17/south-floridahuman-trafficking-victims-shares-her-story/.
4.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING:
THE CRIMINAL
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PIMP 5 (n.d.) [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX
TRAFFICKING], available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/victims/humantrafficking/vs/
documents/Domestic_Sex_Trafficking_Guide.pdf.
5.
Id.
6.
See id.
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to get them there, but that she needed to help support them
financially by engaging in commercial sex with some of his
friends. With no money or other options Keisha took him up on
his offer. He drove her back to Florida but insisted when they
arrived that she had not earned enough money to cover their hotel
and gas costs. He physically assaulted her and told her she would
never see anyone else in her family if she did not engage in sex
with other men of his choosing. She felt she had no other choice
and continued to earn money for Mastur D to pay him back . . . .
Keisha was arrested for solicitation in Florida and after serving
time in a juvenile detention center, was returned to her foster
family, and was therefore returned to sexual harassment by her
foster family’s relative. Keisha ran away again a year later and
called Mastur D to help her get back to Florida. He agreed to help
7
again. She was arrested again.

Keisha’s story is a perfect example of a young girl who felt her only option
was to listen to Mastur D and have sex for money. 8 He used threats and
psychological coercion to make her believe this was her only option, and
poisoned her mind with lies for so long that she even returned to him after
she had been arrested and returned to her foster home.9 Now she is not only
psychologically and physically scarred, but she also has a criminal record
with prostitution charges that will follow her around for the rest of her life.10
Two prostitution charges is a first-degree misdemeanor, and three charges is
a third-degree felony in Florida.11 This type of record can make it difficult
for Keisha to find a decent job to support herself or a family.12 The way
Keisha was treated, and the aftermath of the victimization is very common
with other sex trafficking victims.13 This is why Florida Governor Rick
Scott recently signed a bill that will allow human trafficking victims to
petition to have their records expunged.14

7.
Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, http://
www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/client-services/survivor-stories/464-keisha-domesticminor-sex-trafficking (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
See id.
11.
FLA. STAT. § 796.07(4)(b)–(c) (2013).
12.
POLARIS PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims, in
2013 ANALYSIS OF STATE HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAWS 51, 51 (2013) [hereinafter POLARIS
PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims], available at http://
www.polarisproject.org/storage/2013_State_Ratings_Analysis_Full_Report.pdf.
13.
HUMAN SMUGGLING & TRAFFICKING CTR., supra note 2, at 13–14.
14.
Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); H.R. 1325, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013);
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This Comment is focused on human trafficking victims and how
Florida’s legislation is growing in the right direction by adding new laws to
help protect future victims and to assist in the rehabilitation of past victims. 15
Part II will discuss the currently enacted Florida Statutes and how Florida
defines human trafficking.16 Part III will analyze human trafficking victims
and why the victimization continues even after the victim is free.17 Part IV
will address current victim-focused laws Florida has in place.18 Part V will
discuss, in detail, Florida’s new expungement law and how it compares to
other expungement laws.19 Part VI will discuss future laws that Florida can
enact to further benefit human trafficking victims.20
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA’S HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATION

The human trafficking epidemic is an international problem, but
without individual states making an effort to combat local cases of human
trafficking, the epidemic will only grow.21 Human trafficking, and more
specifically, sex trafficking, is a very organized and secretive crime that is
most effectively dealt with at a local level.22 Local communities and local
law enforcement must be educated on the signs of human trafficking and the
best ways to fight it.23
Florida currently defines human trafficking as “transporting,
soliciting, recruiting, harboring, providing, enticing, maintaining, or
obtaining another person for the purpose of exploitation of that person.”24
Exploitation of a person can include labor—farm work, sweatshop work,
cleaning services, or restaurant work—or sex.25 Sex trafficking expands that
definition to include “forc[ing], compel[ling], or coerc[ing] another to

Keyonna Summers, New State Laws to Ease Toll on Human-Trafficking Victims: They Will
Move Toward Getting Their Lives Back When Gov. Rick Scott Signs Legislation Today,
TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 30, 2013, at B1.
15.
See infra Parts II–V.
16.
See infra Part II.
17.
See infra Part III.
18.
See infra Part IV.
19.
See infra Part V.
20.
See infra Part VI.
21.
Adam S. Butkus, Ending Modern-Day Slavery in Florida: Strengthening
Florida’s Legislation in Combating Human Trafficking, 37 STETSON L. REV. 297, 301–02,
311, 315, 324–25 (2007).
22.
Id. at 324–25.
23.
See id.
24.
FLA. STAT. § 787.06(2)(d) (2013).
25.
Id. § 787.06(1)(b).
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become a prostitute.”26 While these definitions do not include every possible
type of human trafficking, the Florida Legislature has attempted to
encompass as much as possible.27
A.

Florida: The Perfect Landscape for Sex Traffickers

Florida is especially vulnerable to human trafficking crime because
of the diverse population and number of immigrants.28 Florida is ranked
among the top three states for cases of human trafficking, along with New
York and California.29 This is due to the fact that Florida also has a large
international airport—Miami International Airport—and many ports for
boats to unload passengers.30 These two factors alone make Florida an ideal
entry point for human trafficking victims to be brought into the United
States.31 Once in Florida, “[s]ome traffickers keep their victims under lock
and key. However, the most frequently used practices are . . . isolati[on] . . .
from the public and family members, confiscating passports, . . . using or
threatening . . . violence, . . . [and] telling victims that they will be . . .
deported for immigration violations if they contact authorities . . . .”32 In
2004, Florida decided to take the steps needed to combat the human
trafficking epidemic and enacted legislation to bring awareness to law
enforcement and the community.33
B.

Florida’s First Steps in Combating Human Trafficking

In 2004, Chapters 787,34 796,35 and 895,36 of the Florida Statutes,
were amended to address human trafficking crimes.37 These laws made it a

26.
Id. § 796.04(1).
27.
See id. §§ 787.06(1)(b), (3)(a)–(h), (4), 796.04.
28.
What Is Human Trafficking?, FLORIDA NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (2009),
http://www.flnow.org/trafficking.html.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(c).
33.
See id. § 796.04; FLA. STAT. §§ 787.05–.06, 796.035, 895.02 (2004)
(current versions at FLA. STAT. §§ 787.06, 796.035, 895.02 (2013)).
34.
FLA. STAT. § 787.05 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 787 (2003))
(repealed 2012).
35.
FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 796 (2003))
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2013)).
36.
FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2004) (amending FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2003))
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 895.02 (2013)).
37.
See statutes cited supra notes 34–36.
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second-degree felony to engage in labor trafficking or sex trafficking of
adults,38 and a first-degree felony to engage in sex trafficking of minors.39
However, these laws were weak when it came to applicability because they
did not address how to properly prevent future human trafficking.40 It was
not until 2006 that the laws were amended to provide a more inclusive
definition of human trafficking, requiring human trafficking training within
law enforcement, and providing relief for victims.41 They were further
amended in 2012 to become even stronger.42
It is the intent of the Legislature that the perpetrators of
human trafficking be penalized for their illegal conduct and that
the victims of trafficking be protected and assisted by this state and
its agencies. In furtherance of this policy, it is the intent of the
Legislature that the state Supreme Court, The Florida Bar, and
relevant state agencies prepare and implement training programs
in order that judges, attorneys, law enforcement personnel,
investigators, and others are able to identify traffickers and
victims of human trafficking and direct victims to appropriate
agencies for assistance. It is the intent of the Legislature that the
Department of Children and Family Services and other state
agencies cooperate with other state and federal agencies to ensure
that victims of human trafficking can access social services and
benefits to alleviate their plight.
....
The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission shall
establish standards for basic and advanced training programs for
law enforcement officers in the subjects of investigating and
preventing human trafficking crimes. After January 1, 2007, every
basic skills course required for law enforcement officers to obtain
initial certification must include training on human trafficking
43
crime prevention and investigation.

38.
39.

FLA. STAT. § 787.05 (2004) (repealed 2012).
FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035

(2013)).
40.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 787.05 (2004) (repealed 2012), 787.06 (2004) (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)).
41.
Act effective Oct. 1, 2006, ch. 2006-168, §§ 1, 4, 2006 Fla. Laws 1, 1–3,
6–7 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 787.06, 895.02(1) (2004)).
42.
Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-97, § 5, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 4–7
(amending FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2011)).
43.
FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(d), (4) (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
787.06(1)(d), (5) (2013)) (emphasis added).
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Amending section 787.06 to include a training requirement was a huge step
for Florida in the battle against human trafficking because spotting the crime
is one of the toughest parts.44 However, the development of the protections
and remedies afforded to the victims is most important.45 Victims need an
effective support system and the ability to seek an adequate remedy from the
legal system.46 Many victims may return to the sex trafficker because life
with the sex trafficker is a better life than “foster care or . . . group homes.”47
If the victim has been with the sex trafficker for a long period of time, he or
she may have already gone through what is known as a grooming process, in
which the pimp attempts to gain control over the victim.48 These victims
need a support system and programs in place after they have been rescued in
order to recover and become accepted members of society.49
C.

Florida’s Harsh Punishments for Convicted Traffickers

Florida has come a long way since the 2004 legislation by adding
harsher punishments for traffickers.50 Currently, all forms of human
trafficking are first-degree felonies in the State of Florida.51 Sex trafficking
with a minor under fifteen years of age is a life felony, which is punishable
up to life in prison.52 Punishment for a first-degree felony is imprisonment

44.
FLA. STAT. § 787.06(1)(d) (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
787.06(1), (5) (2013)); see also Butkus, supra note 21, at 327.
45.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 327–28.
46.
Id. at 329–34.
47.
See Lois Lee, Residential Programs for America’s Child Sex Trafficking
Victims Secure or Non-Secure Facilities?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2013, 10:47 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-lois-lee/residential-programs-for-_b_3536472.html.
48.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3.
Pimps manipulate their victims beginning with an initial period of false
love and feigned affection. This initial period is critical to attaining long-term
mind-control.
....
The process of breaking-down a girl from healthy adolescent sexual
boundaries to commercial sex with strangers is often referred to as grooming or
seasoning. It is a systematic process that has been documented and replicated by
pimps nationwide. In essence, this process aims to achieve complete control over
someone’s identity or individuality using a combination of physical, mental, and
emotional means. In the trafficking paradigm, this process involves force, fraud,
and coercion . . . .

Id.
49.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 328–30.
50.
See Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-97, § 5, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 4–8
(amending FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2011) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013))).
51.
FLA. STAT. § 787.06(3)(a)–(h) (2013).
52.
Id. §§ 775.082(3)(a)2, 787.06(3)(h).
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for up to thirty years and up to a ten thousand dollar fine.53 However, section
787.06 of the Florida Statutes expressly allows for punishment for up to life
in prison for the sex trafficking of a minor.54 Section 787.06 of the Florida
Statutes also authorizes the courts to separate each individual instance of
human trafficking and stack the punishments.55 Therefore, each victim a
trafficker controls would be a separate count of human trafficking, each
punishable with up to thirty years in prison.56
Section 787.06 of the Florida Statutes also allows for seizure of
“[a]ny real property or personal property that was used, attempted to be used,
or intended to be used in violation of any provision of this section.”57 If this
section was used against traffickers, it could potentially shut down their
entire operation because they would lose their houses, cars, and any other
property that was used in conjunction with the human trafficking.58 Having
no house and no car would significantly impair a trafficker’s business.59
Another option is that Florida could use the seized property to help fund nongovernmental organizations.60 This authority comes from the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act, which allows law enforcement to seize property
used for criminal purposes and use the proceeds for future crime prevention
efforts.61 It would be very beneficial to take the property seized from human
trafficking crimes and give all the proceeds to human trafficking victim relief
agencies because these agencies need funding to implement more resources
for victims.62
D.

Florida’s Civil Remedies for Trafficking Victims

Florida’s legislation does include some civil remedies for victims.63
These remedies, however, are hardly enough to make a significant, positive
impact on the victim’s life.64 The victim can only recover up to three times

53.
Id. §§ 775.082(3)(b), .083(1)(b).
54.
Id. § 787.06(3)(g).
55.
Id. § 787.06(3)(h).
56.
FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 787.06(3)(h).
57.
Id. § 787.06(7).
58.
See id.
59.
See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3, 5;
What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28.
60.
Butkus, supra note 21, at 337.
61.
FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1).
62.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 329, 336–37.
63.
FLA. STAT. §§ 772.102(1)(a)(15), .104(1)–(2).
64.
See id. § 772.104(2); Buktus, supra note 21, at 328–29.
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the profit made by the sex trafficker.65 The legislation also includes that a
minimum of two hundred dollars and reasonable attorney’s fees will be
awarded to the victim.66 The burden is on the victim to prove how much was
made as a result of the sex trafficking,67 which can be difficult since the
victim is most likely not keeping a record of how much he or she has made. 68
Unfortunately, section 772.104 of the Florida Statutes denies victims the
right to seek punitive damages against sex traffickers.69 Florida also has a
statute that allows for victims of sexual exploitation to recover awards under
victim compensation laws.70 However, section 960.065 of the Florida
Statutes also restricts the award if the victim “who committed the crime upon
which the claim is based will receive any direct or indirect financial benefit
from such payment.”71
Overall, Florida’s legislation addressing human trafficking has
significantly improved over the last eight years since the 2004 amendments;
however, there is still room for even greater improvement.72 Improvement in
the area of victim relief is the most important.73 Human trafficking is
occurring every day and is so widespread that it cannot possibly be fixed
overnight, but the victims that are rescued need to be helped immediately.74
III.
A.

THE PROFILE OF A VICTIM

National Victim Statistics

A victim of human trafficking can be any sex, age, or ethnicity and
can be as close as a next-door neighbor.75 According to the most recent
report published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between January 2008
and June 2010, there were a reported 527 victims of human trafficking.76 Of
the 527 victims, 257 of them were 17 or younger, 159 of them were 18 to 24,

65.
FLA. STAT. § 772.104(2).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4.
69.
FLA. STAT. § 772.104(3).
70.
Id. § 960.065(1)(a).
71.
Id. § 960.065(4).
72.
Butkus, supra note 21, at 327. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.06
(2013), with FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)), and
FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2013)).
73.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 327–29.
74.
See id. at 315, 327–28.
75.
What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28; Zea, supra note 3.
76.
BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

136

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

130

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

68 of them were 25 to 34, and 27 of them were 35 or older.77 This report
also found that of the 527 victims, 346 of them were United States citizens.78
While this report does not include every single act of human trafficking, the
trend is clear: United States citizens are just as likely, if not more likely, to
become victims of human trafficking within the United States.79
B.

Initial Recruiting of a Victim

Victims can be taken from virtually anywhere; however, the more
vulnerable ones come from foster homes, halfway houses, homeless shelters,
and group homes.80 These victims usually have no family or place to call
home, so the grooming process that the sex traffickers use to control the
victims is much more effective.81 Victims can also be picked up at schools,
playgrounds, bars, and bus stations.82 Once they have been taken, they can
be sent far away from their hometown or locked away in a house, never to be
seen again.83
Some victims choose to go with the trafficker because they have
been promised money, food, or love.84 Martina Okeke, a Nigerian woman,
was brought to the United States and was “promised . . . $300 a month, . . . a
house, and tuition . . . for her . . . children.”85 She admitted that after twelve
years, she never received a dime.86 Martina relied on these promises because
she was living in poverty with two children as a single mother; coming to the
United States looked like a step up from her home in Nigeria.87 Individuals
in vulnerable situations are the ideal targets for traffickers because they can
easily be persuaded by “[p]romises of a better life, fast money, and future
luxuries.”88 Once the victim is secured—either locked up or cooperative

77.
Id. at 6 tbl.5.
78.
Id.
79.
See id. at 6.
80.
See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3.
81.
See id.
82.
Id.
83.
See Zea, supra note 3.
84.
See David Gonzalez, When American Dream Leads to Servitude, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at B1.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
See id.
88.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3; see
also Jessica De Leon, New Laws on Human Trafficking Will Aide Manatee-Sarasota Agencies
as They Form Task Force, BRADENTON HERALD (June 3, 2013), http://www.bradenton.com/
2013/06/03/4551754/new-laws-on-human-trafficking.html (“‘Two-thirds of the world lives in
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because of a false sense of security—the victim may be mentally and
physically abused in order to keep him or her obedient.89 This abuse can
include “beating, rape, starvation, forced drug use, confinement, and
seclusion.”90 Such treatment instills fear into the victim, causing them to
want to perform whatever acts the trafficker desires.91
C.

A Closer Look at Sex Trafficking Victims

Sex trafficking victims are generally young—most often under the
age of twenty-four.92 One common reason for this is many of the clients fear
contracting HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases.93 They believe
having sex with a child—“some as young as seven”—will protect them from
contracting diseases because the victims are “too young to have been
infected.”94 Some of the victims in their late teens and early twenties may be
forced to work in strip clubs or massage parlors—hidden in plain sight.95
Whatever the age may be, the sex trafficker usually sets a quota, or dollar
amount, that the victim must make each night in order to avoid severe
abuse.96 This quota could be anywhere from “$500 [to] $1000 each night.”97
Some of the victims may even resort to theft in order to meet the quota.98
Often times, the victims fear retaliation for not meeting the quota more than
they fear being arrested by law enforcement.99 At the end of the night, all the
profits the victims have made go directly to the sex trafficker; the victim
keeps nothing.100
Sex traffickers reap all the benefits from exploiting the victims by
forcing them to prostitute on the streets, work in brothels, or strip, and then

extreme poverty . . . . So when they are promised a job in the land of opportunity, which is
America, they are going to believe it.’”).
89.
See MIKO, supra note 1, at 4.
90.
Id.
91.
See Leif Coorlim, Victims Endure Lives Degraded by Traffickers, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/06/world/asia/freedom-fighter-victims/index.html (last updated
May 16, 2013, 3:15 PM).
92.
BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6 tbl.5.
93.
MIKO, supra note 1, at 4.
94.
Id.
95.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 313 n.108, 314.
96.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 4–5.
100.
Id. at 4.
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give all the money to the trafficker.101 It has been estimated that a sex
trafficker can make up to $632,000 in just twelve months.102 This estimation
is based on the trafficker controlling four girls, with each girl meeting a
“quota[] of $500 [a] night, [seven] days a week.”103 With this amount of
untaxed income, traffickers have little incentive to let the victims go once
they have them.104
D.

Victim or Offender?

One of the hardest parts for victims is the record they are left with—
if they are lucky enough to escape from the trafficker.105 Many victims are
convicted of theft, drug possession, prostitution, loitering, and other crimes
that make it very difficult to build a life after escaping.106 Some people may
ask why the victim did not tell the police about the trafficker the first time
they got arrested. While this seems like a logical solution to someone who is
not in a victim’s situation, it is not so easy.107 Often times a victim may not
even think of themselves as a victim, under the impression that they owe the
trafficker some debt or depend on the trafficker for food and shelter.108
Victims may also feel a sense of loyalty to pimps, known as Stockholm
Syndrome.109 There is also a possibility that the victim distrusts law
enforcement, due to personal experiences or being convinced by the
trafficker that law enforcement will only harm them.110 It is also very

101.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4;
Butkus, supra note 21, at 308, 314.
102.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4.
103.
Id.
104.
See id.
105.
Maggie Clark, New Human Trafficking Laws Focus on Victims, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 31, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/
new-human-trafficking-laws-focus-on-victims-85899480543.
106.
Id.
107.
See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
Stockholm Syndrome is a . . . psychological phenomenon wherein a
positive bond between hostage and captor occurs that appears irrational in light of
the frightening ordeal endured by the victims. In essence . . . the hostage views the
perpetrator as giving life by simply not taking it. Individuals . . . [with] Stockholm
[S]yndrome display three characteristics, although . . . not always exist[ing]
together. . . . Hostages have positive feelings for their captors, [v]ictims show fear,
distrust, and anger toward the authorities, [and p]erpetrators display positive
feelings toward captives as they begin to see them as human beings.

Nathalie de Fabrique et al., Understanding Stockholm Syndrome, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
July 2007, at 10, 12.
110.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5.
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probable that victims are scared that once they are out of jail, the trafficker
may harm them or their family.111 Consequently, many victims accumulate a
record because they were being forced to prostitute, which then makes it
nearly impossible to find a job, go to school, locate a place to live, or apply
for credit cards.112
Victims are suffering consequences for the rest of their lives, while
traffickers may only be in jail for a few years—if they are caught at all.113
Ten years after Telisia Espinosa had broken free, her life
on the lam with the boyfriend who had urged her to sell her body
for cash continued to haunt her.
From Las Vegas to Cleveland to Florida, Espinosa had
racked up arrests for prostitution, loitering, solicitation—so many
charges that, years later, it would take her months to track down all
the arrest warrants she [did not] even realize she had.
“You have a person who sells you and exploits you,” said
Espinosa, a [thirty-seven]-year-old Tampa woman whose record
has barred her from jobs and even from volunteering with the
human trafficking victims whose stories match her own. “They
may have a slap on the wrist and then you [are] paying for it with
114
the rest of your life.”

Non-governmental organizations are at the home front of post-trafficking
victim treatment.115 These organizations need more funding and support in
order to maintain their facilities.116 Many of these facilities provide law
enforcement training as well as victim support.117 Victims need to have a
safe place to go and resources to utilize in order to have a future.118 Without
community resources and community awareness, many victims are treated
like offenders due to their criminal record, which is why victim-focused laws
are so important for victim recovery.119

111.
Id.
112.
Clark, supra note 105.
113.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(d)–(4)(a), 796.07(4)(b)–(c) (2013); POLARIS
PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 5; Clark, supra note 105.
114.
Summers, supra note 14.
115.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 329.
116.
See id. at 329, 331.
117.
See id. at 329–30.
118.
See id. at 320.
119.
See id.; Clark, supra note 105.
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SAFE HARBOR ACT: FLORIDA’S FIRST BIG VICTIM-FOCUSED LAW

Florida has taken steps towards enacting laws for the benefit of
victims.120 The Safe Harbor Act became effective January 1, 2013, and it is
focused on protecting child victims of sex trafficking.121 This law requires
that children be placed in a safe house and assessed through physical and
mental examinations.122 In addition, section 409.1678 of the Florida Statutes
requires that the children be provided with “food, clothing, medical care,”
and other resources.123 The goal of the Safe Harbor Act is directed towards
the rehabilitation and reintegration of children into society.124
When an officer has established probable cause to believe a minor is
being sexually exploited, the officer has the authority to take that child into
custody “to be placed in a short-term safe house.”125 The safe house is
required to have staff awake twenty-four hours a day to ensure the safety of
the children being housed.126 The Safe Harbor Act states that appropriations,
gifts, and government funding will be provided to the safe homes to help
facilitate the rehabilitation process.127 The ultimate goal is to either reunite
the minor with his or her family or find a long-term living arrangement
where the child can be cared for and ultimately lead a normal, healthy life.128
A.

A Major Flaw in the Safe Harbor Act

While the Safe Harbor Act is very beneficial to minor victims, it
completely ignores victims over the age of eighteen.129 While a majority of
sex trafficking victims appear to be minors, there are still a substantial
number of sex trafficking victims who are eighteen or over.130 Victims need

120.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 409.1678 (2013).
121.
Act effective Jan. 1, 2013, ch. 2012-105, §§ 1–2, 10, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–
2, 12 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (2012)); POLARIS PROJECT, Safe Harbor–Protecting
Sexually Exploited Minors, in 2013 ANALYSIS OF STATE HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAWS 33, 33
(2013), available at http://www.polarisproject.org/storage/2013_State_Ratings_Analysis_
Full_Report.pdf.
122.
FLA. STAT. § 39.524(1).
123.
Id. § 409.1678(1)(e).
124.
See id. § 409.1678(2)(b); Lydia Butler, Modern-Day Slavery Eclipsing the
Sunshine State Compels Safe Harbor Legislation in Florida, 7 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 191, 236–37 (2012).
125.
Butler, supra note 124, at 237.
126.
FLA. STAT. § 409.1678(1)(b).
127.
Butler, supra note 124, at 237; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.1678(2)(e).
128.
See Butler, supra note 124, at 236–37.
129.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.524(1).
130.
See BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6 tbl.5.
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to be able to find a safe place to stay while they go through the rehabilitation
process.131 Group homes and halfway homes are potential safe houses for
adult victims; however, those places are, often times, targets for sex
traffickers to recruit more victims.132 The likelihood of being pulled back
into sex trafficking is much higher if victims do not have a place to stay and
be protected.133 The best possible solution is to amend the Safe Harbor Act
to be non-discriminatory.134 Victims of all ages need physical and mental
medical attention, food, shelter, and legal assistance to effectively seek legal
remedies.135
There has been some debate recently over whether to implement
secure safe houses or open safe houses.136 The difference between the two is
that the former essentially is locking up the victims until they are physically
and psychologically ready to be given freedom, and the latter does not lock
the doors to keep the children in.137 However, locking a child up can be just
as traumatizing as being with a trafficker.138 Often times, the advocates that
wish to have secure facilities are inexperienced and would rather force their
treatment on the children.139 Secured homes act more like a punishment for
the victim rather than an effective treatment.140 Also, they will most likely
cost more, which would pull funding away from victim treatment and put it
towards security to keep them in.141 The Safe Harbor Act is a step in the
right direction to help victims after-the-fact;142 however, there are still many
holes in this legislation that need to be filled.

131.
Butler, supra note 124, at 238.
132.
POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 3.
133.
See Butler, supra note 124, at 236–37.
134.
See id. at 238–39.
135.
See id. at 236, 238–39.
136.
See Lee, supra note 47.
137.
See id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
See id.
141.
See Lee, supra note 47.
142.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.524(1), 409.1678(1)(b) (2013) (addressing the issue
of minor sex trafficking victims, while leaving out individuals who are no longer minors but
may have been minors while being trafficked).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

142

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

136

V.

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

FLORIDA’S EXPUNGEMENT LAW: ANOTHER STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION

Florida is now one of eight states to pass a law that allows victims of
human trafficking to petition to have their records expunged.143 Chapter
2013-98 of the Florida Laws will give victims the opportunity to petition to
have a conviction for any offense expunged off their record if the conviction
occurred while they were victims of human trafficking.144 However, there
are a few exceptions to the offenses that victims can have expunged.145 The
exceptions include, “[a]rson, [s]exual battery, [r]obbery, [k]idnapping,
[a]ggravated child abuse, . . . [a]ggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
[m]urder, [m]anslaughter, . . . [using a] bomb, [a]rmed burglary, [a]ggravated
battery, [and] [a]ggravated stalking.”146 These crimes are considered violent
felonies, which may be why the Florida Legislature does not want to give
individuals the ability to have them expunged.147
Furthermore, a victim who is petitioning to have his or her
convictions expunged must no longer be under the control of the trafficker.148
If the victim cannot be completely free, due to possible harm, the victim may
show that he or she attempted to escape by seeking services for victims of
human trafficking.149
(4)
A petition under this section must be initiated by the
petitioner with due diligence after the victim has ceased to be a
victim of human trafficking or has sought services for victims of
human trafficking, subject to reasonable concerns for the safety of
the victim, family members of the victim, or other victims of
human trafficking that may be jeopardized by the bringing of such
petition or for other reasons consistent with the purpose of this
section.150

If the victim has official documentation of his or her status as a
victim of human trafficking, then the Session Law only requires a

143.
Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); Clark, supra note 105.
144.
Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3.
145.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)1.
146.
FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)1.a.–e., g.–i., l.–o.; see also Ch. 2013-98, § 2,
2013 Fla. Laws at 3.
147.
See FLA. STAT. § 775.084.
148.
Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
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preponderance of the evidence to grant expunction.151 However, if there is
no official documentation, the victim must show clear and convincing
evidence in order to get his or her record expunged.152
(b)
“Official documentation” means any documentation
issued by a federal, state, or local agency tending to show a
person’s status as a victim of human trafficking.
(c)
“Victim of human trafficking” means a person subjected
to coercion, as defined in [section] 787.06, for the purpose of
being used in human trafficking, a child under [eighteen] years of
age subjected to human trafficking, or an individual subjected to
153
human trafficking as defined by federal law.

Expungement of a conviction “is deemed to have been vacated due
to a substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.”154 This
essentially means it will be as if the conviction never occurred.155 Once the
court has granted the expunction, the victim will be able to “lawfully deny or
fail to acknowledge the arrests covered by the expunged record.”156 The
victim will not be liable for any criminal penalties as a result of failing to
disclose the arrests to potential employers, credit card companies,
apartments, or other institutions that may request information about criminal
history.157 However, there are some limitations on when the victim can
withhold the information:
The [victim] . . . may lawfully deny or fail to acknowledge the
arrests covered by the expunged record, except when the subject of
the record:

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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1.

Is a candidate for employment with a criminal
justice agency;

2.

Is a defendant in a criminal prosecution;

3.

Concurrently or subsequently petitions for relief
under this section . . . ;

Id.
Id.
Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2.
Id. § 2, at 3.
See id.
Id. § 2, at 4.
See id.
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4.

Is a candidate for admission to The Florida Bar;

5.

Is seeking to be employed or licensed by or to
contract with the Department of Children and
158
Family Services . . . .

[Vol. 38

Even with these very limited exceptions to the expungement law,
this addition to Florida’s victim-focused statutes will give victims the chance
to start a new life without being held back by an unfortunate past.159
A.

Similar Legislation in Other States

Florida modeled its expungement law after New York’s
expungement law passed in 2010.160 However, New York’s statute only
seems to allow expungement of loitering and prostitution.161
The judgment is a conviction where the arresting charge was under
section 240.37 (loitering for the purpose of engaging in a
prostitution offense, provided that the defendant was not alleged to
be loitering for the purpose of patronizing a prostitute or
promoting prostitution) or 230.00 (prostitution) of the penal law,
and the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of
having been a victim of sex trafficking . . . .162

Yet, it seems that New York courts will expunge other crimes that are related
to human trafficking if the victim is able to argue that the additional crimes
were committed under the same coercion as prostitution and loitering.163 The
discretion to do this comes from the word may in section 440.10(1),164 which
has been interpreted to give the New York Court the ability to expunge other
crimes relating to sex trafficking.165 Both Florida and New York laws

158.
Ch. 2013-98, § 4, 2013 Fla. Laws at 6 (amending FLA. STAT. §
943.0815(4)(a) (2013)).
159.
Id. §§ 2, 4, 6, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2, 5, 8; Clark, supra note 105.
160.
Clark, supra note 105. Compare Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4,
with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2013).
161.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i).
162.
Id.
163.
Memorandum from Melissa Broudo, Staff Atty., & Sienna Baskin, CoDir. of the Sex Workers Project at the Urban Justice Ctr., on Vacating Criminal Convictions
for Trafficked Persons, to Advocates & Legislators 3–4 (Apr. 2012), available at http://
sexworkersproject.org/downloads/2012/20120422-memo-vacating-convictions.pdf.
164.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1).
165.
See Memorandum from Melissa Broudo & Sienna Baskin, supra note 163,
at 3–4.
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require that the victim no longer work for the trafficker, but they also both
leave open the possibility that safety may be an issue for the victim trying to
escape.166
New York’s law also includes a provision that allows a
“presumption that the [victim’s] participation in the offense was a result of
having been a victim of sex trafficking,” if he or she has official
documentation showing his or her “status as a victim of sex trafficking.”167
Florida’s statute has the same provision, making it easy on the victim once
he or she has been established as a legal “‘[v]ictim of human trafficking,’” to
successfully get his or her record expunged.168 Once a victim has the
presumption in his or her favor, the burden will shift to the other side to
prove that the victim’s participation in the crime was not a result of sex
trafficking.169 Only six other states have currently enacted expungement
legislation, including Nevada, Illinois, Vermont, Maryland, Hawaii, and New
Jersey.170 A few “other states are . . . considering expungement laws,
including California, . . . Pennsylvania, Texas, . . . and Virginia.”171
Unfortunately, Florida’s expungement statute does not spell out what
evidence should be used to prove one’s status as a victim.172 Since the law

Moreover, the defendant has provided a very compelling narrative of the
circumstances surrounding all of her arrests, demonstrating that they were the
product of years of brutal physical, psychological, and sexual violence by her
husband, which resulted in having been trafficked by him. While the defendant has
moved to vacate all six convictions based on the provisions of the new amendment,
and even though only two are prostitution offenses technically covered by the
[statute], this issue need not be addressed in the instant case because the People
have consented to the defendant’s motion in its entirety. Based upon the unique
circumstances presented here, this court concurs with the People’s position that all
of the defendant’s convictions are entitled to the relief requested. Thus, under the
provisions of the new amendment, this court “must vacate the judgment . . . .”

People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 765–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 440.10(6)).
166.
Compare Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 3
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)), with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
440.10(1)(i)(i).
167.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i)(ii).
168.
Compare ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–3, with N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 440.10(1)(i)(ii).
169.
See ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
440.10(1)(i)(ii); POLARIS PROJECT, Vacating Convictions for Sex Trafficking Victims, supra
note 12, at 53.
170.
Clark, supra note 105.
171.
Carrie N. Baker, The Influence of International Human Trafficking on
United States Prostitution Laws: The Case of Expungement Laws, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171,
180 (2012).
172.
Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4. Contra 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/116-2.1(b) (2013).
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has just been enacted, becoming effective January of 2014, it is too early to
determine exactly what the Florida courts will accept as sufficient evidence
to prove victim status or exactly who may provide official documentation
when determining if a victim’s record should be expunged.173 Illinois law
states that “evidence such as court records, law enforcement certifications, or
a ‘sworn statement from a trained professional staff of a victims services
organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical . . .
professional’” can be used as evidence to help establish status as a victim and
ultimately determine if the victim’s record should be expunged.174 A report
from one of these individuals would need to include a determination as to
whether the individual is truly a victim of human trafficking, which may also
be accompanied by expert testimony in court as to how the individual
reached his or her conclusion.175 Expungement laws are extremely beneficial
to victims because they provide a chance at starting a new life.176 Hopefully,
other states will follow the growing trend of victim-focused laws and realize
that the battle against human trafficking requires state involvement.177
VI.
A.

FLORIDA’S OPTIONS FOR FUTURE VICTIM-FOCUSED LAWS

Affirmative Defense Laws

Even though Florida has made huge improvements to its human
trafficking legislation by adding victim-focused laws, there is still room for
improvement.178 One law that a few states have implemented a variation of,
is the affirmative defense law.179 This law basically allows victims to use
human trafficking as a defense for the crime they are being charged with.180

173.
174.

See ch. 2013-98, § 8, 2013 Fla. Laws at 9.
Baker, supra note 171, at 180; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-

2.1(b).
175.
See Baker, supra note 171, at 180.
176.
Id. at 180–81.
177.
See id. at 179–81.
178.
Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 39.524, 787.02–.025, 796.035, 796.04,
895.02(1)(a)(29) (2013), with FLA. STAT. § 787.06 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
787.06 (2013)), and FLA. STAT. § 796.035 (2004) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 796.035
(2013)).
179.
Baker, supra note 171, at 180–81.
180.
POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF:
VICTIM ASSISTANCE 1 (n.d.), [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING
LEGISLATURE ISSUE BRIEF], available at http://www.national-consortium.org/2013Annual/
Presentations/Human-Trafficking-Victim-Assistance.pdf.
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Generally, with sex trafficking, this would include prostitution and loitering;
however, it can be used for other related crimes.181
Implementing an affirmative defense law would allow victims to
come forward with their situation early because they would be able to use it
as a defense and hopefully seek help at that juncture in time. 182 This type of
statute would also allow victims to avoid acquiring a cumbersome criminal
record, thus, alleviating future expungement proceedings.183 If the victim
can affirmatively show that he or she has been coerced into performing the
illegal acts, the affirmative defense law allows for the charges to be dropped,
treating the defendant “as [a] victim[] rather than [a] criminal[].”184
Georgia’s version of the affirmative defense law states that “[a]
person shall not be guilty of a sexual crime if the conduct upon which the
alleged criminal liability is based was committed under coercion or
deception while the accused was being trafficked for sexual servitude.”185
Implementing a statute such as this in Florida would give victims another
legal resource in their fight against human trafficking.186
B.

Punitive Damages

Allowing victims to recover punitive damages will not only benefit
victims by giving them more financial resources, but also will help weaken
trafficking organizations.187 Human trafficking is a business built on making
money; therefore, taking away the traffickers’ resources will potentially
place them out of business.188
Illinois is leading the way with one of the strongest victim-focused
“laws by allowing victims to [collect] punitive damages [from] sex
traffickers, [individuals] who pay for prostitutes, and [individuals] who
knowingly benefit from . . . sex [trafficking].”189 A 2008 report by the
Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation found that—of the men
interviewed—sixty-eight percent would think twice before buying a
181.
POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF, supra
note 180: Clark, supra note 105.
182.
See POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF,
supra note 180; Baker, supra note 171, at 181.
183.
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6 (2013); see also Baker, supra note 171, at
181.
184.
Baker, supra note 171, at 181.
185.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-6(b).
186.
See id.
187.
Meribah Knight, Campaign Against Sex Trafficking Is Gaining, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at A.21A.
188.
See id.
189.
Knight, supra note 187; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/5 (2013).
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prostitute if it involved fines of one thousand dollars or more.190 The Illinois
law goes a step further, giving traffickers almost no legal recourse to defend
themselves.191 The traffickers are not allowed “to use victims’ consent to sex
acts, prior criminal conduct, or their marital, sexual or familial relations as
defenses.”192 The Illinois Legislature has taken a stand against human
trafficking by implementing such a powerful and harsh law that negatively
affects human traffickers, which should prove to be an effective deterrent,
and may make traffickers think twice before committing or continuing their
crime.193
Florida does not currently allow victims to collect punitive damages
from human traffickers; however, Florida law does allow victims to recover
in a civil lawsuit, and collect up to three times the amount gained from the
trafficking.194 This method may not be the best way to allow victims to
recover from years of victimization because it could leave the victim with
just a small amount of award money.195 Generally, compensatory damages
are awarded to make the victim whole again—which looks at what the victim
had before the crime—but many victims had little to nothing before being
trafficked.196 Additionally, the amount the trafficker gained is something
that may be hard to prove.197 Since many victims do not keep any of the
profits made, it may be nearly impossible to determine how much was made,
and will most likely come out to less than was actually made.198
While Florida does not seem to be close to passing a law allowing
for punitive damages any time soon, the Florida Congress should seriously
consider making it an option.199 It would be a great legal tool for victims to
utilize in order to recover for the time they were victimized, and to
potentially cripple human trafficking enterprises.200

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/25; Knight, supra note 187.
Knight, supra note 187.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 128/5, /25.
FLA. STAT. § 772.104(2)–(3) (2013).
Butkus, supra note 21, at 333.
Id.
See POLARIS PROJECT, DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 4, at 4.
See id.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 324–25.
See Knight, supra note 187.
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CONCLUSION

Human trafficking is an international epidemic that affects our
neighbors, co-workers, friends, family, and children.201 Florida is one of the
top three states for human sex trafficking because of its diverse population
and easy access for international travelers.202 Subsequently, the Florida
Legislature has been aggressive since 2004, creating and amending human
trafficking laws to instill harsher punishments for traffickers and to provide
assistance and relief to victims.203 Victims of human trafficking suffer even
after they escape from the grips of their traffickers because they are left with
criminal records that make it hard to move on with their lives.204 Florida’s
Safe Harbor Act provides relief for minors, but discriminates against older
victims who need the care and services just as much as minors.205 That is
why the expungement law that Florida has enacted is a huge step towards
providing victims of all ages with a second chance.206 New York’s
expungement law has been used effectively and there is no reason to believe
that victims in Florida will not obtain similar positive results.207
Keisha, the little girl whose story was discussed earlier, has
successfully escaped life as a sex trafficking victim.208
Keisha reached out to a Polaris Project social worker and told her
parts of her story. Polaris Project immediately stepped in to
provide emotional support and additional social services. The
social worker helped Keisha talk to her case manager at the
detention center about what happened and helped Keisha’s
probation officer understand other options for support instead of a
detention center and returning to her foster family. Keisha now
has an order of protection against Mastur D and was able to leave
the detention center and go to an out-of-state residential program
for young girls who were victims of sex trafficking. Keisha is
209
doing well in her program and is almost finished with her GED.

201.
See Butkus, supra note 21, at 301–02.
202.
What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 28.
203.
Butkus, supra note 21, at 32526.
204.
Clark, supra note 105.
205.
Butler, supra note 124, at 23637.
206.
See Act effective Jan. 1, 2014, ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 2–4 (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0583 (2014)); Clark, supra note 105.
207.
See People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
208.
Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, supra note 7.
209.
Id.
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Keisha’s story is an example of how one victim can successfully use
her resources and reach out to the community for help.210 With Florida’s
new expungement law in place, Keisha can petition to have her record
expunged, which she accumulated over years of being trafficked by Mastur
D.211 Florida is moving in the right direction by implementing more victimfocused laws.212 While these laws may not help prevent new trafficking
crimes, they will certainly help the current and future victims, which is the
first step in a long battle against human trafficking.213

210.
Id.
211.
Ch. 2013-98, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws at 2–4; Keisha, Domestic Minor Sex
Trafficking, supra note 7.
212.
See FLA. STAT. § 409.1678 (2013); Butler, supra note 124, at 235; Clark,
supra note 105.
213.
See FLA. STAT. § 409.1678; Clark, supra note 105.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

151

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

“FOR NEVER WAS A STORY OF MORE WOE THAN THIS OF
JULIET AND HER ROMEO”—AN ANALYSIS OF THE
UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF FLORIDA’S STATUTORY
RAPE LAW AND ITS FLAWED “ROMEO AND JULIET”
EXCEPTION
JAKE TOVER*
I.
II.

III.
IV.

V.

VI.

INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 146
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY RAPE LAW ....... 147
A.
Statutory Rape Laws: Beginnings .................................... 147
B.
Age Discrepancy Considerations in Statutory Rape Law . 148
C.
Statutory Rape Laws Today .............................................. 149
D.
Gender Discrimination in Statutory Rape Law................. 149
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN ADOLESCENTS ........................................... 150
FLORIDA STATUTES § 800.04—LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BATTERY ON
A CHILD TWELVE TO SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE .............................. 152
A.
Definitions in Florida Statutes § 800.04 ........................... 152
1.
Sexual Activity .................................................... 152
2.
Consent ................................................................ 152
3.
Coercion ............................................................... 153
4.
Victim .................................................................. 153
B.
The Text of Florida Statutes § 800.04 ............................... 154
C.
The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes § 800.04 ................. 154
CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER .. 155
A.
Employment Opportunities ............................................... 156
B.
Residential Restrictions .................................................... 156
C.
Impact on the Family ........................................................ 157
D.
The Lasting Effects of Registering as a Sex Offender ....... 158
FLORIDA STATUTES § 943.04354THE ROMEO AND JULIET LAW 159
A.
Text of Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law........................... 159
B.
Legal Authority Regarding Florida’s Romeo and Juliet
Law.................................................................................... 159
1.
Defendants Charged with Multiple Sex Crimes .. 160

* Jake Tover earned his bachelor's degree in English from Florida State University,
and will receive his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, in
May 2014. Jake would like to thank the members of Nova Law Review for their hard work in
editing this article. As always, Jake is grateful to his family and friends for their continued
support. In particular, he would like to thank his parents, Craig and Lisa, his brother, Sam, his
sister, Falyn, and his girlfriend, Ryanmarie, for their love and guidance—without which, this
accomplishment would never have been realized.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/1

152

: Nova Law Review 38, #1

146

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

The Law’s Strict Age Limit ................................. 161
Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Romeo and
Juliet Laws ........................................................... 164
OPINION.......................................................................................... 165
A.
Why Florida’s Statutory Rape Law Is Too Harsh on
Otherwise Consenting Teenagers ..................................... 165
B.
Why Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law Does Not Do Enough
to Protect Otherwise Consenting Teenagers .................... 166
THE SOLUTION ............................................................................... 167
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 168
2.
3.

VII.

VIII.
IX.

I.

INTRODUCTION

When you hear the term sex offender, what kind of a person comes
to mind? Let me guess: An eighteen-year-old high school senior with great
grades and a talent for cheerleading, basketball, and chorus.1 Not what you
had in mind? Well, in February of this year, Kaitlyn Hunt, an eighteen-yearold Florida high school student with the attributes listed above, was expelled
from her high school and was charged with “two counts of lewd and
lascivious battery of a child [twelve] to [sixteen] years of age.”2
Kaitlyn and her younger girlfriend met at Sebastian River High
School in Sebastian, Florida.3 Kaitlyn was an eighteen-year-old senior, and
her girlfriend was a fourteen-year-old freshman at the high school.4 There
was a three year and seven month age difference between the two partners,
which—as you will soon learn—will be a crucial piece of information in
determining Kaitlyn’s future sentence.5
The couple played on the school basketball team and socialized with
the same circle of friends.6 While dating, they engaged in sexual acts
multiple times before the younger girlfriend’s parents discovered their
1.
Stacey Barchenger, Support Grows for Student Expelled over Same-Sex
‘Love’, USA TODAY (May 21, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/05/21/student-expelled-same-sex-relationship/2345157/.
2.
Stephanie Slifer, Kaitlyn Hunt Update: Fla. Teen Charged over Same-Sex
Underage Relationship Speaks Out, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2013, 11:26 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57585885-504083/kaitlyn-hunt-update-fla-teencharged-over-same-sex-underage-relationship-speaks-out/.
3.
Jason Parsley, When Did High School Senior Kaitlyn Hunt Meet Her
Freshman Girlfriend?, SFGN (June 1, 2013), http://www.southfloridagaynews.com/when-didhigh-school-senior-kaitlyn-hunt-meet-her-freshman-girlfriend/122918; Slifer, supra note 2.
4.
Parsley, supra note 3.
5.
Id.; see discussion infra Parts II.B., VI.B.2.
6.
Slifer, supra note 2.
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relationship.7 Once they learned their daughter was dating a girl about threeand-a-half years older than her, they promptly contacted the police to report
Kaitlyn.8 After rejecting a plea deal that would have sentenced her to two
years house arrest and one year of probation, Kaitlyn now faces up to fifteen
years in prison, and may be required to register as a sex offender.9
There is no question as to the importance of statutory rape laws.10
Young teenagers are at risk of being taken advantage of by older individuals
and they absolutely deserve the legal protection that statutory rape laws
provide.11 Offenders of said laws are usually given lengthy prison
sentences12 and are required to register as sex offenders upon their release.13
However, despite the importance of statutory rape laws it is worth
questioning whether some of the acts punishable by statutory rape laws—
sexual activity between two otherwise consenting teenagers—are acts that
should result in such crippling consequences.14
This Comment will analyze whether Florida’s statutory rape laws are
too harsh on teenage offenders, and whether or not its Romeo and Juliet
law—a law used to negate the sex offender registration requirement for
teenage offenders—does enough to protect teenagers from the life-changing
consequences of being found guilty of statutory rape.
II.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY RAPE LAW
Statutory Rape Laws: Beginnings

Statutory rape laws criminalize sexual activity with persons who are
not yet old enough to legally give consent for sex.15 Such laws have been
enforced in English law for over seven hundred years.16 England’s first
7.
Carlos Harrison, Florida Student, 18, Gets Online Support After Her
Arrest for Sex With Girlfriend, 14, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at A20.
8.
Id.
9.
Barchenger, supra note 1; Parsley, supra note 3.
10.
See Steve James, Comment, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An
Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 245–46 (2009).
11.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04, 943.04354 (2013).
12.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04; see also id. § 775.082.
13.
Id. § 775.21(6).
14.
See Barchenger, supra note 1; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(c)–(d).
15.
Emily J. Stine, Comment, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth
Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1169, 1183 (2011) (describing the intent of Romeo and Juliet laws and why they were
enacted by some states).
16.
Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1994) (providing a brief historical
overview of statutory rape laws).
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statutory rape law—put into effect in 1275—prohibited children under the
age of twelve from consenting to sex.17 At this time, women were
considered to be chattel.18 Their family would marry them off to another
family’s son for a bride price.19 Chastity was of significant monetary value
and a woman’s parents would receive a greater bride price if their daughter
was chaste at the time she was sold.20 For this reason, statutory rape was
originally considered to be a property crime.21 These laws were later
adopted into American law and they continue to be the foundation of modern
day statutory rape laws in America.22 Statutory rape is considered a strict
liability offense, eliminating consent as a viable defense.23 At the beginning
of the twentieth century, however, states began to raise the age of consent to
as high as twenty-one in order to prevent young women from engaging in
non-marital intercourse.24
B.

Age Discrepancy Considerations in Statutory Rape Law

Originally, the age of the perpetrator had no impact on the severity
of a punishment for statutory rape because the offender’s age was not
considered to be an element of the crime.25 This led to a failure in
differentiating between sexual acts amongst peers and sexual exploitation of
young females by older men.26 This is different today; some states take into
consideration the difference in age between the alleged victim and the
alleged perpetrator when determining the punishment for statutory rape.27

17.
Id.; Anthony M. Amelio, Note, Florida’s Statutory Rape Law: A Shield
or a Weapon?—A Minor’s Right of Privacy Under Florida Statutes § 794.05, 26 STETSON L.
REV. 407, 410 (1996) (providing a historical overview of statutory rape laws).
18.
Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27
UCLA L. REV. 757, 767 (1980) (explaining the method in which women were once bought
and sold in marriage).
19.
Id.
20.
See id.
21.
Id.
22.
James, supra note 10, at 245 (providing historical context for statutory
rape laws).
23.
Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (explaining how statutory rape laws were
adopted into the U.S. legal system).
24.
Eidson, supra note 18, at 762–63 (describing how statutory rape laws
were written at the turn of the twentieth century).
25.
Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (providing a historical overview of statutory
rape laws).
26.
Id. at 410–11.
27.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (2013).
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Statutory Rape Laws Today

There have obviously been significant changes in how women have
been treated since 1275,28 but statutory rape laws are still being enforced
today.29 Instead of protecting women as if they were just a piece of
property,30 statutory rape laws now serve to “‘protect young people from
coerced sexuality activity; enforce morality; prevent teen pregnancy; and
reduce welfare dependence.’”31 Florida has two statutory rape laws:
Sections 794.0532 and 800.04 of the Florida Statutes.33 Section 794.05
prohibits a person twenty-four years of age or older from engaging in sexual
activity with a person between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.34 Section
800.04 prohibits any sexual activity whatsoever with a person between the
ages of twelve and sixteen.35
Some states have also chosen to put Romeo and Juliet laws into
effect.36 These laws are meant to lessen the punishment of teenage offenders
under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes so that they are not punished in
the exact same manner as adult offenders.37 When teenage offenders apply
for protection under Romeo and Juliet laws, their prison sentences can be
reduced and their sex offender registration requirement can be dismissed as
well.38
D.

Gender Discrimination in Statutory Rape Law

Originally, only men could be found guilty of statutory rape.39
Women were viewed as property in need of legal protection.40 Despite our
ever-evolving societal views, however, some statutory rape laws still
discriminate based on the minor’s gender.41
28.
See Oberman, supra note 16, at 24.
29.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.05, 800.04.
30.
James, supra note 10, at 245.
31.
Id. at 246 (explaining the intent behind statutory rape laws).
32.
FLA. STAT. § 794.05.
33.
Id. § 800.04.
34.
Id. § 794.05(1).
35.
Id. § 800.04(4)(a).
36.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1184.
37.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354.
38.
See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005).
39.
Eidson, supra note 18, at 760–61 (describing the rationale for statutory
rape laws).
40.
Oberman, supra note 16, at 25 (providing a brief history of statutory rape
laws).
41.
James, supra note 10, at 252 (explaining that age of consent laws can
lawfully discriminate based on a person’s gender).
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In 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States in Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County42 questioned the constitutionality of such
gender-based laws.43 In this case, the defendant, a seventeen-year-old male,
challenged California’s rape law, arguing that the law was unconstitutional
because it discriminated on the basis of gender.44 The Court disagreed and
upheld the constitutionality of California’s statutory rape law despite the fact
that the law only allowed men to be held criminally liable.45 The Court
reasoned that a statute will be upheld “where the gender classification is not
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances.”46
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, admitted that “[c]ommon sense . . .
suggests . . . gender-neutral statutory rape law[s] [would be] a greater
deterrent of sexual activity” among minors because the laws would apply to
more individuals.47 Currently, many states have chosen to use a common
sense approach and now include gender-neutral language in their statutory
rape laws to allow for the protection, as well as the punishment, of both
males and females.48
III.

SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN ADOLESCENTS

Among U.S. high school students, 46% have had sexual intercourse
at some point.49 Additionally, “[m]ore than 400,000 teen[age women] aged
[fifteen to nineteen] . . . gave birth in 2009.”50 Moreover, the likelihood of a
teenager having sex in his or her freshman year of high school is 31.6%,
while the likelihood of a teenager having sex in his or her senior year of high
school is a whopping 62.3%.51

42.
450 U.S. 464 (1981).
43.
Id. at 466.
44.
Id. at 466–67.
45.
Id. at 467.
46.
Id. at 469.
47.
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493–94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48.
See id.; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 404 (1984).
49.
59 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NO. SS–5, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: YOUTH RISK
BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2009 20 (2010), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf.
50.
Sexual Risk Behavior: HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy Prevention, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/sexualbehaviors/ (last updated Aug. 26, 2013).
51.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 49, at 20.
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Florida high school statistics show similar trends.52 According to the
Florida Department of Health, which polled 6212 high school students in
seventy-eight different Florida high schools in 2011, 48.2% of Florida high
school students had sexual intercourse.53 In fact, 7.6% of high school
students had sexual intercourse for the first time before they reached the age
of thirteen.54 Of the students polled, 43.4% had also participated in oral sex,
which—as you will soon learn—is also prohibited under Florida’s statutory
rape laws.55
These statistics are not all that surprising when you consider how
much sexual content teenagers are being exposed to.56 These teenagers are
more vulnerable to such content than adults because the exposure occurs
during a period in which sexual attitudes and behaviors are being
Statistics show that teenagers who frequently watch
developed.57
television—which are many, since the average high school student has 2.9
televisions in his or her house—“see 143 incidents of sexual behavior on
network television . . . each week.”58 Shockingly, “80% of all movies shown
on network or cable television [includes] sexual content.”59 There is no
doubt that such television content has had an impact on how teenagers view
and understand sex, as 80% of teenagers reported that they or their peers
have learned about sex from watching television or movies.60

52.
Compare id., with FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, SEXUAL BEHAVIORS AMONG
FLORIDA PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS: RESULTS FROM THE 2011 FLORIDA YOUTH RISK
BEHAVIOR SURVEY 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.floridahealth.gov/reports-and-data/
survey-data/youth-risk-surveys/youth-risk-behavior-survey/reports/2011/_documents/sexbehavior.pdf#search=%22sexual%20behaviors%20among%20high%20school%20students%2
2.
53.
FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 52.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013).
56.
See Enid Gruber & Joel W. Grube, Adolescent Sexuality and the Media:
A Review of Current Knowledge and Implications, 172 W.J. MED. 210, 211 (2000), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1070813/pdf/wjm17200210.pdf (providing
statistics about sexuality in the media).
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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IV.

FLORIDA STATUTES § 800.04—LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BATTERY ON
A CHILD TWELVE TO SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

A.

Definitions in Florida Statutes § 800.04
1.

Sexual Activity

“‘Sexual activity’ means the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or
union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of
another by any other object; however, sexual activity does not include an act
done for a bona fide medical purpose.”61
In Burnett v. State,62 the First District Court of Appeal held that the
defendant was not guilty of lewd and lascivious battery towards a minor
when he engaged in inappropriate activities involving pornographic films
with minors and did not participate in any physical sexual acts.63
In this case, there was evidence that the defendant had watched adult
pornography with at least two minors.64 The defendant was charged and
found guilty of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, which he
appealed.65 The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that
there was no evidence that he actually participated in any kind of physical
sexual act with the minors.66 The appellate court agreed, holding that
because there was no evidence of the defendant committing a lewd and
lascivious act on the minors, he could not be found guilty under section
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes.67
2.

Consent

“‘Consent’ means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent, and
does not include submission by coercion.”68 Supporters of statutory rape
laws argue that sexual activity between two people, regardless of how close
in age both parties may be, cannot be considered consensual if one party is
below the age of consent.69 Opponents of statutory rape laws, however,
argue that these laws—many times—punish teenagers who are engaging in
what would otherwise be considered—if not for their young age—wholly
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013).
737 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Burnett, 737 So. 2d at 1107; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2013).
FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(b).
Stine, supra note 15, at 1183.
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consensual sex.70 Proponents of statutory rape laws have argued that acts
that would legally be classified as consensual sex are—in reality—not
wholly consensual when dealing with teenage girls, due to manipulation by
older adults.71
Michelle Oberman—in her law review article titled Turning Girls
into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law—discusses
Antioch College and the college’s attempt to create a system that would
assure consensual sex.72 In this system, one partner would ask the other for
verbal consent for each separate act of intimacy.73 This method was
criticized for “tak[ing] all the fun out of sex,” which in Oberman’s opinion,
“provides ample evidence of the entrenchment of the hazy spectrum that
separates consensual sex from rape.”74 Consent is clearly a major element in
sexual relationships, yet it is overlooked in statutory rape cases due to the
language of these laws, which strictly prohibits minors from being able to
give such consent.75
3.

Coercion

“‘Coercion’ means the use of exploitation, bribes, threats of force, or
intimidation to gain cooperation or compliance.”76 In her article, Oberman
explains that despite the intent of statutory rape laws, which is to protect
teenage girls who are at risk of being coerced into having sex, the teenage
girls’ vulnerabilities are overlooked.77 Instead, statutory rape laws require
courts to focus simply on the age differences between the parties.78
4.

Victim

“‘Victim’ means a person upon whom an offense described in this
section was committed or attempted or a person who has reported a violation
of this section to a law enforcement officer.”79 The common perception of a
70.
Id. at 1183–84.
71.
Oberman, supra note 16, at 70 (pointing out the short-sightedness of
statutory rape laws when dealing with teenage girls who can be easily manipulated).
72.
Id. at 71 (explaining the increasing difficulty of differentiating between
permissible and impermissible sexual encounters).
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 42; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2) (2013).
76.
FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(c).
77.
Oberman, supra note 16, at 42 (arguing that the vulnerability of teenage
women is overlooked in statutory rape laws).
78.
Id.
79.
FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(d).
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victim—which usually involves an individual being hurt or injured—may not
always apply in statutory rape cases; a minor in a sexual relationship—
regardless of how honest and consensual such a relationship may be—is
considered a victim.80
B.

The Text of Florida Statutes § 800.04

Section 800.04 states, “[n]either the victim’s lack of chastity nor the
victim’s consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this section.”81 The
statute also says, “[t]he perpetrator’s ignorance of the victim’s age, the
victim’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator’s bona fide
belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution under
this section.”82 Lewd or lascivious battery—the charge that Kaitlyn is
currently being charged with—occurs when:
A person . . . [e]ngages in sexual activity with a person [twelve]
years of age or older but less than [sixteen] years of age; or . . .
[e]ncourages, forces, or entices any person less than [sixteen] years
of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality,
prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity commits
83
lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree . . . .

Therefore, a person under the age of sixteen in Florida is unable to consent to
sexual activity, regardless of the age of the defendant.84
C.

The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes § 800.04

Section 800.04 continues to be upheld because the State of Florida
has determined that these laws are necessary to protect its youth, which is
considered a compelling state interest.85 It is important to note, however,
that these laws have not been known to be effective in preventing consenting
teenagers from having sex with one another.86 The ineffectiveness of these
laws at deterring teenagers from having sex puts the future of many high
school students in doubt, as many of them will be required to register as sex

80.
See Oberman, supra note 16, at 25.
81.
FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2).
82.
Id. § 800.04(3).
83.
Id. § 800.04(4).
84.
See id.
85.
Amelio, supra note 17, at 422 (pointing out Florida’s compelling interest
in protecting its youth).
86.
See Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining that very few teenagers
who are sexually active are actually prosecuted).
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offenders for the rest of their lives.87 The consequences of carrying such a
label can be absolutely devastating.88
V.

CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER

The public strongly supports sex offender registration and
notification laws because of the popular belief that having knowledge of
where sex offenders live in a person’s community will help protect them or
their children from future sex crimes.89 This view is not without merit, as
some sex offenders may repeat past unlawful sexual acts, which would pose
a serious risk to people in the community.90
The Florida Sexual Predators Act—which aims to protect the
community from sexual predators—enforces a number of requirements and
prohibitions on registered sex offenders.91 The statute reasons that because
of “[t]he high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public
safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses,” there is
a significant state interest to monitor the release of sexual predators into the
community, monitor the supervision of these sexual predators released into
the community, enforce registration and notification laws, restrict certain
employment opportunities for sex offenders, and create strict residency
requirements.92 The legislature—despite their good intentions—even admits
that “the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while
incalculable, [is] clearly exorbitant.”93
Although there is surely a need to prevent these wrongful acts, the
majority of research shows that the sex offender registration and notification
laws have proven to be largely ineffective.94 Critics of such policies argue
that “sex offender laws do not work, that is, they do not reduce sex offenses;
. . . the stigmatizing and ostracizing effects of registration, notification, and
residency restriction[s] may encourage the violent behavior they are aimed to
deter.”95 This argument is sound, as these policies have been known to have
87.
Id. at 1214–15.
88.
Id. at 1215.
89.
Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family
Members of Registered Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 55 (2009).
90.
Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1134 (10th Cir. 2012).
91.
FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b) (2013).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. § 775.21(3)(a).
94.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55.
95.
Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex
Offenders: Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 277, 286 (2010) (explaining the ineffectiveness of statutory rape laws in regards to
reducing sex offenses).
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a significantly negative impact on the lives of both sexual offenders and their
families.96
A.

Employment Opportunities

As a result of the registration and notification laws required by the
Florida Sexual Predators Act, up to half of all sex offenders experience a
decrease in employment opportunities.97 This is troubling because studies
have shown the “lack of stable employment” to be a central factor in sexual
offenders repeating their past criminal behavior.98 Not only does the Florida
Sexual Predators Act restrict sex offenders from working near places where
children frequently visit, but these sex offenders “are also excluded from
working in [such] fields . . . as law, real estate, medicine, nursing, physical
therapy, and education.”99
If that were not bad enough, when sex offenders are finally able to
find jobs that they are not restricted from obtaining, employers are still
reluctant to hire these individuals because of their criminal past.100 In fact, in
“[a] survey of employers in five major” U.S. cities, two-thirds of the
employers answered that they would never hire a sex offender.101 Sadly, the
lack of employment opportunities has led many registered sex offenders to
live a life of crime to support themselves and their families.102 This pattern
just serves to reinforce the already unfavorable perception of sex
offenders.103
B.

Residential Restrictions

Most states require that sex offenders live a certain distance away
from “schools, daycare centers, parks, [and school] bus stops.”104 The intent
of these restrictions is to decrease the possibility that a sex offender could
commit future sex crimes by diminishing his or her opportunities to commit
such crimes again.105 To put into perspective the extreme inconvenience
96.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57.
97.
Id. at 55; see FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6), (7).
98.
James L. Johnson, Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision:
Factors That Influence Revocation, 70 FED. PROBATION 18, 19 (2006).
99.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b)(5).
100.
Johnson, supra note 98, at 19.
101.
Id.
102.
See id. at 20.
103.
See id. at 19–20.
104.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56.
105.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (discussing the rationale behind residency
restrictions).
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these restrictions could cause a sex offender and his or her family, consider
this: In the city of Orlando, a whopping 95% of residential homes fall within
1000 feet of a school, daycare center, school bus stop, or park, leaving only
5% of the city available for them to live in.106
Some states have even been known to enforce larger safety zones
than are required by law.107 In Miami Beach, for example, sex offenders are
prohibited from residing in homes within 2500 feet away from a school if the
victim was under the age of sixteen.108 These strict policies prevent sex
offenders from living stable lives, which have proven to be
counterproductive in trying to reduce instances of recidivism.109
Even when sex offenders are able to finally find a home to settle
down in, in 20 to 40% of cases, the sex offender is forced to move out of his
or her home at the request of his or her landlord or neighbors after they
receive notification of their sex offender label.110 Not surprisingly, these
residency restrictions have left a large number of registered “sex offenders
homeless throughout the state [of Florida].”111
C.

Impact on the Family

As stated earlier, classifying somebody as a sex offender not only
has an adverse impact on the offender’s life, but on the lives of his or her
loved ones as well.112 While residency restrictions are intended to keep sex
offenders away from certain areas, they also indirectly prevent the spouses
and children living with sex offenders—individuals who may not have been
charged with sex crimes—from living in close proximity to these areas as
well.113 As a result, the children of sex offenders are forced to live farther
away from schools, which can be quite an inconvenience for the family.114
As far as their social life is concerned, a survey of the family
members of registered sex offenders revealed that 86% experienced stress in
106.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56.
107.
Kari White, Note, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency
Restrictions as Modern-Day Banishment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 170 (2008)
(explaining that some states go above and beyond what statutory rape laws require in regards
to residency restrictions for sex offenders).
108.
Id.
109.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (arguing that strict residency restrictions
prevent sex offenders from living stable lives, which could be the cause of some offenders
repeating past criminal behavior).
110.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55–56.
111.
White, supra note 107, at 170 (explaining the serious consequences of
being labeled a sex offender).
112.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
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their lives, 77% felt isolated, and 49% had fear for their own safety. 115 Half
of the family members polled had lost friends as a result of their family
member becoming a sex offender, and many who were polled admitted that
being in a family with a registered sex offender kept them from participating
in community events.116
Unfortunately, the children of sex offenders suffer tremendous
emotional strain from their parents’ label.117 More than half of the family
members polled said that the children of sex offenders were treated badly by
their classmates.118 Children of sex offenders are reported to feel increased
“anger (80%), depression (77%), anxiety (73%), [loneliness] (65%), and fear
[for their safety] (63%).”119 Perhaps the most disturbing fact of all is that
“one in eight . . . children of [sex offenders] were reported to [experience]
suicidal tendencies.”120 The statistics are clear: Sexual registration
requirements will have an extremely negative effect not only on the actual
offender, but extend to the offender’s family as well.121
D.

The Lasting Effects of Registering as a Sex Offender

In 2009, a Michigan appellate court held that forcing a “teenager
[who was] convicted of [having] consensual [intercourse] with his belowthe-age-of-consent girlfriend” to register as a sex offender was considered
cruel and unusual punishment.122 “Sex offender registration [could be
considered a] modern day scarlet letter,” and as a result, the decision to
classify a person as a sex offender should not be taken lightly.123 For this
reason, some states—including Florida—have chosen to put Romeo and
Juliet laws into place to protect consenting teenagers from having to register
as sex offenders.124 These laws, however, are far from perfect.

115.
Id. at 57.
116.
Id.
117.
Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 63–64.
118.
Id. at 63.
119.
Id. at 63–64.
120.
Id. at 64.
121.
Id. at 63–64.
122.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1188 (providing past constitutional challenges to
sex offender laws).
123.
Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 324 (2006) (describing the serious
consequences of having to register as a sex offender).
124.
Id.; Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013).
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FLORIDA STATUTES § 943.04354THE ROMEO AND JULIET LAW
Text of Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law
(1) For purposes of this section, a person shall be considered for
removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender or
sexual predator only if the person:
(a) Was or will be convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a
violation of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . ;
(b) Is required to register as a sexual offender or sexual predator
solely on the basis of this violation; and
(c) Is not more than [four] years older than the victim of this
violation who was [fourteen] years of age or older but not more
than [seventeen] years of age at the time the person committed this
violation.
(2) If a person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and the violation
of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . was committed on or after July 1, 2007,
the person may move the court that will sentence or dispose of this
violation to remove the requirement that the person register as a
sexual offender or sexual predator. The person must allege in the
motion that . . . [the] removal of the registration requirement will
not conflict with federal law. The state attorney must be given
notice of the motion at least [twenty-one] days before the date of
sentencing or disposition of this violation and may present
evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise
demonstrate why the motion should be denied. At sentencing or
disposition of this violation, the court shall rule on this motion and,
if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection
(1) and the removal of the registration requirement will not conflict
with federal law, it may grant the motion and order the removal of
the registration requirement. If the court denies the motion, the
person is not authorized under this section to petition for removal
125
of the registration requirement.

B.

Legal Authority Regarding Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law

Over the past decade, some states have implemented Romeo and
Juliet laws, which absolve certain teenagers from having to register as sex

125.
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offenders.126 These provisions were created to “impose lighter penalties
when both parties are underage, while maintaining strict penalties for sex
between an adult and a minor,” because some states believe that “sex
between two young people is . . . less punishable than sex between a young
person and an adult.”127
An offender under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is
automatically labeled a sex offender unless the offender satisfies three
elements.128 First, the offender must be no “more than [four] years older
than the victim.”129 Second, the offender must have been “required to
register as a sex[] offender” solely for that offense.130 Third, the offender
must have not been charged with multiple sex crimes.131
If the offender were to satisfy all three of these elements, the
offender would have the potential to take advantage of the Romeo and Juliet
exception to remove the registration requirement.132 The following cases
provide authority as to when and how the Romeo and Juliet law could be
applied.
1.

Defendants Charged with Multiple Sex Crimes

In Courson v. State,133 the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the defendant—who was charged on two separate occasions under section
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes—did not qualify for the Romeo and Juliet
exception because the law requires that an applicant not be charged with
multiple sex crimes.134
The defendant was found guilty of two separate charges of “lewd
and lascivious battery of a victim over [twelve] but [fewer than sixteen]
years of age.”135 “He was [then] sentenced to three years [in prison],
followed by five years of probation, and [was labeled] a sex[] offender.”136
The defendant tried to apply the Romeo and Juliet law to remove the
requirement that he register as a sex offender, but his motion was denied by
126.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1184 (providing a brief history of Romeo and
Juliet laws).
127.
Sabrina A. Perelman, Note, A Step in the Right Direction: How Kansas v.
Limon Indicates a Brighter Future for Gay Rights Under Lawrence v. Texas, 7 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 217, 240 (2006) (explaining the rationale behind Romeo and Juliet laws).
128.
FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1).
129.
Id. § 943.04354(1)(c).
130.
Id. § 943.04354(1)(b).
131.
Id. § 943.04354(1)(a).
132.
Id. § 943.04354(2).
133.
24 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
134.
Id. at 125051; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04(4), 943.04354(1)(a).
135.
Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250.
136.
Id.
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the trial court.137 The trial court agreed with the State, and the defendant
appealed.138
On appeal, the defendant argued that although the Romeo and Juliet
law requires that the defendant not be convicted of more than one section
800.04 crime, denying him usage of the Romeo and Juliet law would be to
disregard the legislature’s true intent, which was to keep young lovers in
consensual relationships from being branded as sex offenders for the rest of
their lives.139 The State, on the other hand, argued that the plain language of
the statute denied the defendant the right to take advantage of the Romeo and
Juliet law.140
The appellate court agreed that “[i]f the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to engage in statutory construction, and the
statute should be given its plain and obvious meaning.”141 Therefore,
because the statute clearly states that offenders with multiple sex crime
convictions are not able to remove their sex offender registration
requirement, the defendant was unable to take advantage of the Romeo and
Juliet exception.142
The appellate court’s holding was consistent with the express terms
of the statute but contrary to the original legislative intent.143 Regardless, the
court would not hold otherwise because to modify the statute’s express terms
would be an abuse of the court’s power.144 In other words, its hands were
tied.
2.

The Law’s Strict Age Limit

In State v. Welch,145 the Second District Court of Appeal held that
because the defendant was slightly more than four years older than his minor
girlfriend when she became pregnant with his child, the defendant did not
meet the elements required to use the Romeo and Juliet Statute to remove his
sex offender registration requirement.146
137.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)–(2).
138.
Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250.
139.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1)(a).
140.
Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250.
141.
Id. at 1251 (citing Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318,
329 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002), review granted sub nom. Bay Anesthesia, Inc. v. Aldrich,
847 So. 2d 975 (2003)).
142.
Id. at 1251; FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(a).
143.
Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1251.
144.
Id.
145.
94 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911,
2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
146.
Id. at 634.
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At the time the victim became pregnant with the defendant’s child,
the victim was fourteen years old, and the defendant was eighteen years
old.147 They were in a relationship with one another, and the defendant was
aware of the victim’s younger age.148 The defendant, who was four years,
two months, and twenty days older than his girlfriend, was charged with the
“second-degree felony of lewd or lascivious battery on a female under
sixteen years of age.”149 The defendant was adjudicated guilty, placed on
probation for ten years, and labeled a sex offender.150
After his probation, the defendant attempted to take advantage of the
Romeo and Juliet law to remove this requirement to register as a sexual
offender.151 The State opposed, arguing that although the sexual conduct
between the victim and the defendant was consensual, the defendant did not
meet the element of the statute that requires the defendant be no more than
four years older than the victim at the time of the violation.152 Despite this
argument, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, and reasoned that
the ages at the time of the offense—eighteen and fourteen—could be
considered a four-year difference.153 The trial court stated that its decision
was ‘“equitable under the circumstances”’ because, in the last ten years, the
defendant had completed his sex offender treatment, he had married another
woman, and had been having unsupervised contact with the children from his
marriage.154
The State later appealed this ruling, and the case was brought to the
appellate court.155 The higher court then reversed the lower court’s ruling,
holding that the language, “‘“not more than [four] years older than the
victim,”’”156 is clear, and that construction of its interpretation was not
necessary.157 Therefore, the court had no choice but to hold that he did not
meet the requirements of the Romeo and Juliet law because the defendant
was more than four years older than the victim.158

147.
Id. at 633.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633.
156.
Id. at 634 (quoting State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2011)); FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013).
157.
Welch, 94 So. 3d at 634 (quoting Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225).
158.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

169

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1

FLAWED “ROMEO AND JULIET” EXCEPTION

2013]

163

Erasing all doubt as to what the phrase not more than four years
meant, the court in State v. Marcel159 held that “[i]f a defendant [was] one
day [older than] the four-year . . . limit, . . . he [would be] ineligible to” use
the Romeo and Juliet law to pardon his sex offender registration
requirement.160 The defendant was charged with one count of lewd or
lascivious battery of a person over the age of twelve but under the age of
sixteen because he “was four years, three months, and eight days older than
the victim.”161 The defendant was initially labeled a sex offender, but once
the Romeo and Juliet law was enacted, the trial court granted relief to the
defendant.162
The State appealed, arguing that the defendant had not met the
criteria required for the Romeo and Juliet law because he was more than four
years older than the victim.163 The defendant disagreed and argued that
completed years of life, not months and days, should be used when
determining whether an offender is “not . . . more than four years older than
[a] victim.”164 This interpretation, known as the birthday rule, would not
consider a defendant to “be more than four years older than [a] victim until . .
. [he] was five years older.”165
The appellate court rejected this argument and explained that the
Romeo and Juliet law requires an analysis of time and the birthday rule was
only meant to calculate age.166 The court also reasoned that because the
Romeo and Juliet law uses the word more—“commonly understood to mean
greater”—the law’s language was clear as to whether or not the defendant
was more than four years older than the victim.167 The court went even
further, stating, “[i]f a defendant is one day past the four-year eligibility limit
prescribed by section 943.04354 of the Florida Statutes, he is ineligible to
petition for relief.”168 Therefore, because of the strict interpretation of the
Romeo and Juliet law, the defendant was unable to petition for removal of
his sex offender registration requirement.169

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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67 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c).
Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4)(a).
Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c).
Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c).
Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c).
Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225.
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Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Romeo and Juliet Laws

Unfortunately, not only are some statutory rape laws gender-biased,
some are biased regarding sexual orientation as well.170 As shown in State v.
Limon,171 the penalties in statutory rape cases can be much harsher for samesex couples than for heterosexual couples.172 In this case, the defendant had
just turned eighteen years old when he participated in consensual oral sex
with a fourteen-year-old.173 The defendant was less than four years older
than the victim, so the defendant was young enough to take advantage of
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law.174 Unfortunately for the defendant, however,
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law did not provide protection for individuals in
homosexual relationships.175 Therefore, because the defendant’s partner was
of the same sex, he was unable to use the Romeo and Juliet law exception
and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison.176
The defendant appealed and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s decision.177 The court held that the discrimination of a samesex relationship in its Romeo and Juliet statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause and, therefore, was unconstitutional.178 As a result, the defendant’s
sentence was reduced from seventeen years in prison to one year in prison.179
However, Kansas is not the only state that has discriminatory
language against same-sex couples in its statutory rape laws.180 Currently,
Texas prohibits homosexuals from taking advantage of its Romeo and Juliet
statute.181 There has recently been a legislative push to include same-sex
couples in this law, but as of today, homosexual teenagers in Texas cannot

170.
James, supra note 10, at 253 (providing an instance of discrimination in a
Romeo and Juliet law).
171.
122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
172.
James, supra note 10, at 253; Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait:
Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 313, 327 (2003) (discussing the discrimination of same-sex couples in Romeo and Juliet
laws).
173.
Limon, 122 P.3d at 24.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327.
177.
Limon, 122 P.3d at 41.
178.
Id. at 40; James, supra note 10, at 253.
179.
See James, supra note 10, at 253; Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327.
180.
See Jim Vertuno, Bills Would Add Gays to Texas’ ‘Romeo and Juliet’
Law, STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/04/08/4759215/
bills-would-add-gays-to-texas.html.
181.
Id.
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use the Romeo and Juliet law to remove their sex offender registration
requirement.182
VII.

OPINION

A.
Why Florida’s Statutory Rape Law Is Too Harsh on Otherwise
Consenting Teenagers
The purpose of this Comment is not to condone teenage sex; it is to
bring to light that the consequences of section 800.04(4) of the Florida
Statutes regarding consenting teenagers—which can be as severe as serving
fifteen years in prison—are unintended consequences.183 Instead of
providing real, effective ways to communicate to teenagers why abstaining
from sexual activity at such a young age is a viable option, the statute seeks
to imprison teenagers who have already engaged in sexual activity.184 This
law does not deter consenting teenagers from engaging in sex, but merely
punishes those who have already done so.185
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), a statutory text written by the
American Law Institute, argues that teens close in age should not be held
criminally liable for partaking in oral or vaginal sex.186 The American Law
Institute reasons that because of the greater likelihood that teenagers would
be otherwise consenting participants in sexual activity, criminal law should
not target such activity.187 Additionally, the MPC states that criminal
liability against only the older party of an otherwise consenting teenage
relationship is unfair.188 Some states agree with this reasoning and have
completely decriminalized sex amongst consenting teenagers altogether.189
With a growing number of states implementing Romeo and Juliet laws, it is
clear that states do not find such severe punishments against consenting
182.
Id.
183.
FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(c), 800.04(4) (2013).
184.
Id. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); see also id. § 775.082; Stine, supra
note 15, at 1212–15.
185.
See FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); Stine, supra note 15, at
1212–15.
186.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Siji A.
Moore, Note, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to
Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L.J. 197, 224 (2008)
(providing an argument posed by the MPC).
187.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore,
supra note 186, at 224.
188.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore,
supra note 186, at 224.
189.
Olsen, supra note 48, at 404 (discussing recent revisions of statutory rape
laws).
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teenagers to be just.190 Even these Romeo and Juliet exceptions, however, do
not do enough to protect teenagers from the severe consequences of statutory
rape laws.191
B.
Why Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law Does Not Do Enough to
Protect Otherwise Consenting Teenagers
In the Welch case, Justice Morris, in his concurring opinion,
discussed the injustice of the appellate court’s holding that the defendant—
who was four years and two months older than his girlfriend—would be
unable to use the Romeo and Juliet exception to remove the requirement to
register as a sex offender:
This case profoundly illustrates the manifest injustice
which can result when a statute has rigid criteria that prevents a
trial judge from exercising reasonable discretion. Judge Stargel,
the trial judge in this case, attempted to exercise such discretion in
the application of this statute. The facts of this case cry out for the
result he reached. Regrettably, the requirements of the law do not
permit us to support his decision.
Is there a societal interest in prohibiting an eighteen-yearold boyfriend and fourteen-year-old girlfriend from having
consensual sexual relations? The answer to that question is
obvious; of course there is. Mr. Welch should be punished for this
behavior, and he was. However, is it really the will of the people
to label the eighteen-year-old in this situation a sex offender for
life? Is Mr. Welch who we really think of when we contemplate
the definition of what a sex offender is or should be? I doubt most
192
people would include him in this category.

Although these Romeo and Juliet laws help protect most consenting
teenagers, some teenagers continue to fall victim to the laws’ strict
construction.193 These high school seniors, because they are more than four
years older than their partners, end up receiving the same exact punishment
as much older adult sex offenders.194

190.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354.
191.
See State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634–35 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.)
(Morris, J., concurring), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
192.
Id.
193.
See, e.g., id.
194.
See, e.g., id.
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We need to use a common sense approach here: There is no
substantive difference between a relationship in which an offender is 3 years
and 364 days older than his or her partner and a relationship where an
offender is four years and one day older than his or her partner. Even if there
were a substantive difference, it surely should not amount to enough of a
difference that one party be labeled a sex offender, while the other party is
not. According to Florida’s statutory rape laws, however, this distinction is
justifiable.195
VIII.

THE SOLUTION

Kaitlyn is not a sexual predator who sought to take advantage of a
younger girl.196 Kaitlyn is just a girl who had a crush on her friend.197 There
is no doubt that when looking from the outside in, there seems to be a
difference in maturity between an eighteen-year-old and a fourteen-yearold.198 But who is to say that all teenagers act their own age? When Kaitlyn
was asked whether she thought it was wrong of her to be in a sexual
relationship with her girlfriend because of their age difference, she responded
“‘that she did not think about it because (redacted) acted older.’”199 Instead
of sentencing teenagers like Kaitlyn to fifteen years in prison—a punishment
that has not been shown to prevent consenting teens from beginning sexual
relationships200—we should lower the sentences for consenting teenagers and
provide services to help both the offender and the victim understand the
consequences and risks that come with entering into a sexual relationship.201
If our true intent is to prevent teenagers from having sex at such an
early age, there needs to be a more beneficial outcome than locking teenagers
in prison for fifteen years and robbing many of them of promising futures. It
would not be surprising in the least if neither Kaitlyn nor her girlfriend knew
that they were even breaking the law.202 This lack of effectiveness in
deterring underage sex is the statute’s biggest flaw.203
While Kaitlyn may still be able to apply the Romeo and Juliet statute
to remove her sex offender registration requirement, she still faces up to

195.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354.
196.
See Barchenger, supra note 1.
197.
See id.
198.
See id.
199.
Id.
200.
Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining the ineffectiveness of rape
laws in regards to consenting teenagers); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 800.04.
201.
See, e.g., Stine, supra note 15, at 1211–12, 1214–16, 1224–25.
202.
See Barchenger, supra note 1.
203.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354; Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–14.
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fifteen years in prison.204 Not all teenagers charged with statutory rape will
be as lucky—if you can call it that—as they may be slightly too old to use
the Romeo and Juliet exception.205 Instead of using such a strict numbering
system to determine whether a teenager should be labeled a sex offender, a
totality of the circumstances approach should be implemented to determine
so.
Whether the teenagers were in the same high school, whether they
shared the same friends, whether the older partner truly had good
intentions—this is information that is important and should actually be
weighed in the legal process. The current Romeo and Juliet laws do not take
these essential factors into account, and for that reason, the true intention of
the Romeo and Juliet exception is not being realized.206
IX.

CONCLUSION

Since Kaitlyn was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a
minor, her case has received national media attention.207 Society can clearly
see the wrong in Kaitlyn facing such a harsh punishment.208 And though she
will likely escape her sex offender registration requirement,209 the teenagers
who fall beyond the Romeo and Juliet law’s four-year limit will be provided
no such legal protection.210 Until Florida makes a change, these unlucky
teenagers will continue to be treated the same as the sexual predators that
society and the legislature intended to label as sex offenders.211
Labeling a teenager a sex offender is not a decision that should be
dependent solely on something as insignificant as a birthday. To the person
who argues that a line needs to be drawn somewhere, I say, draw it
somewhere else.

204.
Barchenger, supra note 1; Slifer, supra note 2.
205.
See, e.g., State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
206.
See, e.g., id. at 634–35 (Morris, J., concurring).
207.
Slifer, supra note 2.
208.
Barchenger, supra note 1.
209.
Slifer, supra note 2.
210.
State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
211.
See Barchenger, supra note 1.
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